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A Note on Transliteration 
  
 Arabic names and terms have been transliterated to the spelling that is most prominent in 
similar scholarship and literature without using letters or marks outside of the English alphabet. 
Most transliterated Arabic words have been italicized to visually distinguish these words and 
highlight foreign vocabulary. As much as possible I have allowed for words to take their English 
form. Some of the Arabic terminology has, in fact, been incorporated as official words of the 
English language, yet I have chosen to differentiate these words with italicization nevertheless. 
By re-representing words like jihad as foreign, though it may be found in the English dictionary, 
I hope to symbolically divorce such a term from the connotations it carries to encourage a 
rediscovery of its meaning in its original contexts. 
Some Arabic words particularly pertaining to Islamic jurisprudence carry a weight that is 
often lost in translation. Where it has been possible, I have examined original sources in Arabic 
such as the Qur‟an and the Hamas Charter to point out vocabulary that is central to 
understanding the significance of text beyond what is conveyed in translation to English alone. 
While there are no capital letters in Arabic, certain proper nouns in Islamic terminology 
have been capitalized to indicate veneration in the same way we capitalize God and the Bible.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Transnational terrorist attacks of recent decades have brought Islamist militancy to the 
forefront of the world‟s security concerns. Radical Islamist organizations like al-Qaeda that 
advocate violence as a means for establishing an Islamic state dominate public perception of 
Islam in Western societies. After the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11
th
, 2001, there exists a 
tendency to judge the legitimacy of the Islamic message by the terrorist attacks of al-Qaeda and 
the jihad preached by Osama bin Laden. This assumption coincides with the common 
misconception that jihad translates to a “holy war,” to kill or convert all nonbelievers. This brand 
of holy war, combined with the modern legacy of the Christian equivalent, the Crusades, has 
propagated the theory that Judeo-Christian societies of the West are inherently at odds with 
Islamic societies of the East in a “clash of civilizations”.1 On the other hand, such attention has 
                                                          
1Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72:3 (1993): 22-49. 
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led to genuine desire to learn about and understand Islam in this context. I have found myself 
among those asking what is Islam? And how does Islam advocate destruction, murder, and war? 
Over the course of the last decade, scholarship on militancy in Islam has taken off in attempts to 
answer such questions.  
An attempt at understanding the ways in which Islam promotes militancy requires an 
examination of the Islamic tradition as well as its fruition in modern and historical conflicts. 
Furthermore, in such a study, one is immediately reminded that the concept of religious 
campaigns of violence and war is not unique to Islam. Indeed, the rhetoric of contemporary 
Islamists is rich with historical allusion to the Crusades that began at the end of the 11
th
 century. 
My personal experience during my studies in Jordan further elucidated this element of the 
collective memory of Muslims in the Middle East.  
While I was enjoying a leisurely Thursday afternoon floating on the Dead Sea, a boy 
called out to me from the shore. Excited by the opportunity to practice the colloquial Jordanian 
Arabic I was studying, I returned his greeting appropriately and we struck up a conversation.  
When he eventually asked me if I was Muslim – a common question I faced as a foreigner 
studying in the Middle East – I told him no, I am mesihi, a Christian. He didn‟t understand. 
Yehudi? he postulated, asking if I was Jewish. I told him no, repeated myself, mesihi, and added 
an attempt to explain using the Arabic name for Jesus. At his next guess I was pretty taken 
aback, salibi? Literally meaning “person of the cross,” I recognized this as the Arabic term for a 
crusader. For lack of a better way to communicate my religion, I told them yes, but explained 
that mesihi was a better word. The rest of our conversation was nothing out of the ordinary in my 
experience making small talk with Palestinian children: They ask me where I‟m from, I reply 
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that I‟m American, they ask why my government is friends with the Jews and hates Muslims, I 
offer a vain attempt at diplomacy in my limited vocabulary, and we go our separate ways.  
 At the end of my semester, I came home with a very favorable impression of a society 
that hated the American government (almost exclusively for its pro-Israel stance), but welcomed 
the American people. However, among Palestinians, whose displaced or refugee families account 
for over half of Jordan‟s population, I found traces of a deeply pervasive view that Islam is under 
attack today, and has been continually since Pope Urban II first called for the Christians of 
Europe to take back the Holy Land from the Muslims in 1095. Being called a “crusader” by a 
child demonstrated to me that “a Muslim does not have to be an extreme Islamist to hold the 
view that the west is still engaged in crusading.”2 Observing the ubiquitous nature of this lexicon 
for myself gave me a personal desire for understanding the Crusades as both a historical series of 
events and as a compliment in Christianity to my interest in the relationship between religion and 
violence with regard to Islam.  
As both jihad and crusading are commonly conceived of as the concepts of Holy War in 
Islam and Christianity respectively, I believe it is relevant to examine the degree to which they 
fit the criteria of Just War. How do the Crusades and Counter-Crusades qualify as legitimate 
within their own religious doctrines and corresponding concepts of Just War? And, in the same 
regard, how does religion not only define circumstances in which violence can be considered 
justified, but also act as an ideological stimulus or driving purpose for waging campaigns of 
violence? How has religion, the foundation of the Just War tradition, become inspiration for the 
terrorist attacks of al-Qaeda? In the medieval period, the Crusades and Counter-Crusades provide 
                                                          
2
Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades, Christianity, and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 76. 
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examples of religious justifications for violence in two different contexts. While both campaigns 
contained elements that were reactionary in nature, the extent to which the Crusades can be 
considered defensive is questionable.  
Making the distinction between waging a proactive war based on a theologically 
conceived sense of purpose and taking defensive measures in circumstances that qualify violence 
as legitimate is important in understanding how the theory of Just War applies in contemporary 
conflicts as well. In review of today‟s violent movements of jihad, militant Islamism takes on a 
variety of forms that all seek to justify violence with theological doctrine. Two of the most 
prominent movements are the Islamic Resistance Movement (better known for its Arabic 
acronym, Hamas) and the transnational terrorist network of al-Qaeda. The violent resistance of 
the former against the foreign incursion of Zionists has been continual, local, and defensive in 
nature since the first wave of Zionist settlers arrived under the British mandate in the 1920s. 
Under the same banner of Islam, the terrorist attacks of the al-Qaeda network over the past two 
decades are transnational, indiscriminate, and unprecedented. Despite the differences in 
methodology, both groups claim that their respective campaigns of jihad are legitimate, and even 
obligatory, under Islamic law. The argument for religious justification of Hamas‟s jihad against 
the Israeli state is takes precedence from the historical Counter-Crusades that sought to defend 
against the European crusaders and they seized control of Muslim territories. Ironically, the 
ideology and militancy of al-Qaeda more closely resemble that of the Crusades; they both call 
for the liberation of the Holy Land from the treacherous occupation of the infidels by means of a 
violent overseas campaign. To be sure, the ways in which the Crusaders and al-Qaeda militants 
seek to justify their causes within their respective religions are as different as the religious 
traditions themselves. But the two movements do share a common context in the form of a 
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vindictive campaign viewed as a religious obligation to liberate foreign and sacred lands from 
oppression. In the case of defensive campaigns of violence, the degree of legitimacy is more 
clear-cut within both Christian and Islamic doctrines. For the other sort of reactionary war – 
those waged because of perceived religious obligation to liberate or vindicate – any claim to 
legitimacy in Just War theory must be questioned on historical, theological, and theoretical 
grounds. 
The first chapter introduces classical concepts of Just War in Christianity and Islam as a 
lens through which to examine the phenomenon of religiously justified violence in the historical 
and contemporary case studies. The development of Christian theory of Just War, beginning with 
Saint Augustine and carried onward by such theologians as Thomas Aquinas, establishes the 
circumstances in which violence is justified clearly and with general consensus among scholars. 
An attempt to define a corresponding theory in Islam must take into account the nature of fiqh, or 
Islamic jurisprudence as well as the political and military contexts in which classical scholars 
interpreted the Qur‟an and Sunna to issue valid judgments. John Kelsay‟s book Arguing the Just 
War in Islam provides a comprehensive and logically organized overview for understanding the 
fundamental elements of jihad and ethical warfare in the Islamic tradition throughout history.
3
 
Chapters Two and Three discuss the justifications for the Crusades within Christianity 
and the same for the Counter-Crusades within Islam in the historical period from the end of the 
11
th
 through the 14
th
 centuries. Chapter Two discusses first the driving factors behind the 
Crusades on an institutional and individual level. In doing so, it is necessary to distinguish 
between common misunderstandings or mythology and historical evidence. By the arguments of 
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John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), (hereafter cited as 
Arguing). 
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contemporary historians, sociological, economic, and political purposes all fall short of 
explicating what can only accurately be classified as a religious campaign. In examining the 
theological justification for the Crusades at the institutional level, the argument that Pope Urban 
II presented in his issuing of the initial call to the Christians of Europe at the Council of 
Clermont in 1095 is of particular relevance. The Augustinian principles of just cause, legitimate 
authority, and right intention in conjunction with canon law and precedents of Gregorian holy 
war have relatively visible manifestations in the Crusades. However, drawing simple parallels 
prior to objective discussion runs the risk of oversimplification for the sake of convenience. 
Therefore, this chapter first methodologically examines the rationale behind and justification for 
the endeavor at the institutional level and the motives behind its popularity among individuals 
before drawing conclusions and connections to the more formalized notion of Just War. 
Chapter Three discusses the opposing movement by Muslims and the new developments 
in medieval Islamic jurisprudence that sought to determine the theological legitimacy of fighting 
the crusader threat. This chapter discusses the revival of jihad doctrine as a political tool by 
historical figures such as Saladin and examine to some extent how the actual military campaigns 
adhered to or departed from classical doctrines of jihad. This raises the second element of 
medieval jihad:  the theologically ordained doctrines on warfare and their role in forming the 
trajectory of the Islamic Just War concept. The Islamic jurisprudence regarding militancy in the 
Middle Ages, particularly by Ibn Taymiyya, established important ideological and historical 
precedents in the Islamic tradition that had lasting implications for the modern period. 
The fourth chapter fills in the gap between the historical and present-day case studies 
with a discussion of the significant developments in the age of European imperialism and post-
colonialism that contributed to the emergence of contemporary Islamist militant movements. The 
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first element of Chapter Four is a selective overview of various historical encounters between 
Western imperialist powers and Muslim polities in the form of colonialism and the post-WWI 
mandates. This section pays particular attention to the case of Palestine and the resistance of the 
Muslim Palestinians to Zionist settlement. The interaction between the modernizing forces of the 
West and the Islamic world during this period was crucial in empowering neo-jurists and 
spreading their ideologies on a global scale through the technological processes introduced that 
increased availability of books, and the resulting increase in literacy rates. This chapter examines 
the ideologies of three notable neo-jurists, Hasan al-Banna, Abul A‟la Mawdudi, and Sayyid 
Qutb, and their roles in the radicalization of jihad doctrines. 
In a way, the jihad campaign of Hamas claims legitimacy by virtue of the historical and 
political precedent of defending Muslim lands from foreign invasion. However, Hamas operates 
in a different historical context and with a dramatically different tactics. Chapter Five discusses 
how Hamas uses historical context and the ideology of neo-jurists to justify their campaign of 
jihad against Israel within Islamic law. In Hamas‟s “Charter of Allah: The Platform of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement”, the attempt to justify their armed struggle against Israel 
combines the theological tradition of Islamic jurisprudence and the historical precedent of 
combating Western incursion. In analyzing the Charter, the theological influences behind 
Hamas‟s ideology can be seen in the form Qur‟anic citation and neo-jurist doctrines woven 
throughout.  Secondly, this chapter examines the actual policies pursued and their justifying 
arguments since the founding ideology was published in 1988. Ultimately, this chapter questions 
the extent the jihad waged by Hamas is legitimate in the Islamic tradition and consistent with the 
organization‟s own Charter. 
8 
 
Chapter Six asks the same question of the jihad preached by Osama bin Laden and the 
terrorist network al-Qaeda. What elements of the theological base for al-Qaeda arise from the 
tradition of Islamic jurisprudence? Which elements result from the modern influences of neo-
jurists? The first topic addressed in this chapter will be the transition from waging defensive 
wars to promoting overseas attacks on distant Western powers. Azzam‟s doctrine for offensive 
jihad and Qutb‟s call for jihad of liberation emphasize that Islam does not only justify, but 
obligates Muslims to wage war beyond defensive engagements.  How does this jihad doctrine 
measure up against the traditional concept of Just War in Islam? Is Osama bin Laden a legitimate 
authority to declare jihad and issue fatwas because of his role in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s? 
How could a “Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” be in accordance with Islamic law when it 
targets civilians and engages in suicide tactics?
4
 This chapter examines the strategies and 
doctrines of al-Qaeda against the group‟s contemporary counterpart in Hamas, and the historical 
campaigns of the Crusades and Counter-Crusades, and the Just War concept in Islam. 
This study is a comparative analysis of the varying approaches by which modern Islamist 
militancy movements attempt to justify their respective use of violent jihad within Islamic 
doctrine. This focus is contextualized by a broader study of the historical role of religion in the 
development of modern ethical standards for warfare and justifications for horrific bloodshed 
and injustice. The relationship between the driving ideologies behind the Crusades and global 
terrorist attacks is characterized by ideological similarities as well as reciprocal hostility. The 
commonalities in religious justifications for violence shared by Christianity and Islam in both the 
historical and contemporary conflicts demonstrate the different ways in which the respective 
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Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, trans. James Howarth (London: 
Verso, 2005), (hereafter cited as Messages). 
9 
 
principles of Just War manifested themselves in the actual military campaigns of the Crusades 
and jihad.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Just War Concept in Christianity and Islam 
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of Just War suggests that under a given set of circumstances, it is permitted, 
and even obligatory, to wage war. This idea has pervaded the philosophical traditions of both 
Western and Eastern cultures as well as theological discourse in both Christianity and Islam. The 
criteria of a Just War in modern thought are relatively well known: not least among them, just 
cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality, military necessity, 
reasonable chance of success, and non-combatant immunity. However, it was the medieval 
concept of Just War by which European Christians justified the Crusades, and thus it is the 
developments of Just War theory up until this point that bear the most relevance to this 
discussion. The classical and medieval ideas of Just War that provided a theological basis for the 
Crusades may seem archaic or even barbaric in relation to modern theory. It is clear that the 
concept of Just War has changed drastically as it developed over time. That said, the non-
religious, moral, or secular modern theories of Just War naturally surface as each case, the 
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Christian Crusades and the Muslim Counter-Crusades of both old and new, continue to shape 
modern consciousness and conflicts.  
The process of formulating theological doctrine differs significantly between the two 
religions due to the structures, or lack thereof, of religious authority. For the first millennium of 
Christianity, the Roman pontiff acted as the infallible Vicar of Christ on earth for all Christians. 
Even after the Great Schism that produced the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox 
Church and until the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation that began in the 15
th
 century, 
European Christians faithfully followed their leaders within Church hierarchy with a sincere 
conviction that papal edicts carried as much weight as the lessons of the scriptures themselves.  
The question of religious leadership in Islam, on the other hand, has been a point of contention 
since the fourth and final “Righteously Guided” caliphate ended in a civil war, or the first fitna, 
that created permanent divisions in Islam. Shia Muslims hold that the only legitimate leader held 
a direct connection to the Prophet‟s bloodline. The majority of Shia Muslims believe that after 
the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam and until his return, there can be no legitimate caliphate. 
Without a legitimate caliphate or imam, there is no legitimate temporal authority for declaring 
any kind of jihad besides that of defense.
1
 For this reason and for the purpose of studying the 
tradition that produced the Counter-Crusades specific to this study, this discussion will focus on 
the tradition of justifying war by Islamic jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. 
The four main schools of classical jurisprudence in Sunni Islam differ mostly in day to 
day specifics such as prayer rituals rather than fundamental religious doctrine. Their real 
                                                          
1Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History,” in Cross, Crescent, and 
Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, ed. James Turker Johnson and 
John Kelsay (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
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contribution was, over the course of centuries, the institutionalization of the practice of fiqh.
2
 
Rather than viewing these schools in opposition, it is best to review their contributions to war 
doctrine as amendment and development. Fiqh can be described as the practice of shari‟a 
reasoning, or the “science of religious law in Islam,” an undertaking reserved for the class of 
learned Muslim scholars, the „ulama, with the purpose of determining how to live in accordance 
with the will of God.
3 
Traditionally, fiqh consists of four main elements; in order of decreasing 
authority and importance, the Qur‟an, the sunna, ijma‟, and qiyas.4 The Qur‟an is the book of 
divine revelation as related through the Prophet Muhammad and is considered the inviolate word 
of God. The importance of shari‟a to Islam, and the importance of the Qur‟an to shari‟a, can be 
observed in its stated purpose of the divine revelation to “command the good and forbid the 
wrong.”5  Sunna, meaning habit or custom, denotes the exemplary precedents set by the Prophet 
as primarily transmitted through the hadith, the records of his various sayings and actions. Ijma‟, 
the consensus of the umma or the Muslim community, and qiyas, reasoning by analogy, carry 
less weight and more debate because they are viewed as susceptible to error in their reliance on 
human judgment. 
Though not officially considered part of Islamic jurisprudence, ijtihad, or individual 
reasoning deserves just as much attention for its instrumental role in the formulation of modern 
militant doctrine. With the onset of modernity in the Muslim world during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries and the subsequent increases in literacy and availability of Islamic texts, ijtihad was 
responsible for undermining the juristic authority of the „ulama and empowering unqualified 
                                                          
2
Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 26 (hereafter cited as Political Islam). 
3
Encyclopedia of Islam, 2
nd
 ed., http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/uid=1492/entry?entry=islam_SIM-2364. 
4
Though still of lesser religious authority than the Qur‟an, the Sunna is less abstract and just as important a source 
for jurists who seek to derive practical doctrine from the divine sources. 
5Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History.” 
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Muslims in professions outside the field of Islamic law.
6
 Historical and political circumstances 
continually influenced the process of shari‟a reasoning on war and jihad since the beginning of 
the tradition after the death of the Prophet, constantly being reviewed, revised, and amended to 
cope with new questions in new times. 
Both Christian and Muslim medieval theological jurisprudence established foundations of 
the Just War concept rather than timeless comprehensive doctrines. The consensus of early 
Muslim jurists established roughly correlating principles to the Augustinian tradition of Just 
War. In both Early Islamic and medieval Christian thought, jus ad bellum required just cause, 
legitimate authority, and right intention while jus in bello provided some exclusion of non-
combatants from intentional harm. These elements describe the context of religious ethical 
rulings on warfare at time of the Crusades‟ birth and the Counter-Crusade response. 
 
The Foundations of Just War Theory in Christian Theology 
 
Western discourse on the morality of war and killing began before Christianity with 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. The term “just war” was first coined by Aristotle to 
convey the idea of war as a means to secure peace and prosperity through self-defense against 
conquest of barbaric civilizations.
7
 War became almost a legal practice under Roman law, 
leaving a judicial sense of “just cause” as its major contribution to Just War theory. After 
Emperor Constantine was baptized in 313 C.E., Saint Ambrose Christianized Cicero‟s De 
Officiis, combining Christian morality and the previously established Roman ethics to offer the 
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Ayoob, Political Islam, 27. 
7
Franck H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 4. 
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newly baptized emperor guidance for every aspect of governance, including war.
8
 Roman law 
served as a political backbone for the Just War concept while Christianity provided a basis for 
the moral elements of the doctrine. 
The first theologian to present a comprehensive Christian Just War concept was Saint 
Augustine of Hippo. Writing around the turn of the 5
th
 century, Augustine sought to reconcile the 
previously considered pacifist New Testament Christian values of patience and peace with the 
vengeful violence of the Old Testament. In line with the theme exhibited in the Old Testament of 
divine punishment for sinning, Augustine wrote “the single most important statements of the 
later medieval theories: „iusta bella ulciscuntur iniurias,‟ just wars avenge injuries.”9 Augustine 
insisted that such punishment is an act of love to reconcile the guilt of the transgressor through 
Old Testament sense of divine justice. This theory, which Alfred Vanderpol terms “vindictive 
justice,” describes “positive acts,” violent if necessary, intended to restore divine order.10 The 
Augustinian concept of vindictive justice teeters on the fringe of aggression; though still a 
reactive response, the extent to which it can be considered defensive is clearly questionable. 
However, the requirement that a just war be defensive in nature is a much later development in 
the evolution of the Western Just War tradition. Historian Frank Russell makes the important 
observation that “Augustine‟s just war did not attempt to distinguish between offensive and 
defensive warfare,” only just and unjust.11 Whereas the need to protect others out of love and 
responsibility for them logically justifies defensive violence to repel enemy aggression, offensive 
warfare or vindictive justice finds legitimacy through the belief that it is divine commandment. 
                                                          
8
Louise J. Swift, “St. Ambrose on Violence and War,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association 101 (1970): 522-543. 
9Joachim Von Elbe, “The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,” The American Journal of 
International Law 33:4 (1939): 668. 
10
James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 54 (hereafter cited as Holy War). 
11
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 21. 
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Critical to the Augustinian concept of vindictive Just War are the concepts of right 
intention, of those waging the war and the temporal authority declaring it, and a right authority, 
the sovereign who declares war out of moral responsibility in accordance with the will of God. 
By Augustine‟s theory, a private campaign to punish a wrong-doer was sinful because the inward 
disposition of the avenger is personal hate toward the offender. According to Augustine, even if 
a person kills an aggressor out of self-defense, the act is unjust because such violence is 
personally, not divinely, motivated. A campaign of vindictive justice employs warriors who kill 
out of obedience to divine authority with a higher purpose of restoring peace and justice. Thus, 
an inward disposition of love and obedience to God‟s will redeems the outward disposition of the 
individuals engaged in fighting a Just War to the extent that it cannot be considered a violation of 
the Sixth Commandment: Thou shalt not kill.
12 
The inward disposition of the belligerent and 
obedience to a cause of justice qualifies as an essential element of the Just War: right intention. 
For Augustine, there was nothing inherently evil about war and death; the tragic sin of warfare 
was the seduction of violence – the bloodlust, hatred, and cruelty that poisoned the souls of men 
at war.
13
 Right intention means for a campaign of violence to be considered just, the temporal 
authority and the individuals engaged must fight out of a motivation of love and with care to 
minimize suffering of enemy combatants. 
Augustine equates the authority of the secular ruler with divine mandate to argue that 
legitimate wars of vindictive justice declared by a political authority are justified by the 
assumption that such authority represents God‟s will on earth and that the authority is inherently 
                                                          
12
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 22-23. In response to the Christian doctrine of pacifism, Just War 
theorists like to point out that the meaning of the word translated as “kill” has a closer meaning to the English word 
“murder” in the original Hebrew. 
13
Riley-Smith, The Crusades, Christianity, and Islam, 13. 
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insusceptible to whims of violent passion.
14
 Augustine (and the theologians to build on his 
theories in the centuries to follow such as Thomas Aquinas) referred to the biblical passage 
Romans 13:4, which states that “He [the prince] is minister of God to execute his wrath on the 
evildoer.”15 The issue of right authority can be considered “the most crucial issue in any just war 
theory,” because it justifies both individual and institutional violence in campaigns of vindictive 
justice.
16
 
What kinds of iniurias are significant enough to warrant violent vindication? Simply put, 
“War was justified when a people or city neglected either to punish wrongs done by its members 
or to restore what it had unjustly seized.”17 However, in the view of Augustine and the Church, 
any perceived injustice against the Church or Christianity qualified as usurpation of the moral 
order on earth, which in turn reflects divine order. It was the duty of temporal leaders to uphold 
this order that hinged on the sovereignty of the Christian patria. Thus, the injury need not be 
done to the party waging the just war so long as it fights for the restoration of peace and justice. 
Augustine‟s definition of just cause is defined as either punitive or restorative, as a part of 
vindictive justice.  
 The three criteria first established by Augustine and expanded upon by later canonists 
and theologians – legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention – all constituted indicators 
for justifying a decision to engage in a given violent conflict. Fulfillment of these three 
conditions assures that there is jus ad bellum, a right to wage war. However, any morally 
responsible institution (or theory) risks atrocity if it permits war without overarching limitations 
or a code of conduct. The element of Just War theory that performs this function, known as jus in 
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Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 68. 
15
Johnson, Holy War, 53. 
16
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 68. 
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Ibid., 18. 
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bello, seeks to define the limits to the conduct in war. A fundamental element of jus in bello in 
contemporary theory is that the warring party must observe special protection for civilian non-
combatants, women, and children, innocents who constitute no threat by their inability to do 
harm. However, in Augustinian theory, the inability of non-combatants to inflict injury and lack 
of guilt is irrelevant to the nature of vindictive justice. Even status as an enemy combatant has no 
necessary correlation to the injustice of the enemy party. The complexity of Augustine‟s 
argument about innocence is best explained by Richard Hartigan– “though enemy soldiers may 
be killed in a just war, this is permitted in order to restore justice, not because they are morally 
guilty, for it is likely that they may be completely innocent of injustice.”18 Hartigan also notes 
that this stance is consistent with Augustine‟s definition of the soldier as a “passionless agent of 
the public authority” and that the injustice of an authority in no way condemns his subjects to the 
same guilt.
19
 Hartigan argues that because the individual enemies‟ innocence and guilt are 
irrelevant, so too is the distinction between soldiers and non-combatants.
20
 While Augustine does 
not present protection of non-combatants as a clear element of his Just War doctrine, the concept 
of right intention seems to be the redeeming element. 
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Augustine‟s role as the theologian who first articulated the beginnings of Western Just 
War theory is recognized in retrospect. The influence of his theological doctrine peaked at the 
end of the 5
th
 century as the political policies pursued by the Church took precedence.  
Ecclesiastical officials who sought to consolidate Church power, such as Pope Gregory the Great 
at the turn of the 7
th
 century, pursued the wars against heretics and barbarians justified by 
Augustinian doctrine.
21
 The “far-reaching imperial program of religious, moral and political 
authority” of the Christian Emperor Charlemagne (8th-9th centuries) gained legitimacy from 
Gregorian edict as together they sought to pursue righteousness through military enforced 
justice.
22
 The emergence of the just cause of “defense of the patria” was championed by the 9th 
century Pope Nicholas I, as the notion of self-defense became assumed as an inalienable right to 
individuals, kings, and religious entities. The papal proclamations of the 11
th
 century also 
contributed to the development of Christian ethical code in warfare with the Truce of God and 
the Peace of God. Forbidding non-defensive fighting on holy days and violence against clergy, 
nuns, peasants, orphans and church property respectively, these two doctrines sought to limit 
violence between warring Christian Europeans with a policy of protecting those that pose no 
threat.
23
  
The notion of defense as a just cause for going to war became explicit in the 12
th
 century, 
as the canonist Gratian infused Augustinian the Roman notion of a defensive war to protect the 
patria, be it homeland or Church, from enemy aggression. In the 13th century, the ethicist, 
philosopher, and theologian Thomas Aquinas expanded on this idea of defense as a part of just 
cause. Johnson writes of Aquinas‟s contribution here, “Punishment of evil and retaking that 
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which has been wrongly taken are thus two specific justifying causes within this larger 
conception of defense of the common good.”24 It is significant that defense of the common good, 
as a third element of just cause, developed in the Christian Just War tradition well after the 
beginning of the Crusades. Though Augustine acknowledged the defense of the patria and the 
divine order qualified as a just cause, the need for the campaign to be militarily defensive was 
absent from the Just War tradition at the time Pope Urban II made the call to the Christians of 
Europe at the end of the 11
th
 century. 
 
War in Early Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
As the most sacred source of divine teaching in Islam, the Qur‟an is the fundamental 
source of guidance in shari‟a. The revelation of the Qur‟an to the Prophet Muhammad occurred 
over the span of ten years, some while he was in Mecca, and then some after he fled to Medina in 
622 to seek refuge from persecution. In Medina, the Prophet became not only a religious leader 
but also a statesman and military commander. Accordingly, the divine guidance given to the 
Prophet in Medina served a different purpose than it had in the previous climate. The Qur‟anic 
verses on war (commonly referred to as the Sword Verses), along with the Sunna of the 
Prophet‟s wartime actions and decrees, sanction violence “always with the caveat of restraint,” 
and within the context of warfare.
 25
 These elements of the holy sources of Islamic text establish 
the basis of the concept of Just War in Islam. Sura 3, verses 190-193 is one of the most often 
cited passages, which commands Muslims: 
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“Fight in the cause of God those who fight against you, but do not commit aggression, for God 
loves not the aggressors. And fight them where you meet them and expel them from where they 
expelled you, for oppression is more evil than killing, but do not fight them at the Holy Place of 
Worship unless they fight you there, and if they fight you then fight them, thus is the reward for 
the disbelievers. But if they cease then God is much-forgiving and merciful. And fight them until 
there is no more dissent and there is worship for God alone, but if they cease then no hostility 
except against those who do evil.”26 
This fundamental doctrine of restraint commands Muslims to engage in defensive warfare when 
attacked. The more complex and controversial subject of war doctrine in Islamic jurisprudence is 
that of jihad and waging offensive campaigns.  
For all its usage in military context, jihad does not mean fighting (or “holy war” as 
commonly misconceived) eo ipso. The majority of its usage in the Qur‟an and Sunna, however, 
is explicitly military in nature. Yet the peaceful notions of jihad must not be overlooked. 
Accordingly, the striving or struggle in the cause of God that jihad refers to has been classified 
by jurists to be of four types: jihad “of the heart (faith), that of the tongue (right speech), that of 
the hand (good works) and finally, that of the sword ([warfare]).”27 Furthermore, the Prophet 
himself referred to spiritual struggle to purify oneself as the “higher” or “greater” jihad.28 Thus 
in different contexts, jihad can refer to both violent and non-violent efforts. The question of 
whether or not jihad doctrine is to be interpreted empirically or in respect to its context continues 
to effect modern shari‟a debate. 
Classical Islamic thought divides the world into two abodes: the abode of submission to 
God (dar al-Islam) and the abode of war (dar al-harb). The concept of these two realms 
distinguished between territories under Muslim rule and foreign territories where Islam has yet to 
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establish order and peace. The militant element of shari‟a reasoning sought to define the way to 
wage war justly both in defense of the ruling Islamic polity as well as in expanding dar al-Islam. 
The classical notion of jihad, used mostly in the context of “striving in the path of God” in the 
Qur‟an, pertains to establishing the rule of God and expanding the dar al-Islam. This more 
idealistic purpose distinguishes between the everyday justification for force within the dar al-
Islam to maintain the peace, such as military action to fight rebellion, apostasy, and crime. Jihad 
for the expansion of the Islamic realm and the fight against disbelief has stronger religious and 
ideological connotations more closely related to an offensive, external campaign.
29
 
In the early tradition Islamic jurisprudence, the nature of the jihad as a defensive or 
offensive campaign determined whether or not the task was an individual or communal 
obligation.  Through study of the Qur‟an and Sunna, the early jurists seemed to agree that each 
Muslim had the obligation to participate in the jihad declared by the imam, the religious leader of 
the umma, in defense of the Muslim community or Islam as a religion.  On the other hand, 
“offensive military jihad was defined as a community obligation, only to be undertaken by the 
authority of the head of the [Muslim] community, the imam.”30 In the case of an offensive 
campaign into the dar al-harb, individuals were permitted and encouraged, but not obligated to 
take part. An example of the Qur‟an corroborates this claim: 
 “Those who sit idle and unhurt do not equal those who strive in the path of God with their 
possessions and their lives: God exalted those who strive with their possessions and lives a level 
above those who sit idle. And God has promised good for all [Muslims], but God has exalted those 
who strive over those who sit idle with a great reward.”31 
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The Qur‟an clearly encourages jihad, but it is not incumbent upon every Muslim – all believers 
are promised the ultimate good, even those who are passive. Many verses of the Qur‟an and 
examples from the Sunna prescribe jihad as obligatory action, but to be waged collectively at the 
auspices of an Islamic authority, not individually. Sunni jurists also came to the consensus that it 
was the duty of the imam to wage jihad in the dar al-harb at least once a year, barring 
extraordinary circumstance that rendered such an undertaking impractical.
32
  
Classical Islamic scholars like Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the Maliki school, offered 
the argument that jihad is a noble deed encouraged by the Prophet, but not personally obligatory. 
Malik ibn Anas, wrote a chapter of his jurisprudential work, al-Muwatta‟, on jihad in the Sunna. 
Malik‟s chapter clearly establishes that the Prophet urged others to take up the sword and wage 
jihad. The Prophet is quoted as giving the following exhortations: 
“Someone who does jihad in the way of Allah is like someone who fasts and prays constantly and 
does not slacken from his prayer and fasting until he returns.”33 
“The Prophet of God said: „One who spends his wealth in the cause of the Lord will be called on 
at the gate of heaven. . . The man of prayer will be admitted from the prayer gate, the man of 
fighting will be admitted from the fighting gate, and the man of fasting from the gate of fasting.‟ 
Abu Bakr al-Siddiq said: „Prophet of God, for a man who is called from one gate, there would be 
no trouble, but would there be one who is called from all the gates?‟ The Prophet of God said: 
„Yes, and I would hope you would be among them.‟”34 
These early accounts of the Prophet‟s teachings on war provided the basis for the argument that 
jihad is an essential part of being Muslim. However, fighting is not the only way to fulfill the call 
for jihad – interpretation of such doctrine must take into consideration the different types of 
jihad and the Prophet‟s declaration that the jihad of the soul was the “higher” jihad. 
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            One of the writings of al-Shaybani, a jurist of the Hanafi school in the 8
th
 century, takes 
the Western terminology “law of nations,” as it describes the role of the state in its relationship 
with external communities.
35
 Drawing on the previously established division of the two abodes, 
dar al-harb and dar al-Islam, Shaybani defines the circumstances in which war is legitimate. The 
requirement that the imam, act as the commander-in-chief of the entire Muslim community, 
authorizing and overseeing the execution of warfare, reflects the concept of legitimate authority. 
The classical equivalent of just cause is summarized by John Kelsay:  
“The purpose of war is the establishment of the governance of an Islamic state. That state, in turn, 
finds its purpose in connection with the Muslim community‟s mission of calling human beings to 
Islam. A just war must be tied to these purposes.”36 
Furthermore, war is only an appropriate recourse after other means of promoting Islam have 
failed. An invitation to the enemy to lay down arms and accept Muslim rule, known as the 
da‟wa, is a necessary precursor to taking military action. The dhimmi, or protected people of 
Abrahamic faiths (Jews and Christians) were also afforded the chance to pay tribute, jizya, to 
Muslims for living peaceably under their rule before action was taken against them. Thus, “the 
jihad of the sword. . . takes second place to that of the tongue.”37 Though different from the 
modern Just War concept of last resort, this policy amended the equivalent jus ad bellum 
requirements of just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention already established within the 
tradition of fiqh.  
As for the Islamic equivalent to jus in bello, classical jurists all agreed that in 
examination of the Qur‟an and Sunna, the Prophet clearly forbade cheating, acts of treachery or 
meaningless destruction, and the intentional killing of other Muslims and non-combatants. 
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However, Shaybani‟s doctrine asserts that in some practical instances, collateral damage is 
unavoidable.
38
 The jurist al-Mawardi of the 11
th
 century explains that the Prophet‟s intention 
behind the protection of women, children, and slaves was based on their status as non-
combatants. Killing a non-combatant or fellow Muslim, even if inadvertently, demands the 
transgressor to pay compensation, the same as if a Muslim were to commit a surprise attack 
without issuing the da‟wa first. In this way the doctrines of early Sunni jurists viewed religion as 
a restricting factor in both in the conduct of and decision to wage war. 
 
Holy War in the Just War Tradition 
 
Neither “crusade” nor “jihad” mean “holy war” eo ipso. However, their uses in the 
historical context of Christian and Muslim military expeditions have led to such interpretations. 
Merriam-Webster offers two definitions of “jihad” as a word of the English language: 
1: a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; also: a personal struggle in devotion to 
Islam especially involving spiritual discipline  
2: a crusade for a principle or belief
39
 
The actual translation of the Arabic word jihad appears only as a supplement – both the primary 
and secondary definitions define jihad as “a holy war” and “a crusade”. The strong relation 
between jihad and crusading is commonly reduced to that of synonymity because they both 
historically signify campaigns of holy war. 
In addition to the terminological oversimplifications, the word “oxymoron” has been used to 
describe the concept of a holy war accompanied by outrage and disgust at all the atrocities that 
                                                          
38
Kelsay, Arguing, 109. 
39
Merriam-Webster.com, s.v. “jihad,” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad. 
25 
 
have been committed in the name of God. A common pacifist position tends to reject any claim 
that violence could be part of any divine will. However, when viewed in the context of religious 
war doctrine of the Middle Ages, one finds religion to be the roots of modern Just War theory. 
The distinctions between Just War and Holy War can be viewed in relation to the distinctions 
between moral and religious doctrine respectively. With the strong influence of Christian ethics 
on Western morality and the inherent religious nature of Muslim political authority, the 
distinctions are often difficult to identify.  
In general agreement that it is a subcategory of or one of the many themes in the long 
tradition of Just War theory, several scholars have sought to define the term “holy war”. Frank 
Russell reports, “The holy war is fought for the goals or ideals of the faith and is waged by 
divine authority or on the authority of some religious leader.”40  Lloyd Steffen writes that “holy 
war refers simply to any use of force justified by appeal to divine authority.”41 Crusade historian 
Jonathan Riley-Smith writes that a just war becomes holy when it is “considered to be authorized 
directly or indirectly by God (or Christ) and as being fought to further what are believed to be his 
intentions.”42 After identifying ten examples of the meaning of holy war, James Turner Johnson 
goes into further detail to categorize what he proposes are the three characteristics of a holy war 
that distinguish it within the Just War concept:  
“. . . [1] a transcendent authority, either given directly from God or mediated through the religious 
institutions in some way . . . [2] a purpose directly associated with religion, either its defense or its 
propagation or the establishment of a social order in accord with religious requirements. . . [3] that 
the war be waged by people who are in some sense set apart, whether cultically or morally or 
simply by membership in the religious community, from those against whom the war is waged.”43 
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Extracting the similarities from the variety of definitions brings forth the idea that a just war is 
holy when the legitimate authority is divine authority and the just cause is a religious cause. 
The historical event of the Crusades embodied the notion of holy war in Christianity. 
Likewise, the current campaigns by Islamist militancy groups have allowed Islamic holy war to 
adopt the banner of jihad, when in Islam the jihad of the sword is only one element of the word‟s 
meaning. The observer must be conscious then, that the prevalent meanings of such terminology 
are a product of centuries of historical conflict and political propaganda with religious 
undertones. It is similarly important to remember that principles like last resort, proportionality, 
and reasonable chance of success are modern developments in the Just War tradition. A 
examination of the Crusades and Counter-Crusades that considers historical contexts demands 
one to set aside such notions and instead view the events within the context of theological ethical 
debate of the time. The Augustinian principles of Just War and the corresponding consensus of 
medieval Islamic jurisprudence provide the appropriate lens.
27 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Crusades: Justifications and Motivations 
 
 
 
 
 
A common story in Crusade literature tells of a vision of Saint Ambrose appearing to an 
Italian priest to inquire as to why the response to the call for the Crusades had been so prolific. 
The priest revealed his mixed feelings: 
“Different people give different reasons for this journey. Some say that in all pilgrims the desire 
for it has been aroused by God and the Lord Jesus Christ. Others maintain that the French lords 
and most of the people have begun the journey for frivolous reasons and that it was because of this 
that setbacks befell so many pilgrims in the kingdom of Hungary and in other kingdoms. And for 
that reason they cannot succeed.”1 
As expected in such a conglomerate movement of individuals from varying nations, socio-
economic classes, and backgrounds, the individual motives of the crusaders was certainly not 
monolithic. This 12
th
 century account confirms that even during the time of the Crusades, the 
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personal motivations of the knights and lay people who embarked were ambiguous. The rationale 
at the institutional level of the Church, expressed by both Pope Urban II at the campaign‟s 
inception and others who supported its later phases, has also been subject to centuries of 
historical speculation. Due to the great diversity of claims in the material available, 
demythologizing the driving forces behind the Crusades has become a primary task of many 
modern historians, not least prominent among them, Thomas Madden. Madden writes in his 
“The Real History of the Crusades” that, “misconceptions about the Crusades are all too 
common. The Crusades are generally portrayed as a series of holy wars against Islam led by 
power-mad popes and fought by religious fanatics.”2 Though Madden‟s assertions must also be 
viewed with scrutiny, his characterization of the scholastic setting gives such studies their 
relevance. For example, should it be surprising to read Maddens conclusion, that, “the Crusades 
met all the criteria of a just war, especially in their defensive nature,”?3  Having already 
discussed the theological and canonical developments in the Just War tradition up until the end 
of the 11
th
 century, it is possible to study the degree to which such doctrines were adhered to in 
the decision to embark on and the conduct of warfare within the Crusades. 
 
Divine Justification: Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont 
 
 Pope Urban II‟s sermon at the Council of Clermont explicitly made the call for the 
military expedition now known as the Crusades. However, much to the dismay of historians, 
there is no existing transcript that can be considered authentic. There are a variety of historical 
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accounts that refer to elements of the Pope‟s speech or attempt to write a word for word record, 
but the reports themselves were fragmented, variant, and even the earliest are dated after the fall 
of Jerusalem to the Crusaders in 1099.
4
 Among these, historian D.C. Munro has distinguishes the 
five most reliable reports the Pope‟s address to be those of writers who were present at the 
Council themselves or informed by sources who were: Fulcher of Chatres, Robert the Monk, 
Baldric of Dol, Guibert of Nogent, and William of Malmesbury.
5
 Munro undertakes the 
complicated task of analyzing each account and comparing them to reconstruct an outline of the 
arguments most likely included in the exhortation of Urban at Clermont. Despite the verbal 
differences between the accounts, Munro asserts that there is general agreement on the main 
points of the speech, identifying the common elements existing among certain or all reports.
6
 
Bracketing possible arguments, parenthesizing probable arguments, and writing those certainly 
included without inclosures, Munro hypothesizes the following outline: 
“[Praise of the valor of the Franks] ; necessity of aiding the brethren in the East, appeals for aid 
from the East ; victorious advance of the Turks ; [reference to Spain] ; sufferings of Christians in 
the East ; (sufferings of the pilgrims) ; desecration of the churches and holy places ; [expressions 
of contempt concerning the Turks] ; special sanctity of Jerusalem ; this is God‟s work ; (rich and 
poor to go) ; grant of plenary indulgence ; fight righteous wars instead of iniquitous combats ; 
(evil conditions at home) ; promise of eternal and temporal rewards ; let nothing hinder you ; God 
will be your leader.”7 
Munro‟s conclusion is quite the intellectual feat; previously historians tended to summarize the 
speech deferring to a single source of the speech, such as the imaginary “historical” account of 
William of Tyre.
8
 Instead of attempting to convey Urban‟s message verbatim, Munro‟s 
hypothesis captures the conceptual arguments of the sermon. Without the need to quote Urban, 
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Munro‟s outline allows for identification of the elements of the Just War concept that he 
appealed to in examining the justifications for the Crusades at the institutional level of the 
Church. 
 The purpose of Urban‟s address at Clermont was to summon the Christians of Europe to 
a holy war on Christ‟s behalf.9 With Munro‟s outline, it is possible to observe how Urban did 
exactly this through an appeal to the Just War tradition. As Thomas Madden suggests, “Urban II 
did not overturn the teachings of Augustine but rather blended the Just War theory with other 
well-established principles such as Christian charity and pilgrimage.”10 Urban II spelled out the 
reason for authorizing the Crusades in accordance with the Augustinian doctrine of intolerable 
injury and just cause: Muslim rule was directly responsible for the plight of Christians in the 
East, the desecration of the Holy Sepulchre and other holy sites, and the conquest of the 
Christian lands. These elements of Urban‟s argument declared that these were intolerable injuries 
not only to those individuals effected (the Christians in the East) but to Christianity at large and 
Christ Himself. Though it is likely that the reported atrocities were often exaggerated for effect 
in the chronicles, enough evidence exists to confirm that the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in 
1009 and other Christian holy sites subsequently as well as other widespread acts of intolerance 
towards Christians under Fatimid rule were legitimate grievances. With his address at Clermont, 
Urban extrapolated such offenses from instances of temporal injustice to an intolerable assault on 
Christ and Christianity.  
Urban made explicit not only the grievances of the Christian world, but also the goals of 
the campaign he authorized. Consistent with the duality of the claimed offenses, the stated goal 
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of the Crusades was to free “the Eastern churches . . . from the oppression and ravages of the 
Muslims” and “the city of Jerusalem from the servitude into which it had fallen.”11  The first goal 
of liberation can be considered to include the Christian people within the context of protecting 
the Church from Muslim conquest in general. This element of Urban‟s call was nothing new; his 
preoccupation with the Spanish Reconquest suggested one united campaign of liberation of 
Christian peoples that included repelling the Turks in the East and the Moors in Europe.
12
 As a 
part of this broader effort, the Crusades were Urban‟s response to the plea for aid by the 
Byzantine Emperor by encouraging the faithful in Europe to come to the aid of their Eastern 
brethren who were suffering at the hands of Muslim conquerors. Thus, the idea of Christian 
charity became a compelling argument behind the campaign of liberation, very much in 
accordance with Augustinian Just War doctrine.  
Urban also appealed to the practice of penitential pilgrimage to Jerusalem and holy sites, 
a long-standing Christian tradition, with Just War principles in his justification for the Crusades 
in his sermon at Clermont. The religious significance of these sites was crucial to the 
sanctification of the campaign to seize the lands back from Muslim control. The liberation of the 
Church, after all, was just as much if not more concerned with the plight of the holy lands as the 
Christians themselves. As the historian Todd Patrick Upton observes, most of the chroniclers of 
Urban‟s speech at Clermont, “characterized the rescue of Jerusalem as the primary rationale for 
traveling eastward.”13 The belief that Christ himself was the victim of the Muslim conquerors, 
robbed of His inheritance in the holy land and re-crucified in the desecration of the holy sites, 
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combined the mission of a pilgrim with that of a holy warrior. Urban first and foremost 
commissioned the Christians of Europe to take up the cross under a pilgrim‟s vow and directed 
them to the Holy Sepulchre, as was the tradition. The difference in this mass campaign was that 
these pilgrims were also charged with the military task of taking back Jerusalem from the 
Muslims to restore the holy land to Christ. As James Brundage describes this unique role, 
“Juridically, the crusader was first and foremost a pilgrim, although a pilgrim of a special type, 
inasmuch as he was pledged to fight a holy war in the course of achieving his pilgrimage goal.”14 
Indeed, the crusader vow was not to a military or political leader, nor to the Pope, but to God 
alone. Brundage also cites the Clermont chronicles of Fulcher of Chatres and Robert the Monk 
which both suggest that Urban discussed the crusader‟s vow as a binding legal mechanism to 
secure a commitment from men who would undoubtedly be tempted to abandon the cause for the 
secular temptations of comfort or plunder as their initial enthusiasm faded and their devotion was 
tested along the warpath.
15
 Those who made the vow became known as milites Christi, or 
Knights of Christ, based on the belief that they were fighting in the via Dei, or way of God, both 
military campaign and pilgrimage out of religious obligation.
16
 
 The success of Urban‟s sermon in summoning the Christians of Europe to take up the 
cross relied on his holy stature as the Pope, the Vicar of Christ on Earth. His call, the call of the 
Catholic Church, was equivalent to divine mandate even in his own eyes. As Riley-Smith 
explains with multiple examples, “the association of God and God‟s will with military triumphs 
against the Muslims had been a feature of [Urban II‟s] letters from the beginning of his 
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pontificate.”17 Urban‟s classification of the armed pilgrimage he heralded as God‟s work and 
lead by God at the Council of Clermont clearly confirmed this association. Across Europe and 
into the Levant the calls of “Deus lo volt!” meaning “God wills it!” echoed far and wide as the 
crusaders took up what they believed to be God‟s cause. 18  
 
Crusader Motives: Rhetoric and Reality 
 
Through the Crusades, Pope Urban II offered Christian Europeans an opportunity for a 
remission of sins in return for their fulfillment of their vows. The idea of a penitential warfare 
first arose in the language of Pope Gregory VII, who expressed the belief that the voluntary 
exposure to danger of a warrior in the very nature of his fighting a just war was commendable to 
the degree that it could be treated as penance.
19
 However, the promise of a spiritual reward for 
military service became convincing and popular only once Urban contextualized the risks of the 
holy warrior with risks involved with the long-standing tradition of the penitential pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem.
20
 Offering penance for participation in the Crusades was also a strategic decision 
through which Urban sought to limit the composition of the crusading armies to the professional 
warrior class of Christian knights with pious motivations; Urban promised a remission of sins 
only to those who took the vow, “for devotion only, not to gain honour or money.”21 Clearly, 
Urban meant for the intentions of the individual crusaders to match the pious intentions with 
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which he authorized the campaign. At the same time, this condition also indicates that Urban 
acknowledged that the prospect of material gain, be it earthly glory or the spoils of war, would 
undoubtedly provide serious incentives for the Christians of Europe to join the campaign or 
revert to plunder along the way. 
The idea that crusaders were moved by a desire for wealth and glory is supported by the 
historical circumstances at the time of the Clermont sermon in 1095. Europe was suffering 
economically from an agricultural depression due to a series of droughts that caused poor 
harvests and widespread famine in France up until 1096.  The death-rate was growing due to 
outbreaks of disease called ergotism, which arises from consuming mould-ridden rye bread. A 
feudal system where younger sons received no land inheritance appeared to encourage at least a 
number of Europeans to join the Eastward campaign with ambitions of territorial acquisition.
22
 In 
such times, it seems likely that “men with little to lose and everything to gain [sic] took the cross 
merely as a pious pretext to enrich themselves with stolen booty and carve out a new home in a 
distant land.”23 Simply considering the socio-economic context of the first crusaders, the 
argument that the religious rhetoric of crusaders was a convenient façade for economic 
opportunism seems reasonable. 
Until recently, the general consensus of modern medieval historians seemed to focus 
more on the desire for temporal rewards when discussing the type of Europeans composing the 
crusader armies and their motives for joining the Crusades. Madden argues that this trend was a 
result of overreliance on demographic and circumstantial evidence in lieu of a more direct way to 
approach the issue. He attributes the most recent breakthroughs in scholarship like that of Riley-
Smith to advances in technology that allow for concrete evidence through quantitative 
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approaches.
24
 Still, the historical evidence available almost exclusively pertains to the upper-
class of European feudal society – the nobility. Though records confirm that tens of thousands of 
poor Europeans also joined the Crusades, the only information about them is general and vague. 
Thus, the only real scholarship that examines the motives of the crusaders with credibility must 
focus on the group of knights whom Urban had directed his sermon towards in the first place. 
What do the recent developments in scholarship propose? First off, the costs of crusading 
were impoverishing. Riley-Smith conservatively estimates that the individual cost of the journey 
to a French knight in 1096 was at least four times his annual income.
25
 Even wealthy land-
owning knights were forced to mortgage or sell their land in order to finance their crusading. A 
charter of Henry IV of Germany cites that Godfrey of Buillon and Baldwin of Boulogne, “seized 
by hope of an eternal inheritance and by love, prepared to go fight for God in Jerusalem and sold 
and relinquished all their possessions.”26 Crusading not only required this kind of material 
sacrifice from the wealthiest class in Europe, it offered little or no material gain. Those 
embarking knew the incredible risks they were making with their own lives and the livelihood of 
their families. Though the desire to loot and plunder in distant exotic lands must have captured 
the attention of at least some crusaders, most believed that any spoils would be property of the 
Byzantine emperor, as they interpreted from Urban‟s decrees at the time.27 Furthermore, except 
for a few isolated reports, the historical records show little evidence of crusaders returning to 
Europe “rich in anything but relics.”28 The idea of the opportunist younger son crusader is 
unlikely in consideration of the tremendous costs, terrifying risks, and little promise of acquiring 
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wealth. Such evidence even suggests that it was mainly the wealthy first sons of the landed 
gentry who had enough resources available to finance their own excursion. 
Secondly, the image of territorial ambitions driving second class Europeans to join the 
campaign is also misleading. The historical evidence available suggests that most crusaders who 
had taken the vow returned to Europe following the conclusion of their venture. Fulcher of 
Chatres, who served as the chaplain to the first king of Jerusalem, reported that in 1100 there 
were only 300 knights and the same number of infantry remaining in the territories under their 
control.
29
 Though this figure doesn‟t include those who remained under some other crusader 
principalities, it does suggest that few of those who made the journey chose to stay in the East. 
Even of those who remained, the historical records suggest that the bonds of kinship and loyalty 
to leaders were more common reasons for settlement. Riley-Smith analyzes the motives of the 
three main leaders during the earliest years of settlement (who were wealthy enough that they 
“certainly had no financial need to stay in the east”), concluding that “most of the crusaders 
known to us may have settled because their leaders settled and that by no means all the leaders 
were motivated simply by a desire for land.”30 
From the limited historical records available, it is clearly more likely that the crusaders 
were motivated by more than economic incentives. The only real rewards that one could expect 
for all the personal sacrifices entailed in taking up the cross were metaphysical. Madden asserts, 
it is important to remember that the medieval culture of nobility valued unwavering devotion to 
God and valiance on the battlefield as the two manifestations of virtue.
31
 The response of the 
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European nobility to Urban‟s call can largely be attributed to this element medieval culture. 
Thomas Asbridge explains the phenomenon: 
“All medieval society was preoccupied with the pursuit of purity, but the knightly aristocracy, 
forced by the nature of its profession into daily contact with contaminants such as violence and 
personal wealth, seems to have been particularly prone to harbor an obsession with spiritual 
infection.”32 
For this class of land owning warriors, alms-giving was the primary means of securing salvation 
from the Church. Penitential pilgrimage, of course, was the other. Thus the Crusades, as a holy 
war and a movement of penitential pilgrimage, offered the knights of Europe the chance to earn 
spiritual redemption and sanctify their careers as warriors in a single enterprise. As one crusader 
put it; 
 “What greater almsgiving can there be than offering oneself and one‟s belongings to God and 
risking one‟s life for Christ, leaving behind one‟s wife, children, relations and birthplace for the 
service of Christ, exposing oneself to dangers on land, dangers at sea, dangers from thieves, 
dangers from plunderers, the danger of battle for the love of the Crucified?”33 
The historical accounts of the crusades as well as the surviving charters and other administrative 
documents are rich with such rhetoric. The individual crusader could obviously be suspected of 
superficial expression of devotion while harboring ulterior motives. As previously discussed, it is 
impossible to rule out the chance that at least some crusaders paid lip service to the divine cause 
with primary intentions of material acquisition. One thing that Crusade scholarship has verified 
is the diversity of the group of Europeans retrospectively referred to as crusaders. However, the 
historical evidence available today suggests that the knights of Europe were likely to have been 
moved by sincere feelings of piety and duty that were so closely associated with the values of 
their culture. Of the remaining crusaders, the lay people of the lower echelons of medieval 
society, “most were beholden to the [nobility] who supported them, and could not have made the 
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journey without their largesse.”34 Although the composition of the crusaders surely included men 
of every class and every motive, the pious idealism and Christian devotion of the European 
nobility were the instrumental motives behind the response to Urban‟s call. 
 The actions of the crusaders during the war can also be viewed as an indicator of their 
motives. In line with most historical holy wars, chronicles and histories of the Crusades are full 
of examples of atrocities committed in God‟s name. Today, the image of a blood-thirsty 
European knight fighting more out of hatred for Muslims than love for Christians permeates 
popular perceptions about the Crusades. Much of this image is substantiated by the chronicles of 
victim communities, whose accuracy and objectivity is highly questionable. William of Tyre 
reports that the crusaders methodically stormed through Jerusalem upon breaching the walls, 
breaking in to every residence to indiscriminately slaughter all men, women, and children, who 
were implicit in the crimes against the Church in the East.
35
 Similarly Raymond D‟Aguiliers 
conveys a sense of horrific wonder at the “piles of heads, hands, and feet” in the streets of the 
city and blood up to the knees of knights in the Temple of Solomon where many had taken 
refuge.
36
 Thomas Madden asserts that “By the standards of the time, adhered to by both Muslims 
and Christians, the crusaders would have been justified in putting the entire population of 
Jerusalem to the sword,” when instead they showed restraint and even allowed many to flee or 
purchase their freedom from captivity.
37
 The standard to which Madden refers stems from the 
Augustinian position of non-discrimination based on subjective innocence of civilians and 
soldiers alike. However, the subsequent plunder of the entire city, well documented by multiple 
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chroniclers, is enough to suggest that the actions of the crusaders during the siege were of mixed 
motives at best. 
The slaughter of Jews across Europe and especially along the eastward warpath is well 
documented as well. Though the integrity of individual repots of such events cannot be 
confirmed, the prolificacy of their accounts provides at least some validity. It is difficult to 
believe that such acts were motivated by the Augustinian notion of punitive charity towards an 
offending populace. Some historians argue that these rogue Crusaders justified the plunder of 
cities and towns in Eastern Europe as motivated by the necessity to obtain provisions along the 
journey, rather than misinterpreted authorization to fight non-believers perceived as the enemies 
of the Church. Though the individual acts of Crusaders varied and not much can be said with 
certainty about their disposition towards the non-combatant victims of their violence, the 
Christian authorities clearly stood in opposition to such crimes.
38
 Due to the degree of ambiguity 
on the topic, determining the intentions behind such acts of seemingly indiscriminate violence is 
nearly impossible.  
 
The Crusades in the Just War Tradition 
 
 The Crusades were a holy war by the very definition of the term. Maintaining the position 
that Holy War is a category of Just War, this classification transitively implies that they were a 
just war. However, after presenting such research it is possible to evaluate the Crusades in this 
manner based on more than mere categorization. Still excluding the doctrines of Just War that 
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developed after the 11
th
 century, the criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a clear 
structure on which to reflect the historical evidence. 
 Just Cause: The Augustinian concept of just cause was an intolerable injury, in the form 
of aggression, oppression, or neglect that permitted restorative or punitive action in order to 
redress the moral infraction. As Urban II explicitly stated at the Council of Clermont, Muslim 
rule in the Levant was responsible not only for the plight of Christians in the East but for 
transgressing against Christ and the Christian faith through the desecration of the holy sites and 
the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The nature of Urban‟s response to such injury is the subject of 
debate even among leading scholars in the field. Madden‟s insistent classification of the 
campaign as “in every way a defensive war” in response to 400 years of conquest that threatened 
to wipe out Christianity represents a more extreme interpretation of the ideological righteousness 
of the Crusades.
39
 The Crusades were, as Madden asserts, a reaction to Muslim advances, but 
only in so far as they created an environment that allowed the recent instances of horrible offense 
against Eastern Christians and the holy sites to occur. Even if they were considered as a belated 
response to Muslim conquests of four centuries prior, the Crusades would best be considered 
beyond reactive as Madden asserts, but even reactionary, as an effort of restoration to a past 
condition.  If a military campaign with the reactionary goal to reinstate the status quo of 400 
years earlier can be considered “defensive”, this is certainly not in the military sense of the word 
of repelling an immediately threatening aggressor.   
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Such sound research with rather oversimplified conclusions indicates that Madden may 
be intentionally catering to the modern, popular concept of Just War with a subjective judgment 
rather than viewing the Crusades from the historical perspective. Unless the evaluation seeks to 
determine if the Crusades were justified by modern ethical standards, there is no need to classify 
the Crusades as Madden does when the prevailing Augustinian doctrine at the time did not 
distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare. Moreover, the historical evidence suggests 
that Urban II pitched the Crusades as a campaign of liberation, not a defensive war. As Riley-
Smith notes, “For Augustine violence was justified in response to an injury; for Urban this 
response took the form of a war of liberation.”40 At Clermont, elsewhere, and through his letters, 
Urban preached the liberation of the Church in the East, including both the Christians suffering 
under Muslim rule and the assaulted holy sites, to be the primary objective of the campaign. Of 
course, this goal carries a defensive connotation, in that it seeks to protect the well-being of the 
Christians and the religion, but such a classification addresses the nature of the cause, not that of 
its employed methods. Defense of the patria, its citizens, and property was, to Augustine, a just 
cause, in that any violations demanded retribution, but by no means did this restrict the military 
response to defensive warfare.
41
 Nevertheless, this notion of defense of the common good as an 
element of just cause only became a cornerstone in the Just War tradition with the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas nearly two centuries after the Crusades began. The classification of the 
Crusades as a campaign of liberation fits the Augustinian criteria of vindictive justice in response 
to a principality that cruelly oppresses or neglects the people under its rule. The Muslim 
infractions against the Christians and the Church in the East constituted a violation that 
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warranted a holy war of restoration to return the Church its rights in the East and also of 
retribution to restore the divine order of justice. 
 Legitimate Authority: This criterion is easily the least controversial and relatively 
simple to understand. As the Vicar of Christ on Earth and the head of the Catholic Church, the 
pope cannot be denied his divine authority. In Medieval Europe, there was no authority more 
legitimate than that which represented and conveyed divine command. 
 Right Intention: The two divisions within this criterion are the institutional intention, as 
voiced by Urban II, and the intentions of the individual crusaders themselves. Though there are 
scholars who content that the Crusades were launched “first and foremost, to serve the needs of 
the papacy” in its desire to expand its power, such claims lack not only historical evidence, but 
also logic.
42
 As Madden points out, if Urban wanted to employ a military strategy that would 
strengthen the power of the church, it would have made more sense to send armies to fight 
against his enemies in Northern Europe rather then send his most devout supporters thousands of 
miles away to help the rival Byzantine Church.
43
  Furthermore, Urban‟s specific concern over the 
right intentions of those who would take up the cross is further testament to his own intentions. 
The institution intended for the Crusades to be an act of Christian charity to alleviate suffering 
and restore divine order through a restorative and punitive military campaign. 
 Though the intentions of the individuals are difficult define with certainty, the historical 
evidence available argues against the common misconception that the majority of crusaders were 
poor opportunists who took advantage of the religious overtones to escape dire economic times 
in Europe and pursued greedy aspirations of acquiring land and wealth through the violent 
enterprise against evil Muslims in the East. Jonathan Riley-Smith‟s work with primary 
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documents of crusader charters and the like is particularly revealing in this respect, as it suggests 
that the religious piety of the nobility as a motivating factor has been severely underestimated. 
Desire for material gain undoubtedly motivated many crusaders, and perhaps even encouraged 
those who join the crusaders out of sincere devotion. However, the historical facts suggest that 
the desire for the spiritual reward of penance was a more common motive of the knights Urban 
sought to motivate than secular opportunism. 
Treatment of Non-Combatants: Though many historians agree they are probably 
exaggerated, the numerous reports of crusaders engaging in horrific slaughtering of non-
combatants of every age, gender, religion, and ethnicity throughout the span of the Crusades 
must surface in any discussion of the degree to which the Crusades can be considered just. Non-
combatant immunity in the Crusades is a difficult a topic to address without applying modern 
ethical perspective that condemns indiscriminate slaughter regardless of the intent of the 
individual behind the act. The medieval concept of jus in bello, derived from Augustine, meant 
doing no intentional harm to non-combatants not because they were subjectively innocent, as too 
were the enemy militants, but because such acts had questionable motives. If the soldier was the 
passionless instrument of the legitimate authority and he took lives out of obedience to the cause 
of charity, not hatred, then he would not be guilty of wrongdoing. The Peace of God and Truce 
of God, which Urban declared prior to the Crusades, were only interpreted as applying to 
fighting among Christians in Europe and were largely disregarded in the Crusades. Ultimately, in 
lieu of verifiable historical evidence, it is impossible to judge if non-combatants were 
deliberately targeted out of hatred and intolerance in violation of Just War doctrine of the time.  
Though the Crusades may be considered justified within the Just War tradition at the 
time, under the assumption that the implications of the historical evidence are indeed correct, the 
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degree to which they were just remains unclear. The recent advances in scholarship that have 
allowed the Crusades to be viewed with greater objectivity suggests that the campaign of 
liberation called for by Pope Urban II was indeed justified within the Just War tradition at the 
time: The pope is not just a legitimate, but the ultimate authority; the crimes committed against 
the Church in the East constituted a just cause; and the pious devotion that motivated the 
Crusades on both institutional and individual levels signifies right intention. Munro‟s research 
shows that Urban‟s sermon at Clermont explicitly addressed the necessary jus ad bellum criteria 
in making his case for the campaign. However, there is not enough historical evidence to 
determine if the Crusades fit the criterion of non-combatant immunity as an element of jus in 
bello. Thus, with the historical evidence available, it is impossible to conclude that the Crusades 
were a just war. What can be observed, nevertheless, is how the Crusades were indeed justified 
within the medieval Just War tradition.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Muslim Response: Jihad Doctrine in Statecraft and Jurisprudence 
 
 
 
 
 
The Muslim Counter-Crusades have been romanticized and mythologized just as much as 
the Crusades themselves in both Muslim and Christian collective memories. The jihad ideology 
of Nur al-Din and the accomplishments of his successor Saladin continue to inspire modern 
campaigns of jihad as the latter is remembered as the pious commander of the campaign that 
took back Jerusalem, the Third Sanctuary of Islam. Statues and monuments in the image of both 
leaders still stand in Syria today. Likewise, Dante, in his Divine Comedy, places Saladin in 
Limbo among the virtuous pagans such as Socrates, Aristotle, Plato, Homer, and Ovid, the only 
other Muslims being the famous philosophers Avicenna and Averroes. The well-known novels 
of Sir Walter Scott likewise praise Saladin for his embodiment of European chivalrous nobility 
in contrast to the disgraceful ways of his European heroes. The popular 2005 film Kingdom of 
Heaven is the most recent addition to this trend, depicting Saladin as a virtuous Muslim 
counterpart to the hero Balian of Ibelin and the Christian European King Guy de Lusignan as the 
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primary antagonist. As with the historiography of the European side of the Crusades, the 
information available about the individuals and events that composed the Muslim response is 
only what has survived selectivity, speculation, and revision. A historical study of the Muslim 
response must therefore be mindful of the misconceptions and myths in the collective memories 
of the West and the East alike. 
There was no word for “crusader” in Arabic at the time the wars were fought. Muslim 
chroniclers referred to them as franji or “Franks,” to designate European origin, differentiating 
the new comers from the Byzantine Christians, with whom hostility had become static and 
reserved after centuries of war.
1
 Historians have tended to summarize the Muslim perception of 
the Crusades, as evidenced by major chroniclers, as “a nuisance rather than a serious menace to 
the Islamic World.”2 These invaders from the West who arrived during the so-called Golden Age 
of Islam were often looked down upon as barbaric infidels who fought simply to regain 
territories lost in recent wars to the Byzantine Empire. Thomas Madden writes that “most 
Muslims did not give the matter much thought. The underlying motivations of the infidels were 
of little importance to them.”3 With little consideration of the crusaders‟ aims, the Syrian jurist 
al-Sulami voiced a common belief that these foreign invaders who seemed to desire no more 
than the bloodshed and suffering of Muslims were a punishment from God for neglecting the 
duties of Islam, particularly that of jihad.
4
 Thus, the crusaders were viewed not for their motives 
behind their goals, but for the actions they took to reach them. 
                                                          
1
Michale Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 
138, (hereafter cited as Jihad in History). 
2
 John Joseph Saunders, quoted from Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, “A Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern 
Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade,” in The Jihad and Its Times, ed. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier 
(Ann Arbor: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1991), 41 (hereafter cited 
as “Reassessment”). 
3
Madden, Concise History, 46. 
4
Bonner, Jihad in History, 139. 
47 
 
This perception of the crusaders and the political climate of the Muslim East eventually 
gave way to political campaigns of jihad that relied on a different perception of fighting in 
defense of not merely Muslim territories but Islam itself. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel identifies three 
significant phases of the Muslim response in which jihad took on different meanings as the 
perception of the Crusades changed; jihad was a defensive war against enemies at the boundaries 
of the Muslim World; then a war in defense of Muslim lands that was offensive and religious in 
nature; and finally, after the successful campaign to recover Jerusalem that exhausted the 
resources and manpower of the Muslim armies, as a defensive war limited to recovering Muslim 
territory that had been lost in the past century.
5
 Historical and political circumstances continued 
to affect perceptions and practical adaptations of ideology over the course of the entire conflict. 
The idea of a unified Muslim jihad that finally reclaimed Jerusalem from the crusaders in 
1187 misrepresents the fractured political climate in the Levant at the end of the Eleventh 
Century. Amin Maalouf suggests that, “in Syria in the eleventh century, jihad was no more than 
a slogan brandished by princes in distress. No emir would rush to another‟s aid unless he had 
some personal interest in doing so. Only then would he contemplate the invocation of great 
principles.”6 Initially, the calls for jihad of Muslim rulers in response to the European conquerors 
can be considered to be driven by the threat such crusaders constituted to their political power 
rather than peril that Islam was under attack from the West. Accordingly, Muslim rulers who 
answered such pleas for aid acted more out of political opportunism than ideological allegiance 
through Islam.
7
 The political discord of the Muslim world undoubtedly contributed to the 
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remarkable military successes of the First Crusade. Speaking to the Muslim response to the fall 
of Jerusalem, the 12
th
 century chronicler Ibn al-Athir wrote that “The [Muslim] rulers were all at 
variance . . . and so the Franks conquered the lands.”8 The Shia‟ Fatimid Caliphate governed in 
Egypt but was on the decline as the Murabit and Zirid Emirates emerged where Fatimid rule had 
previously extended across North Africa. Further to the East, the Sunni „Abbasid caliphate based 
out of Baghdad began to lose influence to the Seljuk Sultanate, which struggled to consolidate its 
rule in Iraq and Syria as rival provincial leaders continually vied to expand their power. Indeed, 
as the crusaders conquered Muslim lands and established principalities in the Levant, Muslim 
rulers viewed the European invaders as a challenge secondary to the inter-Muslim political 
discord. Peace agreements with the crusaders were not uncommon among Muslim rulers, who, 
daunted by the military might of the foreign armies and more concerned with their own political 
survival, took advantage of the opportunity to gain a strong ally against their Muslim rivals. 
The unification of Muslim principalities began with the rise to power of „Imad al-Din 
Zengi, the governor of Mosul, who quickly expanded his reign in Syria. As he entered the region 
politically and militarily, Zengi gained support from other Muslim princes by announcing his 
plan to wage jihad against the crusaders.
9
 Zengi seized control of Aleppo and various other 
Muslim strongholds in Syria and then moved on to successfully besiege crusader outposts. 
Defeated in his attempt to take Baghdad from the „Abbasid Caliph al-Mutarshid bi-Allah, Zengi 
narrowed his focus to Syrian territories. In 1144, Zengi successfully besieged Edessa, the first of 
the crusader states to fall to the Muslim armies. The fall of Edessa was a huge symbolic and 
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strategic victory for the Muslims; Zengi emerged as the most powerful leader in the Muslim 
world and Muslims gained confidence that God favored their cause against the European 
invaders whom both Muslims and Christians once-thought to be invincible. Though Zengi was 
murdered in his sleep shortly after by one of his slaves, the aptitude of his successor Nur al-Din 
guaranteed that his legacy and accomplishments would survive in what became the Zengid 
Dynasty.  
 
Jihad in Politics: The Campaigns of Nur al-Din and Saladin 
 
 The political and military feats of Nur al-Din and Saladin expanded on Zengi‟s successes 
to a level unimagined at the time by either Muslims or Christians. While Zengi had to some 
extent employed jihad rhetoric to rouse support from other Muslim rulers for his military 
campaign against the crusaders, Nur al-Din‟s religious zeal transformed this rhetorical tactic into 
a fundamental ideology of his campaign to unite the Muslims of the East against the crusaders. 
This ideology was critical to Nur al-Din‟s military strategy and, as an element of such, his 
legitimacy as the leader of jihad against the “Frankish invaders”. The image he projected as the 
exemplary ascetic mujahid, or one who wages jihad, was supported by both his rhetoric and 
deeds. Ibn al-Athir relates a number of poems composed in honor of Nur al-Din: 
“These are the resolves, not what pens claim;  
These are the noble qualities, not what books mention. 
These are the ambitions, which when they are sought, 
Poems and sermons stumble along in their tracks. 
O son of „Imad al-Din, you have shaken hands with their highest 
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With a hand fit for great endeavours, achieved with toil. . .”10 
  
“The most exalted of realms is one whose beacon you have raised high 
And made sharpened sword-blades its nails. 
The most worthy to rule the land and its people is 
A merciful one, whose justice has embraced its regions.”11 
 
Such celebratory odes were an intentional and effective tool of Nur al-Din‟s statecraft; his 
personal corps of writers, poets, scholars and historians aroused the enthusiasm of the Muslim 
world by presenting it a pious leader who fought vigorously against the Franks and embodied the 
virtues of Islam in his justice, courage, and humility. News of his personal participation in 
various battles (rare for the average prince at the time) and descriptions of his modest lifestyle 
were well documented and widely broadcast. The loyalty of the Muslim „ulama to Nur al-Din 
was not unwarranted; the patronage he provided through the establishment of schools, hospitals, 
mosques, Sufi convents, caravanserai, and foundations for public works, cultivated support for 
his political authority among the religious “turbaned” classes.12 Even Europeans expressed 
admiration for the virtues of this adversary, William of Tyre writing that he was “the greatest 
persecutor of the Christian name and faith, but a just ruler, astute and far-sighted and, according 
to the traditions of his race, a religious man.”13 
His military successes against the crusaders further championed him as the righteous 
leader of the jihad he proclaimed. After the crusaders‟ failed siege of Damascus during the 
Second Crusade the ruler of the city they agreed to a treaty of mutual assistance with the city‟s 
governor, Mujir al-Din. Intent on strengthening his ability to conduct further operations and 
inhibited by this agreement, Nur al-Din waged an intricate campaign of political propaganda and 
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trickery to turn the people of Damascus against Murjir al-Din.  Distrusting of their own governor 
who cooperated with the crusaders, the people of Damascus opened their gates to Nur al-Din in 
1154 before Mujir al-Din could muster any support from his European allies.
14
 Various other 
feats in battle and statecraft in contention with both the crusaders and other Muslim emirs soon 
solidified Nur al-Din‟s authority as the ruler of all Greater Syria and Mesopotamia. As the 
situation stabilized in Nur al-Din‟s kingdom in the North, all heads turned to Egypt.  
 After a series of political assassinations, a struggled emerged as to who would become 
the wazir to the Fatimid Caliph, the highest position of temporal authority in Egypt. Initially 
ousted by his rival Dirgham, the second major aspirant, Shawar, appealed to Nur al-Din for aid. 
Nur al-Din sent a division of his army under the command of a general named Shirkuh, who was 
accompanied by his nephew Saladin. Shawar took back the wazirate, but faced new troubles as 
both Shirkuh, who turned against him, and the Latin King of Jerusalem, Almaric, threatened to 
invade. Though the forces of Shirkuh eventually defeated and killed Shawar in 1168, he died 
only two months later, leaving the wazirate of Egypt to his immediate successor, Saladin. Before 
long, Saladin, still a representative of Nur al-Din, began massive endeavors to fortify Egypt 
against the crusaders, built schools for the study of Sunni jurisprudence and gradually replaced 
Shia juridical leadership with Sunnis. Though hesitant for obvious reasons of political sensitivity, 
Saladin deposed the Fatimid Caliphate on orders from Nur al-Din, nominally uniting the Muslim 
world under the rule of the Sunni „Abbasids in Baghdad in 1171. As Saladin came under control 
of all Egypt his relationship and acted with a degree of autonomy, contained feelings of 
animosity grew between him and Nur al-Din. 
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 The unforeseen death of Nur al-Din in 1174 came as he had just been amassing his men 
for a campaign to wrestle control of Egypt from Saladin, whom he suspected was shirking orders 
and viewed as reluctant in waging jihad against the Franks.
15
 Though Nur al-Din left behind a 
number Zengid family members in contention for control, including an eleven year-old son, al-
Salih as a successor, Saladin made a strong claim as the rightful administrator to the kingdom on 
behalf of the boy and quickly took action to that end. Bernard Lewis summarizes the two 
prominent views of Saladin‟s ambitions for dominion expressed by Muslim chroniclers: 
“For those reflecting the Zengid point of view, he was a ruthless and ambitious adventurer, bent 
on personal aggrandizement. To achieve this, he used both cunning and force against the Zangids, 
in order to deprive the heirs of his master Nur al-Din of their inheritance, and to seize it for 
himself. For his own spokesmen, and those of his successors, he was a champion of Islam, who 
had to reunite the Muslim lands as an essential preliminary to his Holy War against the 
Crusaders”16 
 
Saladin‟s campaign of unification of the Muslim world likely contained elements of both, but as 
the most powerful ruler in the Muslim world the only alternative to his intervention would have 
been watching the Zengid Dynasty fragment to rivaling princes or worse, fall to the crusaders.
17
 
In the decade after Nur al-Din‟s death, his political and military efforts were directed toward 
consolidating his power in Muslim territories. Welcomed by its citizens, Saladin made haste for 
the city of Damascus, where he swore allegiance to al-Salih as his servant and protector and 
firmly established himself as ruler.
18
 Shortly after, Saladin declared himself king and subdued his 
Muslim rivals in Syria and Mesopotamia through both diplomacy and force.
19
  
Following in the footsteps of Nur al-Din, the propagation of jihad ideology was a 
fundamental element of Saladin‟s campaign of Muslim unification. His own rhetoric reflected a 
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desire to justify all of his political moves within the context of jihad against the Franks. Lyons 
and Jackson conclude the following: 
“What emerges from his letters during this period is the tenacity with which he maintained the 
justification for his actions. In spite of financial pressures, difficulties of communication and 
administrative problems, he concentrated on his claim to be the champion of the Holy War, to 
whom territories should be ceded in the interests of Islam.”20 
Like his predecessor, Saladin employed a team of biographers and poets to build up his 
reputation as a pious Muslim. One of his biographers, Baha al-Din, wrote of his friend and 
master: 
“The Holy War and the suffering involved in it weighed heavily on his heart and his whole being 
in every limb; he spoke of nothing else, thought only about equipment for the fight, was interested 
only in those who had taken up arms, had little sympathy with anyone who spoke of anything else 
or encouraged any other activity.”21 
Saladin let his dedication to jihad be known through his actions as well. He abolished taxes that 
were unlawful in Islam at a disadvantage to his own finances. He showed mercy toward his 
enemies, bestowing gifts upon them, and divided the spoils of victory among his faithful, 
keeping nothing for himself.
22
 He mimicked Nur al-Din‟s willingness to donate generously to 
religious foundations and schools. 
As Madden points out, Saladin‟s rhetoric was sincere and many of his policies reflected 
an ascetic commitment to Islam, however, his political motives were just as evident. He viewed 
himself as the supreme mujahid and knew that success in his cause and the strength of his 
leadership relied on widespread perception of him as such. The numerous letters from Saladin‟s 
court provide not only details as to his actions, but also “show the construction that Saladin 
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himself wished to have placed on his actions.”23 Thus, his press corps emphasized the religious 
motives behind acts of good faith such as his generous treatment of enemies and his followers 
and not the political benefits it had of binding their loyalties to him.  
Certain examples are even found where Saladin‟s political stances are at odds with 
Islamic law. Saladin, in his truce with Richard the Lionheart in 1192, is reported to have thought 
so highly of the Frankish king that “if [Jerusalem] were to be lost in his time, he would rather 
have it taken into Richard‟s mighty power than to have it go into the hands of any other [Muslim 
or Christian] prince whom he had ever seen.”24 Even as a hypothetical statement, Saladin‟s 
implied value of Richard‟s Christian virtue over Muslim rule beside his own is a far cry from an 
adamant dedication to the expansion of Islam. Furthermore, Saladin‟s adherence to the classical 
doctrines of just conduct in warfare is questionable in light of some methods he employed in 
waging jihad against the Crusaders. While the classical and even medieval jurists preached that 
enemy prisoners were to be spared, Nur al-Din‟s armies executed prisoners who refused to 
convert to Islam and Saladin ordered prisoners to be beheaded after the Battle of Hattin,  
murdering Reynold of Chatillon with his own hands, as he had vowed to, and “did so with 
satisfaction.”25 Almost two centuries later, Ibn Taymiyya maintained that “the shari‟a enjoins 
fighting the unbelievers, but not killing of those who have been captured,” and the judgment of 
the imam is the only way there could be an exception.
26
 Classical jurists established that the 
prophet forbade deceitful tactics such as ambushes, yet Nur al-Din “employed guile” and lied in 
a series of letters to trick the prince of Damascus into banishing or executing his closest 
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supporters so he himself could take control of the city in 1154.
27
 Similarly, ambushes carried out 
by Saladin‟s orders resulted in the slaughter of many crusaders.28  Though ambushes were 
forbidden by the Prophet, it was widely considered acceptable if the victims belonged to a group 
that had refused the formal da‟wa. Ambush tactics were ethical and consistent with shari‟a 
because of the necessary declaration of war was considered inherent in such a refusal, and this 
refusal was implied by the enemies‟ status as a part of that group. Lyons and Jackson give the 
example of Saladin‟s position in the matrimonial dispute between the Seljuk Sultan Qilij-Arslan 
and his son-in-law Nur al-Din Muhammad, which “was so weak in terms of Islamic justification 
that Ibn Shaddad preferred to ignore the whole episode.”29 This event is a clear example of how 
Saladin‟s propaganda team, Ibn Shaddad foremost among his personal biographers, was guilty in 
selectivity of documentation that would question the image of their master.  
Two events in 1176 further legitimized Saladin‟s rule when he married Nur al-Din‟s 
widow, who had joined him in 1174 before he took Damascus, and the „Abbasid Caliph declared 
him lord of all Greater Syria and Egypt.
 30 
Saladin had united the Muslim world nominally under 
the „Abbasid Caliphate in 1171 and now politically under his own rule just five years later. 
Saladin‟s divinely endorsed leadership of the Muslim world granted him the authority, support, 
and resources to wage jihad against the crusaders. Saladin‟s victory in the Battle of Hattin which 
paved the way for Muslims to take back Jerusalem in 1187 and other Crusader territories in 
Palestine over the next five years. Ultimately, Saladin‟s military success than reconciled the 
decades of internal war he waged to unite the Muslim world as he proved to be the champion of 
the jihad not only in word but in fact. 
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Jihad Doctrine in Medieval Jurisprudence 
 
 Muslim jurists had already been reacting to the Crusades with exhortations to jihad long 
before Saladin was even born. The first of these religious scholars was Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami 
who published his Book of Jihad in 1105 a year before his own death. Having witnessed the fall 
of Jerusalem to the crusaders in 1099 establishment of the various Crusader States in Greater 
Syria, al-Sulami sought to explain the reasons for the defeats and suffering of the Muslims. He 
wrote that the Crusades were divine punishment for failure to fulfill religious duties, specifically 
the duty of jihad, for either political reasons or neglect.
31
 Centuries after the unity of the first 
four righteously-guided caliphates, the dar al-Islam had since fallen from unity to discord. 
Michael Bonner succinctly contextualizes al-Sulami‟s theory:  
“The problem was political: while the conduct of jihad was the duty of the caliph in Baghdad, the 
political reality in Syria at the time amounted to a quarreling group of princelings. . . The Fatimid 
rulers in Cairo, and the „Abbasid caliph and [Seljuk] Sultan in Baghdad, were all unable or 
unwilling to do their duty.”32 
Al-Sulami diagnoses the plight of the Muslims as such and prescribes jihad as the only means to 
a cure.  
Justifying his call for jihad within the long-standing tradition of Sunni jurisprudence, al-
Sulami cites the doctrine endorsed al-Shafi‟i, the scholar after whom one of the four major 
schools of fiqh takes its name, that the imam is obligated to wage jihad on behalf of the entire 
Muslim umma at least once a year. Al-Sulami interprets the classical call for Muslims who are 
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“distant” from the attack to respond with aid as a doctrine of individual obligation.33  Further 
legitimizing his claim, al-Sulami quotes his renowned contemporary scholar Abu Hamid al-
Ghazali, who proposed the idea that jihad is “an obligation of sufficiency.”34 By this definition 
al-Ghazali meant that if the voluntary force that fights on behalf of the umma to fulfill the 
communal obligation of jihad is not enough to succeed, then fighting becomes incumbent on 
every Muslim individually. Al-Sulami argued that the current incursion of European crusaders 
who were successfully chipping away at the dar al-Islam in Syria and elsewhere constituted such 
a case.
35
 Though victories were limited, early mobilization of individual Muslims and “fighting 
scholars”, religious and legal jurists who actually participated in battle, was an important 
symbolic testament to the juristic community‟s commitment to their claim that fighting the 
crusaders was now an individual duty.
36
 Furthermore, jurists like al-Sulami preached that 
through the greater, internal jihad, Muslims could purge themselves of the discord and weakness 
and support the rise to power of a leader under whom the Muslim world may unite and 
successfully defeat the infidel invaders by jihad of the sword. By the end of the 12
th
 century, 
such a leader did emerge to successfully repel the crusaders. 
The correlation between the piety of Muslims and their ability to drive off the crusaders, 
a concept first proposed by al-Sulami, became a fundamental assertion in the medieval revival of 
jihad in Sunni jurisprudence. On both sides of the Crusades, military success was seen as divine 
reward for the religious purity of the winning party while defeat was interpreted as punishment 
for the contrary. For the Christians, St. Bernard of Clairvaux preached during the Second 
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Crusade that the Crusades, as penitential wars, relied on religious purification, of both individual 
knights and Christian Europe as a whole, as a prerequisite to victory.
37
 Under such pretext, 
internal holy wars were waged across Europe against pagan kingdoms in the North and the 
Muslim territories on the Iberian Peninsula. Similarly, the motivations for inter-Muslim fighting 
during the Counter-Crusades went beyond mere political consolidation. Nur al-Din‟s political 
campaign to unite Syria against the crusaders was accompanied by persecution of the Shi‟ite 
minority as an effort to win God‟s favor by purifying Muslim society. Saladin continued a policy 
of intolerance toward dissidents, even executing the Sufi mystic Shahab al-Din for heresy in 
1191 and relaxing adherence to the principles of protection for the dhimmi in his treatment of 
local Jews and Christians.
38
 The theological justifications for jihad within the dar al-Islam 
targeted against other Muslims that developed during this time have had profound effects in 
recent centuries, especially through works of the Syrian scholar Ibn Taymiyya. 
Like al-Sulami, Ibn Taymiyya was an embattled scholar who fought and preached with 
the same fervor.  His contributions to the tradition of Sunni jurisprudence were numerous; in 
addition to providing the doctrines of puritanical Islam that provided a basis for the 18
th
 century 
fundamentalist movement of Ibn „Abd al-Wahab in the Arabian Peninsula, his justification of 
violent revolt against Muslim regimes was truly revolutionary. Even at the time, Ibn Taymiyya‟s 
writings were controversial enough to land him several years of detention in multiple prisons. 
The political climate had changed drastically by the turn of the 14
th
 century when Ibn Taymiyya 
wrote. The Crusades, though still ongoing, had been replaced as the most urgent threat to the 
Islamic world by Mongol invaders from the East who sacked Baghdad and violently murdered 
the last „Abbasid caliph in 1258. Muslims were once again forced to live under the dominion of 
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foreign rulers. In Islam‟s classical period, the „ulama had “turned the defense of the status quo 
into a fine art” of legitimizing rulers who were “visibly unjust, cruel and corrupt.”39 As for the 
Turkic military powers that ruled during the „Abbasid caliphate, al-Ghazali classified the role of 
the caliph as a symbol of the unity of the Muslim people while the Seljuk princes governed on 
his behalf.
40
 The „ulama‟s traditional practice of sanctioning less than perfect temporal leaders 
reflected political realism in congruence with the Islamic proverb, “six years of tyranny is better 
than a day of anarchy,” and the Qur‟anic verse 4:59, “O ye who believe! Obey Allah and obey 
his messenger and those of you who are in authority!”41  
Ibn Taymiyya agreed with the theological legitimacy of this tradition with the conditions 
that the authority not inhibit the practice of Islam or commit a severe transgression. However, 
Ibn Taymiyya claimed that the circumstances of the time were indeed exceptional. The 
conversion to Islam of the Mongol rulers, the very same who recently vied to destroy the Muslim 
world, was merely a nominal gesture. Their continued practice of their non-Islamic customs and 
imposition non-Islamic laws equated to a new era of jahiliyya, a term previously reserved only to 
describe the pre-Islamic state of “ignorance.” Ibn Taymiyya proposed that the failure of the 
Mongol rulers to “command the good and forbid the evil” was grounds for punishment as any 
Muslim would be who neglected his duties. He confirmed that jihad was an individual duty for 
all Muslims in the emergency circumstances, even describing it in one treatise as “the summation 
of all virtues and religious duties.”42 Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya argued that the “heaviest jihad 
should be directed against the unbelievers and those who refuse to abide by certain precepts,” 
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such as Muslims who neglect the requirement of alms-giving and rebels or apostates.
43
 As he 
outlines in his “Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad,” rich with references to the Qur‟an and 
Sunna, such transgressors were “enemies of God and His Messenger” deserving of punishment.44  
Ibn Taymiyya‟s views on the protection of non-combatants and the dhimmi also affirm 
the conclusions supported within the tradition of fiqh. His real accomplishment was his 
theologically justified exhortation to wage jihad against dissident Muslims who compromise 
Islam‟s purity. However, Ibn Taymiyya was well aware of the restrictions that shari‟a placed on 
waging jihad, namely, that of legitimate authority. John Kelsay observes Ibn Taymiyya‟s 
dilemma:  
“Rulers, as well as subjects, may depart from Islam in ways suggestive of apostasy, rebellion, or 
unbelief. When this situation holds, who has the duty, and with it the right, of punishing the ruler. . 
? Who will establish [legitimate] authority if and when those who hold the reins of power are 
themselves corrupt?”45 
Though this stipulation limits Ibn Taymiyya‟s doctrine from constituting a comprehensive 
theological basis for “just revolution,” he does acknowledge that the punishment for dereliction 
of duty may be incumbent on individuals rather than standing armies, depending on the 
circumstance.
46
 Thus, Ibn Taymiyya directed his call for jihad in defense of Islam against the 
crusaders from the West, Mongols from the East, and the “half-Muslims” who polluted the dar 
al-Islam by their unorthodoxy and neglect of their obligations under Islam. 
 
 Jihad in the Counter-Crusades and the Classical Islamic Tradition 
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 Whether he knew it or not, Urban II launched the Crusades at an opportune moment. The 
Muslim world lacked both political and religious unity with no imam to lead the war in defense 
of the dar al-Islam.  The loss of Muslim territory and the religious and political division in that 
which remained was unprecedented in Islamic history. Consequently, the Muslim response 
would arise from new theological and political doctrines of jihad that sought to apply the 
teachings of the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence to the wars they fought at the time. As a living 
tradition, Sunni jurisprudence of the Counter-Crusades was both a product of and an addition to 
the doctrines of Islam‟s classical period. James Turner Johnson identifies three points on which 
the practices of jihad during the Counter-Crusades shifted from the doctrines of classical 
jurisprudence: 
“The jihad against the Crusaders. . .was not the religiously motivated and authorized offensive 
warfare that the classical jurists had had in mind. As pursued under the leadership of Nur al-Din 
and Saladin this jihad defined a different normative model. It was, in the first place, defensive in 
character, aimed at retaking lands once part of the core of the Dar al-Islam, rather than 
expansionist; thus it violated the classical assumption that the function of jihad would be always to 
extend the boundaries of the Dar al-Islam to a new territory with the ultimate end of occupying all 
the earth. In second place, the jihad as waged by Nur al-Din and Saladin was closely tied up with 
their purposes as regional Muslim rulers; their campaigns were not warfare of the entire Dar al-
Islam against the forces of unbelief. That Saladin‟s war in Palestine ended not with capitulation of 
the Crusaders but a treaty between the Muslim and Christian sides fits with the character of a war 
for limited territorial and political goals but not with the classical juristic concept of jihad by the 
Muslim community, which envisions an inevitable total victory by the Muslims and rules out the 
possibility of permanent treaties with non-Muslims. And in third place, Nur al-Din and Saladin 
were temporal rulers who, though personally pious, had no credentials as the imam of which the 
classical jurists spoke. Their authority to lead such a jihad had to come from a different source. 
That source was the individual duty of every Muslim to defend Muslim religion and territory 
against unbelievers.”47 
Johnson‟s first point examines the Counter-Crusades in respect to the classical juridical 
distinction between jihad and qital; jihad as a war to bring about the rule of God by expanding 
the dar al-Islam and fighting disbelief, and qital which signified fighting crime, rebellion, and 
defending borders as a non-ideological, political task. The majority of Muslims viewed the 
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Crusades as yet another invasion in a long history of foreign conquest of little significance both 
at the time and even as late as the 19
th
 Century; the Arabic word for “crusader,” salibi, entered 
the lexicon in the mid-1800s and no Arab written history of the Crusades had been published 
until 1899.
48
 Muslims and Christians lived peaceably together for centuries. The misguided idea 
that the Crusades and its participants were vehemently bent on destroying Islam is a modern 
legacy. The real threat of the crusaders was their territorial acquisition, a problem that required 
fighting in defense of Muslim territories more so than Muslim religion. 
 The second difference Johnson identifies is that aspects of the political conduct of the 
Counter-Crusades represented a change from the classical notion of jihad. Indeed, it would be a 
stretch to claim that the enterprises of Saladin never abandoned the established tradition of fiqh 
in favor of military success or political practicality. Deviation from the tradition arised as the 
product of a goal-oriented military strategy rather than one that focused meticulously on the 
theological legitimacy of its means. Thus, the treaties between Muslim armies and the crusaders 
can be viewed as concessions of convenience rather than a pause in the application of jihad. 
Muslim political rulerd like Saladin often rationalized questionable practices by their practicality 
rather than theological mandate, setting a precarious historical precedent with lasting 
ramifications.  
New doctrines of jihad jurisprudence accompanied the . Important developments in the 
tradition of Sunni jurisprudence redefined the role of jihad. Classical jurisprudence had 
envisioned jihad as an uncompromising policy of expanding the rule of God under the authority 
of the imam, through warfare only if invitations to submit were ignored or declined. Al-Ghazali‟s 
doctrine of sufficiency, reaffirmed by jurists like al-Sulami and Ibn Taymiyya, put forth the idea 
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of jihad as individual and apart from the authority of the imam. The concept of an internal jihad 
also arose as a method of enforcing religious purity, without which God would continue to 
punish Muslims with the foreign invaders. In the wake of the Crusades, the nature of jihad 
clearly shifted in both jurisprudence and practice. 
 Johnson also makes the relatively straightforward point that the authority of Nur al-Din 
and Saladin to wage jihad came not from their status as the religious head of the Muslim 
community, but from their military and political prowess that united the Muslim world. Though 
the „Abbasid caliph did recognize Saladin as the temporal ruler, granting him a degree of 
legitimacy in the jihad, this merely reflected the traditional relationship between the temporal 
and religious leaders in Islamic history. The difference in this case, as Johnson explains, their 
leadership was theologically justified as the actualization of the classical doctrine that jihad 
becomes an individual duty in defense of Islam, which abolishes the requirement of the imam‟s 
authorization. Al-Sulami‟s Book of Jihad provided a different argument than that which on 
which Nur al-Din and Saladin made their claims. Al-Sulami viewed the Muslim response to the 
Crusades was an exceptional circumstance not because the invaders threatened Islam, but 
because they were divine punishment for the caliphs‟ failure to fulfill their obligation to wage 
jihad. Thus, the assertion that jihad was incumbent on individuals continued to dominate Sunni 
jurisprudence.  
The political jihad of the Counter-Crusades put forth a new argument; territories once 
part of the dar al-Islam must be rightfully restored to Muslim rule as a measure in defense of 
Islam. In such a case, the authorization of the imam was irrelevant and it was the duty of each 
Muslim to wage jihad in this effort.
49
 Indeed, the jihad propaganda of Nur al-Din and Saladin 
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sought not only to legitimize their leadership by emphasizing their piety, but also by spreading 
this concept of the individual duty to defend the dar al-Islam. This bottom-up power structure in 
the Counter-Crusades was the opposite of the top-down leadership of the imam which classical 
jurists viewed as the only legitimate authority in jihad warfare. In the wake of the Mongol 
invasions, Ibn Taymiyya‟s “Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad” supported the notion 
individual obligation to wage jihad by combining the concept that reclaiming elements of the dar 
al-Islam constituted jihad in defense of the religion with the theological argument that jihad had 
been neglected by the leaders of the umma.  
 The precedents set by the pre-modern Muslim jurists and political leaders of the Muslim 
response to the Crusades became an important part of the Just War concept in the Islamic 
tradition. The practices of Nur al-Din and Saladin in their political and military campaigns and 
their justifying ideologies contained elements that appear to reflect the warfare standards of the 
time rather than saintly adhesion to the principles of classical jurisprudence on the conduct of 
jihad. However, adaptation of the classical principles of shari‟a to the practical necessities of the 
crisis at hand became more a part of the evolution of the tradition rather than a departure from it. 
Doctrines that developed out of medieval Islamic jurisprudence and the political campaigns of 
the Counter-Crusades had lasting implications for how jihad doctrine could adapt to different 
circumstances, especially in a dar al-Islam that lacked unity in every way. As the borders 
between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb became increasingly blurred, the juridical question 
of how to further establish justice or shari‟a on earth became a difficult task of applying timeless 
doctrine to an ever-changing world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Jihad Jurisprudence in Modernity 
 
 
 
 
 
A prominent interpretation of Western imperialism in the Muslim world in the latter half 
of the second millennium classifies the modern phenomenon as a continuation of the religiously 
driven military expeditions that began with Urban II‟s decree at Clermont. Sayyid Qutb, a chief 
ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, argues this position in the book he wrote from 
prison, Milestones: 
“We see an example of [deception] today in the attempts of Christendom to try to deceive us by 
distorting history and saying that the Crusades were a form of imperialism. The truth of the matter 
is that the latter-day imperialism is but a mask for the crusading spirit, since it is not possible for it 
to appear in its true form, as it was possible in the Middle Ages. The unveiled crusading spirit was 
smashed against the rock of the faith of Muslim leadership which came from various elements, 
including Salahuddin the Kurd and Turan Shah the Mamiuk, who forgot the differences of 
nationalities and remembered their belief, and were victorious under the banner of Islam .”1 
This popular perception among modern radical Islamist groups, voiced by Qutb, among others, 
insists that the exploitation and subjugation of Muslims that classified European colonial 
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ventures were another manifestation of religious conflict, with political and economic rationales 
as a convenient façade. As Qutb observes and dismisses, the Crusades and imperialism have also 
been considered as a different means of achieving a single purpose by some scholars in the 
opposite manner. The idea of proto-imperialism argues that the Crusades were economically and 
politically motivated and the crusader states were de facto European colonies.
2
  
Historically, imperialism represented a political attitude of power expansion that often 
entailed gaining economic advantages through commandeering and controlling foreign markets 
with colonization and attempts to “civilize” and influence native populations. Crusading, on the 
other hand, was classified as a military operation waged with divine authority and for religious 
reasons. Jonathan Riley-Smith observes that both concepts played a role in the policies of 
European colonial powers in the latter half of the second millennium. The various European 
Christian movements to establish convents to bring civilization and Christianity to other peoples 
viewed as barbarous in the Muslim world, especially in North Africa, entailed a degree of risk 
that required armament of those taking part.
3
 The existence of military orders that served to 
protect missionaries in Central and East Africa were authentically both crusading and imperialist 
ventures: the authority, purpose, and vows of the members were religious in nature while the 
goals of civilizing natives and spreading European influence were elements of an essentially 
imperialistic agenda.
4
 Such phenomena of what Riley-Smith terms paracrusading certainly 
existed, but were not the attempts at subjugation which Qutb and others observe as attacks on 
Islam.  
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A complicating factor that might have warranted such a perception was the pervasiveness 
of crusading rhetoric in political and economic enterprises of colonialism that subjugated and 
exploited Muslim peoples – what Riley-Smith calls pseudocrusading. Napoleon‟s statement to 
his troops leaving for the Levant in the 1860s is a notable example: “On that distant soil, rich in 
great memories . . . you will show yourselves to be the worthy descendants of those heroes who 
carried the banner of Christ gloriously in that land.”5 In the post World War I mandate of the 
French in Lebanon and Syria, a common anecdote told of General Henri Gouraud kicking 
Saladin‟s grave in Damascus, proclaiming, “Awake, O Saladin! We have returned.”6 The British 
mandate in Palestine entailed widespread propaganda referring to the movement as the “New” or 
“Last Crusade,” to evoke feelings of nostalgia toward romanticized events of the Middle Ages 
and rouse enthusiasm out of British troops.
7
 Examples of such pseudocrusading, rhetorical 
tribute to the historical events of the Crusades, were numerous during the age of European 
imperialism. However, as Riley-Smith observes, “pseudocrusading had no correspondence to the 
old reality, but borrowed its rhetoric and imagery to describe ventures – particularly imperialist 
ones – that had nothing at all to do with the Crusades.”8 The same rhetoric used to inspire and 
idealize European imperialism provided a justifying argument for the ideologies and jihad 
doctrines of many modern Islamic resistance movements who perceived Islam as under attack 
from the West once again. 
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Muslim Resistance to European Imperialism and Non-Islamic 
Governance 
 
 Ibn Taymiyya‟s theological arguments for armed opposition to illegitimate, “half-
Muslim” rulers of Islamic territories provided the basis for the ideologies of the 19th and early 
20
th
 century anti-colonialist jihad movements. The doctrine of jihad as an individual duty of all 
Muslims, when the voluntary, imam-authorized force has failed, became a fundamental 
theological justification for fighting against the Western colonizing powers. The second 
significant argument drawn from Ibn Taymiyya was the equation of Muslims who cooperated 
with the colonizers to apostates who have abandoned the true path of Islam. With such a 
condemnation, “true” Muslims were now obligated to fight against their own governments under 
the banner of jihad. Facing the military superiority of the European imperial powers led many to 
seek a theologically sound ideology of armed resistance that was also practical to their dilemma. 
The question of legitimate authority, which Ibn Taymiyya himself struggled to resolve, 
continued to present a troubling obstacle for the leaders of these jihad movements in their 
contention for theological support. In many parts of the Muslim world, from Indonesia to 
Algeria, local uprisings and political struggles against foreign colonizers brought religious 
justifications for waging jihad and the tradition of Sunni jurisprudence into the unprecedented 
context of European imperialism. 
 In 18
th
 century Arabia, the Hanbali theologian Ibn „Abd al-Wahhab denounced the 
practices of visiting the tombs of Muslim saints and the veneration of the dead, even the Prophet, 
as innovative and un-Islamic. His campaign against such acts across Arabia advanced a 
reactionary, orthodox brand of Islam, insisting on a return to the sacred texts and the pre-modern 
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traditions. „Abd al-Wahhab drew inspiration from Ibn Taymiyya‟s medieval arguments against 
un-Islamic innovations which referred to the practices of the monistic Sufis, such as pilgrimage 
to shrines and the worship of relics and saints. „Abd al-Wahhab‟s religious message gained 
legitimacy as it united with the political campaign of Muhammad Ibn al-Saud, the founder of the 
Saudi dynasty. In return for supporting al-Saud‟s rule, „Abd al-Wahhab gained status as the 
imam and a vow from al-Saud to wage a rigorous jihad against the non-believers.
9
 In the 
medieval tradition of Ibn Taymiyya, this Wahhabi jihad meant persecuting Muslims who refused 
to reform their non-Islamic practices as well as resisting the un-Islamic rule of the Ottoman state, 
which „Abd al-Wahhab accused of fostering unbelief.10 In Arabia, the Ottomans were viewed as 
a foreign power inhibiting the establishment of a true Islamic state founded on principles of 
shari‟a. Movements of Muslim resistance to non-Islamic or foreign rule, including European 
imperial powers as well as the Ottoman rule, would draw on the same medieval justifications for 
jihad in the centuries to follow. 
 British rule in India had firmly usurped the power of the Mongol emperors by the early 
Nineteenth Century. New colonial taxation policies disrupted the traditional social order, leading 
to the decline of the Muslim land-owning class. As Peters observes, the widespread discontent 
among Indian Muslims was reflected in their theological discourse as to the proper response. The 
Shah „Abd al-„Aziz issued a fatwa in 1803 that declared India a part of dar al-harb under the 
traditional classification, citing the enforcement of non-Islamic rule and indifference to 
protecting the practices of Muslim faith.
11
 Muslim opposition to the British rule soon became a 
movement of jihad, considered to be an individual duty to fight against foreign invaders. 
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However, the notion of armed resistance through a popular uprising lacked the kind of legitimate 
authority demanded by the tradition of shari‟a.12  
The failure of multiple revolts against the British resulted in the subjugation of Indian 
Muslims. In their losing predicament, many middle to upper-class Muslims sought to reconcile 
their ideological opposition with their desire to be reintegrated in the British-Indian 
administrative beaurocracy. Those who took up arms in opposition suspected that the Muslims 
who did not were conniving to restore the old military and land-holding aristocracy.
13
 The Indian 
„ulama seemed to be among those Muslims who sought to reconcile the British presence. From 
the 1870s onward, a number of fatwas were decreed which argued that Muslims had no religious 
duty to fight the British.
14
 One argument was that India was still dar al-Islam because the non-
Islamic government still afforded Muslims the freedom to practice their religion. Another 
viewpoint conceded that India was indeed dar al-harb, but that the necessity to protect Muslims 
from harm and the impossibility of success made jihad unlawful. The third perspective, that of 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, suggested that India could be described as dar al-Islam or dar al-harb in 
their unique circumstance, but that it was dar al-aman, “territory of security”, where Muslims 
were permitted to live peaceably.
15
 This unorthodox doctrine of the Indian „ulama found little 
support in fatwas from the Meccan juridical authorities, who considered the Indian situation to 
remain as dar al-Islam. However, it was apparent to the advocates of jihad in India that the 
classical tradition clearly suggested otherwise.
16
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The Muslim resistance to French colonization in Algeria suffered a similar fate. The 
leaders of the Berber and Arab tribal federations and the „ulama threw their support behind the 
son of a powerful sheikh to be their military commander, „Abd al-Qadir, in 1832. „Abd al-Qadir 
utilized the network of the twenty-five mystical religious orders in Algeria, belonging to one of 
the most politically influential himself, to unify the Algerian tribes under Islam while 
simultaneously trying to expand the territories of his rule in opposition to the French.
17
 When in 
1837 the French invaded a territory he considered to be his under their treaty, he announced that 
their agreement had been broken and that shari‟a prescribed the resumption of jihad as the 
necessary response.
18
 „Abd al-Qadir justified his resistance within the tradition of shari‟a and 
sought support through promotion of the medieval doctrine of sufficiency, arguing that “helping 
Muslims that are unable to defend themselves against an enemy attack is a general obligation 
incumbent upon all Muslims that are near to them.”19 He went to great lengths to legitimize his 
claims, requesting fatwas from different religious scholars for authority on matters such as 
killing those who collaborated with the non-Muslim rulers for apostasy. A 1835 letter from one 
of his agents to a tribe which was cooperating with the French reflected this belief: “He who will 
follow the infidel will not be included among the Muslims.”20 „Abd al-Qadir‟s efforts to gain 
religious legitimacy through appeal to the tradition of jurisprudence and Ibn Taymiyya‟s 
theological doctrines in particular were initially bolstered by the temporary support of the 
religious scholars. The „ulama of Fez issued a fatwa authorizing „Abd al-Qadir with the full 
power of the imam in jihad against the French and the enforcement of shari‟a among the Muslim 
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Algerians in 1837.
21
 „Abd al-Qadir‟s campaign of Algerian political unity and military resistance 
against the French depended heavily on his legitimacy as the leader of the jihad. 
Eventually, the Moroccan Sultan‟s refusal to offer any military, financial, or ideological 
support and the overwhelming military superiority of the French forces ultimately led to the 
defeat of „Abd al-Qadir and his resistance movement. As with the juridical rulings on the tail end 
of the Indian resistance, the „ulama arrived at a consensus that rejected arguments for jihad 
against the French in Algeria in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. The fatwa of the Hanafite 
school asserted that Algeria was still dar al-Islam so long as shari‟a continued to be enforced, 
implying that jihad was unnecessary. The Shafi‟ite fatwa more explicitly asserted that Algeria 
had become dar al-harb by the domination of its foreign conquerors, but that jihad remained 
nonobligatory because there was no chance of success.
22
 The French forces disseminated these 
fatwas against waging jihad among the Algerian Muslim populations, resulting in significant 
Muslim emigration and some protests. However, significant religious opposition to the French in 
Algeria became inconsequential by the early 20
th
 century.
23
 
The French expedition in Egypt was less successful. Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula 
heeded the call for jihad in the initial insurgent revolt against the French, who were conceived as 
“infidels come to destroy the religion of Muhammad.”24 Having only been in Egypt for three 
years, Napoleon‟s forces were handily driven out by an allied effort of Britain and the Ottomans 
in 1801.
25
 Though Egypt remained a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, it operated with a 
relative degree of autonomy until 1882 when the British besieged Alexandria and invaded the 
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country.
26
 Egyptians rallied behind the Minister of War, Ahmad „Urabi, who became the 
spokesmen of the anti-European National Party. The Egyptian governor, known as the Khedive, 
dismissed „Urabi, denounced the rebellion, and proclaimed that the British “had only come to 
restore law and order” at his request.27 „Urabi rebuked the Khedive and maintained control of the 
military with popular support. On the day the British began their siege, many of the Egyptian 
„ulama threw their support behind the „Urabi Revolt with exhortations to join the noble jihad 
against the apostate Khedive and the infidel invaders.
28
 The Khedive responded with its own 
campaign of religious propaganda which asserted that „Urabi and his followers had abandoned 
Islam through their refusal to submit to the legitimate rulers of Muslim Egypt. Furthermore, this 
argument put forth by the “westernizing” „ulama denounced „Urabi‟s claim to jihad as 
illegitimate because it would ensure needless suffering of Muslims and inevitable defeat.
29
 
Ultimately, the modern weaponry of the Western imperial power once again guaranteed that the 
native Muslim resistance movement would fail. 
The Italian colonization of Libya was not so quick to gain Ottoman support against the 
local resistance. The Ottomans initially sided with the tribal resistance of the Sanusiyyah, a strict 
orthodox Islamic brotherhood that maintained de facto governance more inland where Ottoman 
influence was minimal. In 1912, the Sanusi leader al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif issued a statement 
addressed to all Muslims facing infidel occupations that declared jihad to be an obligation of 
every Muslim, and that “one who refrains from partaking in the jihad, does not anymore belong 
to the religion,” and the same “for those who side with the enemy for the sake of worldly goods 
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in order to fight the Muslims.”30 Peters observes that the influence of „Abd al-Qadir‟s movement 
eighty years prior in Algeria was so great that al-Sharif “quoted extensively” from at least one 
significant fatwa from that period.
31
  
The political leaders of these religiously justified resistance movements adopted 
arguments and doctrines for legitimacy from the Islamic tradition as well as their 
contemporaries. The concept of Mahdism also transcended geographical and political boundaries 
during this time. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, the leader of the Sudanese revolt against the 
Egyptian Khedive, addressed the challenge for religious legitimacy by proclaiming himself to be 
the Mahdi, the apocalyptic redeemer of the world in Islam. He declared jihad against Anglo-
Egyptian occupation and the infidels who denied his status as the Mahdi with the goal to bring 
Islamic rule to the Sudan and enforce shari‟a. Muhammad Ahmad‟s Mahdism received a fierce 
backlash from the Egyptian „ulama for its unorthodox presupposition, but continued to have a 
significant influence on jihad resistance against Anglo-Egyptian rule even after the British 
overthrew the Mahdist state in 1898.
32
  
The concept of the Mahdi as the legitimate authority for declaring jihad against Western 
colonial powers appeared beyond the Sudan. After the death of Sayyid Ahmad in the Indian 
resistance, it was popular belief among his supporters that he had been the Mahdi, and they were 
obligated to continue fighting the British infidels until he returned.
33
 Ironically, Napoleon had 
even suggested that his apparent invincibility was the prophesized power of the Mahdi, in a 
desperate cry for legitimacy as he struggled in his short-lived counter-insurgency campaign in 
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Egypt.
34
 Across the Islamic world, the leaders of armed jihadi resistance movements recognized 
the need for a legitimate Muslim authority that, in the classical tradition, could only be fulfilled 
by the imam. However, without the unity of a single Muslim polity and facing imperial armies 
that commanded an immediate, local response, these leaders could not help but to seek 
theological justification for their authority in unorthodox ways. 
 
Muslim Resistance to the British Mandate and Zionism in Palestine 
 
The European mandates in the Middle East in the aftermath of World War I continued the 
attitudes of imperialism in a new political form. After the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire in alliance with the British during the war, Muslims in the Levant felt their promises of 
independence were betrayed as they saw continued foreign rule in their lands. The declared 
purpose of the British Mandate in Palestine referred to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations which described the obligation to provide stable governance for peoples “not yet able 
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”35 The concern over 
the challenges of modernity and lack of faith in the ability of such peoples to govern themselves, 
however sincere and compassionate, was characteristically imperialistic. In the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, this attitude was explicitly announced as official policy.  
Unique to the Palestinian mandate, however, was the continuation of the practice of 
colonial settlement. Once again, the British assumed the notion that Western industrialized 
nations were under the authority and even the moral imperative to seize control of the affairs and 
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resources of an indigenous population in the name of progress. The idea that the Palestinian 
Arabs were “inherently incapable of building the country because their leaders were parasitic and 
their masses primitive,” was widely held among senior level British policy makers.36 As Scott 
Atran observes, the Palestinian Mandate differed from the other colonial ventures because in this 
case, the socio-economic intervention would be carried out through the implementation of the 
ideologically derived Zionist enterprise.
37
 Indeed, the official British Mandate for Palestine 
explicitly listed the goals of reconstituting a national homeland for the Jews and facilitating the 
accommodation of Jewish settlers in Palestine.
38
 At the same time, the ideology of Zionism had 
begun at the end of the 19
th
 century with Theodor Herzl‟s World Zionist Organization, which 
stated the goal of creating a Jewish state in response to the historical persecution of Jews in 
Europe and Russia. In its early stages, supporters of Zionism considered Palestine merely as one 
of multiple territories suitable for Jewish settlement, but religious zeal and restorationist ideology 
of both Jews and Christians influenced the movement‟s focus on Palestine.39 In 1917, Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Balfour declared the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine to be an official 
policy of the British Government.  
By the 1920s, the British-sanctioned Jewish settlement of Palestine had begun to take a 
devastating toll on its Arab population. The economic and social decline of the Palestinians, 
partially caused by high taxes, loss of land, and exclusion from the newly developing Jewish 
industry, resulted in political radicalization of the educated elite and lower class alike.
40
 Initially, 
opposition to the European mandate powers included both Christian and Muslim Arabs and was 
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primarily inspired by feelings of nationalism rather than religion. Peters observes that the 
feelings of Arab Nationalism that developed against the Ottoman Empire in the years leading up 
to the mandates were secular in nature, as Ottoman rule was self-identified as Islamic.
41
 
However, given their unique problem of Jewish settlers, Palestinians soon recognized the Zionist 
movement as their primary threat rather than British government, which they viewed as a victim 
to a strong Jewish influence in policy-making.
42
 
 The first organized religious opposition movement against the British Mandate and 
Zionist settlement rose out of Haifa. Sheikh „Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a religious scholar who fled 
from Syria after being condemned to death for his participation in revolt against the French, led 
the Palestinian jihad in its early years. Qassam formulated a view during his studies at al-Azhar 
in Cario under Muhammad al-„Abduh, which saw imperialism of the West as the primary threat 
to Islam.
43
 This school of thought advanced brand of Islam resembling that of „Abd al-Wahhab, 
calling for a departure from the backward policy of strict adherence to the Islamic tradition and a 
return to early Islamic doctrine. Qassam argued that the Zionist settlers and the British Mandate 
constituted a breach of the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam, making jihad the individual duty of 
every Muslim.
44
 Further legitimizing this claim, Qassam blamed the „ulama for failing to 
rightfully declare jihad, leaving the obligation to the individual Muslim to revolt against the 
occupying powers.  
Frustrated by the refusal of support from the „ulama and the political elite, Qassam took 
the initiative himself to lead the jihad both ideologically and militarily. As early as the 1920s, 
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Qassam was organizing “jihadi cells” – essentially guerilla warfare gangs – to fight the British 
and the Zionist settlers.
45
  The ideology of Qassam and those in his organization is apparent in 
the creed the members followed: 
“Faith in God was the first requirement. . . The leadership set forth the Islamic creed conscious 
that it was a revolt against imperialism, aggression, apathy, despotism and oppression. It was the 
requirement that each member memorize what he could of the Qur‟anic [verses] on jihad in the 
Path of God and the homeland. . . The members studied the Islamic wars led by the Prophet 
Muhammed. . . Salah al-Din. . . and other of the great warriors of history.”46 
The religious and historical precedents in jihad had a strong influence on the Muslim resistance 
organized by Qassam in Palestine. After fatal clash with British forces in 1935, Qassam‟s death, 
heralded as martyrdom, gave momentum to his movement and its ideology leading up to the 
revolt of 1936. Swedenberg observes that although Qassam became a popular symbol of the 
Palestinian resistance, there was and continues to be confusion among Palestinians as to how to 
label the essence of his ideology. The most popular interpretations of Qassam classify him as a 
Palestinian nationalist, pan-Arabist, mujahid, and “proto-socialist” guerilla warrior.47 Though 
other movements also drew inspiration from Qassam‟s resistance, his ideology as a Muslim 
reformist and mujahid continues to influence Palestinian jihad movements today. 
During this same period, concern for the holy sites of Jerusalem became an increasing 
concern among Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike. The Supreme Muslim Council sent 
delegations to Muslim countries with hopes to rouse support for the Palestinian movement by 
emphasizing the religious sanctity of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock in 
Jerusalem. The 1931 international convention of renowned Muslim scholars and political leaders 
in Jerusalem proclaimed that the site was to be defended against the British and Zionists, but fell 
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short of issuing a fatwa for jihad.
48
 However, the resolution which passed on the last day 
contained the condemnation of any Muslim who aids the British or Zionists as an apostate.
49
 
Anti-colonial sentiments culminated in the 1936-1939 revolt, with support from Muslims across 
the world, including fatwas from various „ulama endorsing jihad against the British and Jews in 
Palestine as a duty for all Muslims.
50
 The Palestinians in the revolt itself were moved primarily 
by nationalistic ideology, though religion was certainly more than a rhetorical element.
51
 As 
Peters points out, the call for jihad was mostly imported from international sentiments of Islamic 
solidarity and concern to rescue the holy sites of Jerusalem.
52
 The distinct local and global jihad 
movements against Zionism in Palestine continue to manifest themselves in different forms 
today. 
The armed conflicts with Western imperial powers in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries 
challenged Muslim resistance groups with the task of reinterpreting classical and medieval 
rulings on warfare in an unprecedented context. The political commandeering of Islamic 
territories by Western nations contested the concept of a distinct dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, 
which earlier jurists had incorporated extensively into their doctrines for jihad. With a politically 
divided umma and an ideologically divided „ulama, Muslim militants looked to the Counter-
Crusades as a source of legitimizing historical precedent and mobilizing inspiration as they 
declared jihad against the latest invasion of the West. The medieval doctrine of sufficiency, 
supported by al-Ghazali, al-Sulami, Ibn Taymiyya, and others, justified the argument that jihad 
to defend Islamic lands against these invaders was the individual duty of every Muslim. 
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However, as the modernist tendency of the „ulama became mainstream in the face of the 
overwhelming military superiority of the imperial powers, marginalized militants‟ feelings of 
being betrayed by their own leaders created an enabling environment for the radicalization of 
militant ideology. 
  
Ijtihad, Neo-Jurists, and Islamist Militancy 
 
 The political and military failures of anti-colonial resistance movements in the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 centuries resulted from the technological superiority of the industrial European powers. The 
great irony of the resistance movements is that colonialism actually empowered them in two 
ways; the Western colonizers undermined the existing authorities in the Muslim world, and the 
cultural exchange produced the positive externality of the print revolution. The introduction of 
modern technology led to an increased availability of books, including the reproduction of 
original Islamic texts, which in turn accelerated the growth of literacy and the development of a 
professional class. Mohammed Ayoob terms this phenomenon, Islam‟s Proto-Reformation, 
comparing this phenomenon to the populist religious reform movement of 15
th
-16
th
 century 
Europe.
53
 While the authority of the Catholic Church suffered as European Christians began to 
interpret the teachings of the Bible independently, now the „ulama in the Muslim world 
experienced a similar fate. The learned class of Muslim scholars previously had held an 
intellectual monopoly as the sole interpreters of shari‟a and unquestioned religious authorities 
until the modernization brought by the West to the region gave birth to this Islamic Proto-
Reformation. The practice of ijtihad by the rapidly growing class of literate Muslims carried 
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prolific political ramifications. The birth of a new kind of jurist, Muslims without extensive and 
formal education in Islam and shari‟a reasoning, provided mobilizing ideologies for populist 
social and political uprisings that called for jihad with the goal of an Islamic state. 
 In Egypt, as a response to political frustration with British imperialism and the ruling 
class of Egyptian elite who embraced modernization and the West, Islamism became the 
fundamental ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood 
began as an apolitical social services organization, but sympathy and support for the Palestinian 
resistance helped solidify the Brotherhood‟s sense of purpose, and by 1941 they had announced 
their own candidates for parliamentary elections.
54
 The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood was 
a school teacher, Hasan al-Banna, whose brilliance as an organizer and activist outweighed his 
lack of qualification as a philosopher or theologian. Al-Banna‟s call for Islamic reform in Egypt 
was popular not by any personal authority of his own, but because he gave a voice to the 
widespread feelings of political and social discontent that characterized the attitude of the 
average Egyptian Muslim. Hasan al-Banna offered an ideology of resilience, piety, and hope, 
that through the Islamicization of the Egyptian nation and the reinstatement of shari‟a, social 
injustice could be eliminated. He blamed the non-Islamic collaborative policies of the Egyptian 
government for the failure to drive out the corrupting forces of the imperial West, which 
prohibited the rule of shari‟a. The obvious question was how the Muslims of Egypt could 
accomplish these goals and set an example for the rest of the world. Al-Banna‟s vision primarily 
focused on political measures to achieve social justice, but he continued to emphasize jihad as a 
necessary and mandatory element of the movement. 
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In his treatise On Jihad, al-Banna reiterated the claim that jihad is an unavoidable 
obligation for every Muslim and provided passages of supporting evidence from the Qur‟an, 
Sunna, and classical works of jurisprudence. The rulings of more recent Muslim jurists, he 
argued, are irrelevant because “the Islamic umma has lost the ordinances of its own religion on 
the question of jihad along with the consensus of opinion of the Muslims throughout ever period 
of their history.”55 He condemned the Muslim community for shirking its duty to wage jihad, as, 
he argues, this obligation had been confirmed by religious scholars who practiced independent 
reasoning (ijtihad) and “strictly followed tradition” alike.56 Al-Banna berated the Muslim 
community as a whole, but specifically blamed his contemporary religious scholars for failing to 
uphold what he sees as the tradition. He questioned the integrity of the „ulama of his day, citing 
exemplary jurists like „Abd al-Wahhab and others from earlier periods, who fought personally as 
embattled scholars in historical campaigns of jihad.
57
 
Hasan al-Banna also offered a message of moderation in a section of the treatise entitled 
“Mercy in the Islamic Tradition”. This section reiterated the regulatory rulings of the classical 
Islamic tradition which forbid atrocities of war, including aggression, mutilation, plundering, and 
the killing of non-combatants.
58
 Al-Banna continued to discuss the common belief that fighting 
is the “lesser jihad” and the jihad of the soul is a higher endeavor. He also entertained a doctrine 
of fiqh which suggests that “one of the loftiest forms of jihad is to utter a word of truth in the 
presence of a tyrannical ruler.”59 Though al-Banna refrained from explicitly denouncing such 
doctrines, he questioned their authenticity in the transmission of the Sunna and argues that they 
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“would never warrant abandoning jihad” but rather constituted an additional spiritual dimension 
to the notion of striving in the path of God.
60
  
This theological element of al-Banna‟s vision for an Islamic state is “the hallmark of 
modern Islamist thinking” – he essentially separated the concept of shari‟a from the tradition of 
Islamic jurisprudence and the religious authorities of his time.
61
 On the other side of the Muslim 
world, Abul A‟la Mawdudi provided nearly equivalent arguments for his Islamist movement, the 
Jama‟at-i Islami. After the British partition of India on demographic grounds that ultimately led 
to the independence of Pakistan in 1947, Mawdudi, a professional journalist, moved to the new 
state and campaigned to ensure that it would be a true Muslim country, governed by shari‟a. 
Essentially abandoning the effort to preserve Muslim identity in India, Mawdudi sought to 
ensure that Islam would dominate Pakistan in every way.
62
 Indeed, Mawdudi viewed politics as 
the highest expression of spirituality in Islam by establishing God‟s rule over men in a time when 
Western powers had asserted false authority over Muslim lands. Mawdudi‟s political ideology 
reflected a Marxist utopianism that classified the subjugation of one man to another as yet 
another manifestation of polytheism, along with the other Western products of nationalism and 
materialism.
63
  
Mawdudi‟s philosophy grew in opposition to the movement called Ahmadiyyat, which 
used the Qur‟an to make “arguments for freedom of conscience, including freedom of religion, 
speech, and association,” against many of the classical doctrines shari‟a.64 Mawdudi and his 
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followers derided members of the Ahmadiyyat as apostate Muslims, gaining enough influence in 
the Pakistani government to have to group officially declared a non-Islamic movement.
65
 In the 
same fashion as al-Banna in Egypt, Mawdudi berated the „ulama as an outdated institution that 
had lost touch with Islam in the modern world. He renounced the tradition of fiqh for its 
development of liberal doctrine, which he viewed as corrupted by innovation and misguided 
interpretation. Thus, Mawdudi echoed the medieval doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya, rejecting the 
validity of the Islamic tradition after the first four caliphs. Indeed, the adaptive stances of the 
Muslim ruling elite in colonial Egypt, India, Algeria and elsewhere testified to the willingness of 
Muslim authorities across the world to accept non-Islamic rule out of practicality rather than to 
resist out of principle.  
Mawdudi‟s beliefs on jihad, however, were relatively moderate, especially given the 
militancy of his contemporaries and even in comparison to medieval doctrines. Mawdudi insisted 
that jihad could only be legitimately declared and waged under a proper religious and political 
authority of an Islamic state – not by any individual or group.66 Still, Mawdudi insisted that 
“jihad is as much a primary duty of the Muslims concerned as are the daily prayers or fasting. 
One who shirks it is a sinner. His very claim to being a Muslim is doubtful. He is a hypocrite 
whose [religious rituals] and prayers are a sham, a worthless, hollow show of devotion.”67 
Mawdudi agreed with the argument that jihad was an individual obligation when the imam-
authorized, voluntary force had failed or neglected the duty as well as when Muslims were under 
attack from the dar al-harb. However, in contrast to medieval doctrines of al-Sulami and Ibn 
Taymiyya, Mawdudi preached that jihad could only be waged against the “enemies of God” in 
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the dar al-harb, which he loosely defined as non-Islamic lands, and rejected the notion of an 
internal jihad.  
Around the same time in Egypt, a school teacher, literary critic, and political activist 
named Sayyid Qutb offered a radical doctrine of Islamist militancy. Rebuking hundreds of years 
of precedents in the Islamic tradition, Qutb was an extremist even relative to his peers in the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
68
 Ascending to the role of the leading ideologue within the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb incorporated the ideas of al-Banna and Mawdudi into 
his views on the role of Islam and Muslims in the modern world. The idea that the entire world 
existed in a state of jahiliyya was central to Qutb‟s philosophy. The term jahiliyya, and its 
adjective form in Arabic, jahili, carried tremendous weight in the Islamic tradition; though 
literally translating as “ignorance,” the term, in classical Islamic discourse, referred to the time 
before the Prophet brought the message of Islam to the world. This tradition of this rhetoric 
began with Ibn Taymiyya, who declared that the pre-Islamic practices of the “half-Muslims” of 
his day “constituted „jahiliyya in the restricted sense‟ although in the absolute sense it had ended 
with Muhammad‟s mission.”69 The fundamentalist doctrine of „Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th 
century also used the term jahili to describe the condition of unorthodox Muslims.
70
 Mawdudi 
had argued that the world had contained realms of jahiliyya, specifically in the West, that 
threatened the Muslim world with corrupting influence. Though often credited with being the 
first to boldly ascribe jahiliyya to the condition of Muslims, Qutb‟s real contribution was how he 
renounced the possibility of any legitimate human authority, insisting any rule that varied from 
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shari‟a in any way was jahili.71 Qutb insisted that the jahiliyya of Europe pervaded the Muslim 
world, replacing the sovereignty of God with the illegitimate sovereignty of man. Qutb had 
declared Nasserite Egypt to be a product of jahiliyya and even declared tafkir, excommunication, 
against the entire Egyptian political system, an act unprecedented in the Islamic political 
philosophy.
72
 Qutb‟s radicalization of the idea of jahiliyya and his explicit stance against the 
Egyptian government earned him, and the Muslim Brotherhood, a warranted status as enemies of 
the state, leading to the imprisonment and execution of Qutb himself in 1966.  
Like his ideological predecessors, Qutb also argued that the „ulama themselves were 
guilty of corrupting the true teachings of Islam, arguing, ironically, that no man‟s knowledge 
qualified him to exercise ijtihad.
73
 Furthermore, Qutb criticized the very concept of a man 
making an occupation out of Islam and interpreting the Qur‟an and Sunna however it best suit 
them.
74
 Thus, to Qutb, the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence itself was corrupted by jahiliyya 
historically and presently. Fiqh was dependent on the judgment of men who were the product of 
their times; the Qur‟an was the only timeless source of divine revelation, from which liberal 
scholarship in the Islamic tradition had led the Muslim umma astray. As many modern academic 
scholars have observed, Qutb‟s call to return to the classical texts of Islam for guidance instead 
of the tradition of fiqh, characteristic of modern Islamist fundamentalism, constituted a unique 
“hybrid that was both retrogressive and progressive at the same time.”75 The legitimacy of the 
doctrines of ideologues like Qutb no longer depended on support from the „ulama or precedent in 
the Islamic tradition and could therefore respond to the demands of the modern age more freely. 
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Simultaneously, this same insistence on a return to the divine texts commanded a divorce of the 
Muslim community from its modern context to return to a pre-modern lifestyle. 
Qutb‟s perspective on the modern world‟s state of jahiliyya and the illegitimacy of 
human rule shaped his understanding of Islamism. Qutb outlined the just causes for waging 
jihad: “to establish God‟s authority on the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true 
guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end 
the lordship of one man over others.”76 To establish the rule of shari‟a, Qutb asserted that “the 
foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose jahiliyya from the leadership of man, and to 
take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the particular way of life which is its 
permanent feature.”77 This sense of obligation is critical to Qutb‟s understanding of the role of 
Muslims in waging jihad. Qutb asserted that the justifications for jihad lie not in the popular 
Western standards of Just War but in the divinely ordained mission of Islam. He argues that the 
modern liberal religious scholars and those in the tradition who limit the role of jihad to 
defensive war exhibit “defeatist and apologetic mentalities” that ignore the fundamental religious 
imperatives.
78
 Nevertheless, Qutb offered a response to the requirement that warfare be 
defensive: 
“If we insist on calling Islamic jihad a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of 
the word „defense‟ and mean by it „the defense of man‟ against all those elements which limit his 
freedom. These elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well [as] political systems, 
based on economic, racial or class distinctions. When Islam first came into existence, the world 
was full of such systems, and the present-day jahiliyya also has various kinds of such systems.”79 
Qutb‟s efforts to justify jihad by its defensive classification merely patronized his more moderate 
audiences; he otherwise made his point clear that jihad was divinely commanded warfare to 
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liberate men from the rule of man that they may know true freedom and justice under the rule of 
God. He continued to argue, “those who say that Islamic jihad was merely for the defense of the 
„homeland of Islam‟ diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less than 
their „homeland‟”.80 To Qutb, the value of a land relied only on whether or not God‟s authority 
has been established over it and rules supreme; only then was defense of the land a valid 
justification, because it represented defense of Islam.  
  
The Individualization of Religious and Political Authority  
 
As the ideological departure from the tradition of fiqh on the topic of jihad is evident in 
the works of al-Banna, Mawdudi, and especially Qutb, so too are the ideological roots of their 
arguments. While Ibn Taymiyya wrote in the context of the Mongol invaders, the same 
perspective found relevance as the influences of the imperial West conquered the Muslim world 
over five-hundred years later. The development of radical fundamentalist doctrine on the role of 
jihad in achieving Islamist goal of shari‟a rule relied extensively on the plight of the authority of 
the „ulama. The Islamic Proto-Reformation had empowered a journalist and two school teachers 
to a level where they could offer doctrines and opinions in shari‟a with authority to rival that of 
the traditional religious scholars. Kelsay keenly points out that in the long run, “the strongest 
opinions are those that command a consensus among believers.”81 Though the modern divorce of 
legitimate Islamic jurisprudence from its tradition fell short of leaving shari‟a to be determined 
by popularity contest, this departure enabled both the development of non-traditional, or perhaps 
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more accurately, anti-traditional doctrine, and its ability to find legitimacy in the support of a 
sympathetic audience. Indeed, the survivalist strategy of the „ulama, which promoted modernist 
doctrines of pacifism, failed to convince a substantial amount of Muslims. In many cases, the 
„ulama preached the equivalent of the modern jus ad bellum criterion which requires a 
reasonable chance of success. Instead, the Muslims in jihad resistance movements embraced the 
classical doctrines of Islam that encouraged undying militancy and exalted martyrdom as the 
most noble of deaths. 
The various jihad movements during this period also marked the important historical 
development of the non-state actor. The medieval scholars maintained the interpretation of the 
individual obligation to fight in defense of Islam, the military campaigns of their time were 
waged by the governors of recognized polities. However, when Muslim resistance groups 
perceived the official political rulers and „ulama of the Muslim world as collaborating with the 
invading forces that threatened the Islamic way of life, their religious obligations not only 
justified, but commanded revolt, as jihad in the cause of God. Such a response was theologically 
justified both in the ideology of Islamist militancy and the medieval doctrine of sufficiency. The 
neo-jurists seemed to agree on the divinely ordained goal of establishing an Islamic state to 
implement shari‟a and ensure justice. A populist revolt to that end was legitimate because the 
„ulama and Muslim political leadership failed to uphold their duty to authorize and lead jihad 
against the foreign invaders. Thus, the modern development of radical doctrines of Islamist 
militancy has given birth to the argument that a campaign of jihad can be legitimate without the 
authority of an imam, support of the „ulama, or the political structure of the state.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Islamic Resistance Movement: Ideology and Pragmatism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The revolutionary precedents in Islamic jurisprudence that developed in conjunction with 
armed revolt against the agents of Western imperialism in the Muslim world continue to 
influence how present-day jihadist resistance movements defend the legitimacy of their warfare 
with Islamic law. The concept of jihad as an individual obligation in fighting to defend Muslim 
lands against foreign incursion even without the authority of an imam became mainstream in 
opposition to occupying colonial powers. Furthermore, the radicalization of such doctrine by 
Sayyid Qutb and his followers to support armed revolution against local rulers had historic 
implications. The assassins of Anwar Sadat in 1981 used these very doctrines to justify their 
armed resistance within shari‟a in a widely distributed treatise entitled The Neglected Duty. They 
argued that Sadat‟s normalized relations with Israel and cessation of Muslim lands represented 
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an abandonment of Islam that commanded the true believers to violently depose of their apostate 
ruler. The response of the Egyptian „ulama to this declaration focused less on questioning the 
legitimacy of their theological argument, stating instead that the preached violent revolution 
risked doing more harm than good.
1
 Following the precedents established in jurisprudence of the 
colonial era, the Egyptian religious authorities argued for moderation, not because the 
theological arguments had no precedent, but on grounds of practicality. 
The case of Hamas exhibits the opposite tendency – necessity trumping principle to 
encourage, rather than limit, extreme Islamist militancy. However, Hamas operates in a different 
context as an armed resistance to a foreign occupier, not against an indigenous government 
viewed as a collaborator. The establishment of the State of Israel after the Second World War as 
the fulfillment of the Zionist promise antagonized Palestinians by denying them a national 
identity, contributing to their socio-economic plight and alienation from the international 
community. The interpretation of the motives and objectives behind the creation of Israel are 
numerous. In contradistinction to the secular ideology of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), the popular Islamist perspective, views Zionism as, “revenge for all of medieval history,” 
an ideologically motivated assault against Islam.
2
 For these Muslims, “the Palestinian cause is 
not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief.”3 As Ayoob observes of the political 
trends since the 1970s in the Arab world, “Islamist formulations [often] became the foremost 
spokespersons for popular national grievances, and Islamist vocabulary came to be routinely 
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used to promote nationalist agendas.”4 In the ideology of Hamas, the nationalist and Islamist 
agendas are fused into a regionally confined armed resistance movement that justifies its warfare 
with theological doctrine.  
At the outbreak of the 1987 intifada, the leaders of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood established Hamas, an acronym in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(literally meaning “zeal”), as a political organization committed to liberating all of Palestine 
from the illegitimate, anti-Islamic Zionist state. In its early years, Hamas, under the leadership of 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, sought to mobilize and organize discontented Palestinian Muslims in the 
intifada by emphasizing the religious significance of the conflict. The leaders of Hamas drafted a 
charter in 1988 outlining the ideology of the movement and justifying the call to armed revolt 
with historical and theological arguments. As Andrea Nüsse notes, the journal Falistin al-
Muslima is a valuable source that presents the ideology of Hamas through the publication of the 
handbills distributed in Palestine, though the editors deny official affiliation.
5
 However, the 
Charter, written at the time of the organization‟s inception, voiced the founding ideology, while 
the journal, as a monthly periodical, is more of a commentary. Thus, the Charter provides the 
best point of departure from which to examine the degree to which Hamas has adhered to not just 
doctrines from tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, but even its own ideology. 
 
The Ideology of Hamas: The Charter 
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The Charter reveals strong influences of the Islamic resistance movements of the past two 
centuries on the ideology of Hamas. The rhetoric of modern Islamist movements claim Islam as 
their sole authority, while condemning human judgment for its susceptibility to error. Hamas 
follows suit in Article 1 of the first chapter, which outlines the ideological origins of the 
movement and declares Islam as the only source. However, as a whole the Charter reveals a 
range of sources beyond the Qur‟an and Sunna that inspire the ideology of the movement, 
ranging from the affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and quoting the early 20
th
 century 
Muslim poet Muhammad Iqbal to invocation of the anti-colonial jihad of „Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
and the historical jihad of Saladin to take back Palestine from the Crusaders. Though the Charter 
cites the Qur‟an and Sunna extensively, present in nearly every article, the influences of modern 
movements and ideologies are also evident.  
An examination of the Charter must consider its dual purposes; announcing an ideology 
and mobilizing Palestinian Muslims to join the movement. The slogan of Hamas is a case in 
point: “Allah is its goal, the Prophet is its leader, the Qur‟an is its constitution, Jihad is its 
methodology, and Death in the cause of Allah is its highest aspiration.”6 This slogan announces 
the fundamental ideology of Hamas‟s jihad, but one must be mindful that its rhetoric serves 
inspire support for the movement among Muslims in Palestine and around the world rather than 
give clarity to its justifying arguments. Nevertheless, the slogan‟s categorical addressing of 
issues such as just cause and legitimate authority provides a useful structure with which to 
understand the ideology as a whole. 
“Allah is its goal”. This first element of the slogan demonstrates the use extreme Islamist 
language to state the goal of a Muslim Palestine as the just cause of Hamas. The second chapter 
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of the Charter expresses the essential elements of modern Islamist argument in explaining the 
objective of the movement. The influences of prominent Muslim writers as dated as al-Sulami 
and as recent as Sayyid Qutb dominate  Hamas‟s perspective on the state of the world: 
“Values have deteriorated, the plague of the evil folk and oppression and darkness have become 
rampant. . . Nations have been occupied, their people expelled and fallen on their faces 
everywhere on earth. The nation of truth is absent and the nation of evil has been established; as 
long as Islam does not take its rightful place in the world arena everything will continue to change 
for the worse.”7 
Though the Charter refrains from using the extremist term of jahiliyya like several of the 
movement‟s ideological predecessors in the Muslim Brotherhood, it expresses the common 
Islamist characterization of the state of the world.
8
 Hamas adopts the mission to “reinstate” the 
Islamic state as the only way to bring the world out of darkness and oppression with the truth and 
justice of divine rule.  
 While the operational mission of Hamas is limited to the establishment of an Islamic state 
in Palestine, the Charter emphasizes the universality of its cause. In Article 7, the Charter defines 
Hamas as an “international organization,” presuming backing from Muslims around the world on 
the basis of “the clarity of its ideology, its lofty goal, and the sanctity of its objectives.”9 The 
extensive argument for the relevance of Palestine in Its argument for the sanctity of Jerusalem is 
based not on the Qur‟an and Sunna, but on the significance Muslims have given to the city since 
the time of the Prophet. Article 9 of the Charter presents the argument to the international 
community with reference to the popular Islamic belief that the mi‟raj, the night journey of the 
Prophet, took place at the site of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem: 
“We must instill in the minds of the Muslim generation that the Palestinian cause is a religious 
cause. It must be solved on this basis because it contains Islamic sanctuaries where Masjid al-Aqsa 
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is tied firmly to Masjid al-Haram (in Mecca) never to be released, as long as the heavens and earth 
last, by way of the night journey [of the Prophet] and ascension to the heavens from there.”10 
The veneration of al-Aqsa the “third sanctuary in Islam,” the holiest site after Mecca and 
Medina, plays a crucial role in Hamas‟s international appeal. While the sanctity of the two cities 
Mecca and Medina is mentioned in the Qur‟an, the emphasis on Palestine as holy territory to 
Islam has more modern roots.
11
 The rallying of the international Muslim community behind the 
Palestinian anti-colonial resistance in the 1930s, seen through the support of the Supreme Islamic 
Council and results of the 1931 convention, confirmed the significance of Jerusalem to the 
greater Muslim world.  
Hamas champions the Palestinian cause as an imperative of Islam not merely to establish 
Islamic rule, as their Islamist slogan indicates, but to reclaim the holy territory of Palestine. 
Addressing the tension between the Islamist and nationalist elements of its rationale, the Charter 
argues, “Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a part of 
the religious creed.”12  Nüsse points out that on this issue, Hamas departs from its ideological 
predecessors.
13
 Although Mawdudi also confined his political activism to a given geographic 
region under the ideology of global Islamism, he believed Islam placed no value on territory. 
Mawdudi argued against worshipping “the idol of Israel,” citing the change in the direction of 
prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca in 624 as a rejection of “chauvinistic attachment to blood and 
land.”14 Likewise, Qutb voiced the goal of establishing God‟s rule as a global endeavor, valuing 
territory only for God‟s dominion over it.15 The ideology of Hamas modified the doctrines of 
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global Islamism to apply to the local case of Palestinian resistance, drawing on other historical 
precedents and doctrines of Islam to justify their cause. Though rhetorically, Hamas attempts to 
reconcile the nationalist agenda of liberating Palestinian from Zionist occupation with the 
universal mission of Islamism, the two causes still appear to be ideologically incompatible. 
Though the Charter supports nationalism, it rejects the notion that its secular, nationalist 
counterpart, the PLO, could achieve the ultimate victory for the Palestinian cause. The slogan 
states that the goal of Hamas is “Allah,” not “Palestine.” Article 27 of the Charter argues, “we 
cannot exchange the current and future of Islam in Palestine to adopt the secular ideology 
because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our [religion] and 
whosoever neglects part of his [religion] is surely lost.”16 Yet the Charter refrains from 
denouncing the secular PLO as an apostate organization that has abandoned Islam. Instead of 
showing hostility, the Charter depicts Hamas‟s relationship with the PLO as a brother 
organization, united against a common enemy, but with two separate visions. Hamas urges the 
PLO to embrace the Islamist goal that they may unite efforts, but commits itself to waging jihad 
with or without the PLO‟s partnership. 
“The Prophet is its leader. The Qur‟an is its Constitution”. The question of legitimate 
authority is of crucial importance to Hamas‟s religious justification for waging jihad. Hamas‟s 
claim of authority to wage jihad reflects an equivalent strategy to the various claims of Mahdism 
made by multiple anti-colonial resistance movements in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. Unlike these 
historical precedents, however, the leadership of Hamas makes no claim that an individual within 
the movement was the actual Mahdi. Instead, the slogan of the Charter implies that executive 
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decisions would consider the precedents set by the Prophet, as related through the Sunna. Thus, 
the temporal leadership of Hamas attempts to utilize the legitimizing power of Mahdism without 
making radical claims that would undoubtedly alienate moderate Muslims and fundamentalists, 
who comprise a significant ideological support base for the movement. 
Hamas‟s claim that the Qur‟an is its “constitution” presents a second complication in the 
political legitimacy of the organization: the modern phenomenon of the non-state actor. The 
symbolic choice of the word “constitution” seems to defy the international community of secular 
nation-states. While the concept of a constitution implies legal foundations of the nation-state, 
Hamas operates as a non-state actor. The modern concept of international war law, for example, 
signifies the commitment of the nations party to binding agreements, like the Geneva 
Conventions, that establish rules to limit war between countries. Cases of non-state actors 
engaged in armed opposition like Hamas, the PLO, and Hezbollah, pose a serious challenge to 
this idea of an obligation to adhere to a set of universal norms that legally regulate warfare. The 
ambiguity of the case of non-state actors in the realm of international law enables not only the 
non-state actors like Hamas to argue they are excluded from the agreed-upon restrictions, 
themselves not being party to any treaty, but also the nation-states engaged in war against them 
like Israel.
17
  
The phrase “The Qur‟an is its constitution” carries other dimensions of the argument for 
the legitimacy of Hamas. The movement‟s claim that the inviolable word of God is its 
constitution contends for religious legitimacy in a fashion characteristic of modern militant 
Islamist ideology.  By declaring the Qur‟an to be its constitution, Hamas nominally incorporates 
the fundamentalist rejection of the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence and the Islamist ideal of 
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enforcing shari‟a as the supreme law of the land. The Charter further develops this 
fundamentalist view in its identification of Islam as the sole origin of its ideology and the 
absence of any reference to fatwas issued by the traditional „ulama. This claim also presents an 
implicit challenge to the State of Israel by utilizing the connotations associated with the word 
“constitution” in the context of international politics,. In doing so, Hamas implicitly questions 
the legitimacy of Israel, which remains one of the few modern nation-states to lack a 
constitution. 
Looking beyond the implications of Hamas‟s slogan, the organization‟s claim for 
legitimate authority mimics the shari‟a precedents of the anti-colonialist jihad movements. 
Hamas views the Palestinian case as imposed war, rendering the Palestinian jihad exempt from 
the requirement of the imam‟s authorization and applying the obligation to fight to every 
Muslim. However, Hamas takes a more moderate approach than Hasan al-Banna or Sayyid Qutb 
in its valuation of the „ulama. After all, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was a member of the community 
of religious scholars himself. As John Kelsay has pointed out, “no doubt the presence of Sheikh 
Yassin and other „ulama lends an aura of public authority to the struggle.”18 Yet, the Charter 
refrains from mentioning this element of its religious authority and instead hedges its argument 
on the doctrine of sufficiency first formulated by the medieval scholar al-Ghazali and reaffirmed 
by other notorious members of the „ulama, such as al-Sulami and Averroes, over centuries: the 
failure of the voluntary, imam-authorized force to wage jihad or defend the Islamic state 
constitutes an emergency situation that obligated individual Muslims to take up an armed 
struggle. 
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“Jihad is its methodology”. Hamas follows a multitude of historical precedents and 
reaffirmed theological arguments in its campaign of jihad against a foreign aggressor in 
Palestine. In Article 7, the Charter identifies the Islamic Resistance Movement as “a link in the 
[long] chain of jihad against the Zionist occupation, which is connected and tied with the 
initiation [of the jihad] of the Martyr „Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his mujahid brothers in 1936.”19 
The military wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, and the “Qassam rockets” in its arsenal 
commemorate the first leader of a single continuous Palestinian jihad against Zionist occupiers. 
The jihad of Hamas, though most immediately inspired by the armed resistance of Qassam in 
Palestine, also exhibits a strong ideological influence of the theological doctrines developed in 
other historical examples of anti-colonial warfare. The Charter adopts the popularized 
theological argument that jihad in a defensive war commands the participation of every Muslim 
as an individual duty. Article 12 reiterates this doctrine: 
“There is not a higher peak in nationalism or depth in devotion than jihad when an enemy lands on 
the Muslim territories. Fighting the enemy becomes the individual obligation of every Muslim 
man and woman.”20 
This rationale is rooted in the tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth century armed 
resistance movements that popularized the “paradigmatic jihad of modern times as a result of the 
colonial experience.”21 Ayoob explains that the movements that inspire the ideology of Hamas, 
“used the concept of jihad to justify resistance against foreign domination, thereby popularizing 
the modern interpretation of jihad as primarily defensive war against foreign occupation, aimed 
at driving out the occupier.”22  
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The combination of jihad rhetoric with defensive warfare originated in response to the 
Crusades, when Islamic doctrines of jurisprudence and political propaganda first began to fuse 
the concepts of jihad, fighting to expand Islamic rule into the abode of war, and qital, fighting to 
bring security within and at the borders of the abode of Islam.
23
 The Charter refers to the 
Crusades as the beginning of the “Ideological Invasion” that sought the destruction of Islam, 
continued by mercenaries and imperialism in more recent centuries.
24
 By portraying Israel as a 
“crusader outpost in the midst of historically Islamic territory,” Hamas defends its jihad with 
analogous justifications.
25
 Accordingly, the Charter supports this perception with the anecdotes 
of General Allenby announcing the end of the Crusades upon taking control of Jerusalem in 1917 
and of General Henri Gouraud kicking Saladin‟s grave during the French Mandate in Syria. The 
historical analogy of the current Palestinian jihad to that of Saladin proves to be a prominent 
theme in Hamas‟s ideological justification. 
 Despite the clear ideological influences of the campaigns of jihad during the Crusades 
and the era of European colonialism, the Charter refrains from classifying the warfare against 
Israel as defensive in its terminology. Rather, the position of Hamas reflects the extremist 
rhetoric of Sayyid Qutb; the Charter only mentions “defense” in the sense of defense of mankind 
and Islamic civilization. Adopting the powerful rhetoric of Qutb, the Charter declares that the 
Islamic Resistance Movement fights as a campaign of liberation, not defense. Furthermore, the 
Charter inserts this radical Islamist terminology into the popularized and traditionally accepted 
theological doctrine of jihad as an individual duty in defensive campaigns, asserting that jihad 
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for “the liberation of Palestine is obligatory on every Muslim, no matter where he is.”26 Such a 
statement seems to indicate a radical departure from the tradition, justifying a campaign of 
liberation with what was previously reserved for warfare that was defensive in nature.  
The contrast between the Charter of Hamas and the traditional doctrine is stark, but the 
real difference is rhetorical; the nature of Hamas‟s jihad and how the organization justifies it 
more closely resembles defensive warfare than the offensive campaign of liberation envisioned 
by Qutb. Firstly, the Charter identifies Hamas as a continuation of a single campaign of jihad 
that began with Qassam to defend Palestine against the colonizing Zionists in the wake of World 
War I. Secondly, it can be argued that Hamas‟s warfare is defensive because the continual 
expansion of Israeli settlements over the past sixty years and even today constitutes a form of 
territorial aggression. Finally, Hamas imposes a geographical restriction on the scope of its 
objectives, confining its campaign to fighting Israel in Palestine. With these considerations, it is 
possible to consider the nature of Hamas‟s warfare as an extension of the defensive jihad against 
Zionist colonizers first declared by Qassam in the 1920s. Looking beyond the rhetoric to 
Hamas‟s rationale also corroborates this proposition. While the Charter titles Article 15 “Jihad 
for the Liberation of Palestine is Obligatory,” the presented rationale hardly departs from the 
modernist interpretation of defensive jihad: “When an enemy occupies some of the Muslim 
lands, jihad becomes obligatory for every Muslim. In the struggle against the Jewish occupation 
of Palestine, the banner of jihad must be raised.”27 Thus, the extremism exhibited by Hamas is 
best understood as the marriage of Qutb‟s Islamist rhetoric with the justifications for armed 
Islamic resistance to foreign incursion that developed over recent centuries. 
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 Another significant rationale for Hamas‟s declared methodology stems from its rejection 
of the peace process and lack of faith in Western dominated international institutions. The 
Charter insists that the initiatives and international conferences intended to help reach a peaceful 
solution to the conflict, “are not able to deliver the demands, provide the right the rights, nor do 
justice to the oppressed . . . Those conferences are nothing but a form of enforcing the rule of 
unbelievers in the land of Muslims.”28 As Nüsse explains, Islamists deny the legitimacy of an 
international system dominated by Western interests like the United Nations.
29
 Considering the 
veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States among 
them, Hamas rejects the authority of such an organization on the basis of inequity and injustice. 
Thus was Hamas marginalized by the political framework of the international community and 
became a rogue organization. 
“And death in the cause of Allah is its highest aspiration”. While the idea of martyrdom 
as the pinnacle of nobility and virtue transcends religions, culture, and time, this concept 
commands particular attention in light of the present day manifestations of this belief in jihad 
warfare. The Qur‟an and Sunna as well as classical doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence all exalt 
the Muslim who dies fighting for his faith. However, this element of the slogan is particularly 
significant when examining the theological validity of Hamas‟s justifications for its actual 
policies and tactics in its war against Israel. The Charter gives no endorsement for the use of 
suicide bomber tactics, which is unequivocally forbidden in the tradition of Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, as the organization was forced to reconcile its ideology with political 
realities, Hamas has resorted to measures driven more by desperation than theological doctrine. 
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Overall, the Charter seeks to justify the mission of Hamas to wage jihad in a number of 
ways. Hamas‟s declaration of the Prophet as its leader and the Qur‟an as its constitution mixes 
the unorthodoxy of Mahdism with an insistence on a return to the holy Qur‟an. It maintains that 
its ideology is consistent with the lessons of the Qur‟an and Sunna by claiming Islam to be the 
sole inspirational element of the movement. The Charter also voices doctrines supported by more 
recent developments in the tradition Islamic jurisprudence that became mainstream in the wake 
of European colonial ventures and the armed resistances that opposed them. The characterization 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict as religious is crucial to selling the validity and importance of Hamas 
to the greater Muslim community and mobilizing Muslims in Palestine to join the movement. 
The Islamist rhetoric of liberation as the goal of the Palestinian jihad contributes to merging 
religious and nationalistic goals of the movement. Finally, the Charter‟s invocation of historical 
analogies, the Crusades in particular, serves to provide legitimacy through the precedents of past 
campaigns. 
 
Confronting Political Realities: A Doctrine of Necessity 
 
It is a struggle to find consistency in the ideology of Hamas even at the organization‟s 
inception. The Charter promotes a hybrid of fundamentalist Islamism and the tradition of 
nationalist Islamic resistance movements of the colonial era, combining the radical terminology 
of “liberation” Islamism with the prevailing doctrine in the modern tradition of Islamic 
jurisprudence that jihad became an individual obligation in defense against foreign aggression. 
However, consideration of the actual justifying arguments employed in the ideology of Hamas 
suggests that the Islamist rhetoric is merely lip service to the radical doctrines of the group‟s 
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ideological predecessors. Nüsse suggests that Hamas uses the rhetoric of jihad and Islamism to 
provide a framework for what is essentially a political struggle: 
 “Hamas is a modern political movement involved in a struggle for power, whose oppositional 
discourse is based on religious references. It is a national organization that is surprisingly 
pragmatic and clear-sighted in its analysis of international politics. Despite the repetitive use of 
fixed concepts, it demonstrates an impressive ideological flexibility.”30 
In examining the basis of Hamas‟s justifying arguments for their conduct in war and questioning 
their legitimacy with regard to shari‟a precedents and the fundamental doctrines of Islam, it is 
possible to evaluate the degree to which Nüsse‟s theory on Hamas bears relevance. 
The use of religious rhetoric with renewed fervor for Jerusalem began to gain momentum 
with the resistance led by Qassam in the run up to the 1936 revolt, which Hamas cites as the 
beginning of its jihad. Al-Banna and Qutb, as ideologues of Hamas‟s affiliate organization, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, both strongly influenced Hamas‟s “Islamicization” of the conflict. This 
strategy proved to be an effective tool in mobilizing and uniting Muslims against the Israeli 
occupation across political boundaries.
31
 However, Hamas is hardly the actualization of the 
Islamist dream for Palestine. Ayoob observes, “While inspired by the [Muslim Brotherhood] 
ideology first propagated in Egypt, Hamas fashions its political strategies not according to the 
dictates of the Egyptian [Muslim Brotherhood] but in response to Palestinian realities.”32 The 
differences between the operational purposes of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood allows for 
the development of this ideology of a kind of Islam-inspired pragmatism. Hamas functions as a 
military-political force affiliated to but operationally independent from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
This separation strategically frees the broader social movement of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
liability for the more extreme actions of Hamas. The visions of al-Banna and Qutb also grew out 
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of a different context – “Egypt was an independent state and there was no more need for a 
mobilizing doctrine to fight foreign invaders.”33 Consequently, Hamas borrows the inspiring 
rhetoric of the Islamist ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, but forms doctrines suitable to 
the unique situation of Palestine. 
The early leadership of Hamas intended for the movement to abide by the rules of just 
warfare in Islam in its engagements with Israel. The Charter promises that the organization 
would “[judge] all its actions according to Islam and [be inspired] by Islam to correct all its 
errors.”34 As Nüsse notes, Sheikh Yassin‟s emphasis in 1990 that Hamas had not killed any 
children, women, or elderly indicates that “the classical rules of jihad laid down in the Qur‟an 
and in Islamic law were accepted as binding for the Intifada.”35 The Charter and the men who 
drafted it clearly envisioned the jihad of Hamas would strictly adhere to the rules of shari‟a. 
However, if examining the evolution of jihad jurisprudence has shown anything, it is that the 
interpretation of shari‟a has often been strongly influenced by its political contexts. The case of 
Hamas is no exception. Hamas‟s participation in recent elections, which fundamentalist Islamists 
denounce as an equal valuation of Islam and other belief systems, and other varying actions, both 
more moderate and more extreme, make clear that recent doctrines have softened the hard-liner 
Islamist rhetoric of the Charter to adapt to its ideology to political realities. 
Since the circulation of the Charter of Hamas in 1988, the organization has been forced to 
justify its controversial tactics to Muslim, secular Palestinian nationalist, and Western or 
international audiences. In response to the Western critics, Hamas softens its Islamist rhetoric to 
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present its armed struggle as a liberation movement and an issue of self-determination.
36
 But 
perhaps the most significant challenge to the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance Movement 
comes from the more modernist Muslim scholars, who threaten to deny the organization support 
from its own constituency. Kelsay makes the important observation that, “In general, Muslim 
criticisms of militancy focus less on the problem of right authority and more on the question of 
means.”37 The medieval doctrine of sufficiency, popularized by the 19th and 20th century jihad 
movements, is widely accepted among even the most moderate of Muslim scholars. Thus, the 
armed resistance in Palestine that began against Zionist settlers in the 1920s and continues today 
against Israel is viewed as legitimate and in accordance with shari‟a precedents. The question of 
determining jus in bello poses the most controversial element of the many theological 
justifications for warfare. 
Suicide attacks and the targeting of non-combatants remain the most prominent of the 
controversial issues in the discussion of the conduct of Hamas in its jihad against Israel. Robert 
Pape‟s study of the political strategies behind suicide attacks proposes a number of rationales. 
Terrorist organizations in general employ the tactic “to coerce a target government to change 
policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support, or both,” also observing of Hamas in 
particular the possible goals of retaliation and “disrupting negotiated outcomes it considered 
insufficient.”38 Pape also points out the powerful effect of Hamas‟s suicide attacks had on 
accelerating Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 1994 and the West Bank in 1995, recognized by 
members of both warring parties. “Martyrdom operations,” Hamas‟s term for suicide bombings, 
have been called “the most effective and the most visible weapon deployed during the [second] 
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intifada” which broke out in 2000. Furthermore, Hamas has enjoyed a great degree of public 
approval for these attacks among the organization‟s Muslim supporters and sympathizers 
worldwide.
39
 As Pape concludes, the suicide attacks of Hamas were an extremely effective 
weapon in the arsenal of the Palestinian jihad in achieving a variety of strategic objectives. Yet, 
to reduce the justifying argument of Hamas down to Machiavellianism ignores the requirement 
of theological legitimacy. Furthermore, Hamas has also faced harsh condemnation for its tactics 
of suicide attacks from not only the international community, but fellow Muslims and 
Palestinians as well.  
The theological argument against suicide tactics often invokes the hadith in which the 
Prophet refuses to grant entry into paradise to a Muslim who committed suicide after he was 
wounded in battle. The same hadith promises that the way one commits suicide will be the same 
way he is punished for all of eternity.
40
 Yet, the prevalent debate on suicide tactics among 
Palestinian Muslims centers itself not on religious legitimacy but political consequences. In 
2002, 55 Palestinian leaders issued a condemnation of Hamas‟s martyrdom operations on the 
grounds that it sacrificed Palestinian lives with little effect on Israeli military power.
41
 Thus, 
these attacks amount to mere suicide, an act forbidden in Islam, a distinct from the concept of 
martyrdom. Less than a month later, 150 Palestinian leaders replied with the argument that 
fighting in all forms was noble and justified, supporting the tactics of Hamas.
42
 
The popular Egyptian Muslim scholar and al-Jazeera television personality Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
responded to the criticism from more moderate Muslim scholars with the doctrine of necessity. 
Qaradawi, al-Azhar graduate and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, argues in his book, The 
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Lawful and Prohibited in Islam, that Muslims are permitted to engage in forbidden acts in order 
to avoid suffering and death. He defends this assertion that “Necessity Dictates Exceptions,” 
with analogies to the exceptions allowed by the Qur‟an in other realms of life, such as eating 
forbidden foods when there is no other option to survive. In multiple sections of the book, 
Qaradawi invokes Qur‟anic verses 2:172-173, which concerns dietary restrictions on certain 
meats: “but if one is compelled by necessity, neither craving (it) nor transgressing, there is no sin 
on him; indeed, Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.”43 Qaradawi applies the same doctrine to the 
Palestinian Muslims‟ state of desperation in their fight for Palestine to argue in support of 
Hamas‟s unprecedented deployment of suicide bombers and the killing of Israeli women and 
children. 
The imam of the predominant school of Sunni jurisprudence, al-Azhar University in 
Cairo, declared that “self-martyrdom” was laudable only if the targets of the attacks were 
military, not civilian.
44
 Islam forbids the intentional targeting of non-combatants, even in 
conditions of necessity. However, the counter-argument questioned the qualifications that 
determine the status of an enemy as non-combatant. Kelsay suggests that Qaradawi represented 
the voice of the majority in his argument: 
“Israeli society is militaristic in nature. Both men and women serve in the army and can be drafted 
at any moment . . . If a child or an elderly person is killed in this type of operation, he or she is not 
killed on purpose, but by mistake, and as a result of military necessity. Necessity makes the 
forbidden things permitted.‟”45 
Some militants have taken the argument a step further, proposing that even children and the 
elderly are eligible targets for their past or assumed future participation in the war. Such 
justifications clearly violate Islamic doctrines of jus in bello not only in the classical tradition but 
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even the shari‟a precedents of recent centuries. The justification of Hamas‟s suicide attacks and 
civilian deaths represents a departure from the ideology of its Charter which promised to adhere 
strictly to the fundamental imperatives of the Qur‟an and Sunna.  
Hamas also appears to abandon the ideology of its charter in the development of a hostile 
relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The PLO‟s participation in the Oslo 
Accords in 1993, and its conversion into the Palestinian National Authority, challenged the 
legitimacy of Hamas as the representative voice of the Palestinian cause. However, Hamas 
criticized the PLO for illegitimately conceding to Zionist pressure, gaining only limited influence 
under Israeli control of a fraction of Palestinian territories in exchange for mutual recognition 
with Israel. Hamas voiced a policy of refusing to “recognize a leadership that imposes 
cooperation with the Zionist enemy on our people.”46 Viewing the Palestinian Authority as an 
illegitimate governing body, Hamas boycotted the 1996 elections. Still, Hamas sought to avoid 
escalation of hostilities and disunity among Palestinians into a military conflict with the PLO. 
Hamas refrained from following the creed of Sadat‟s assassins. Without explicitly invoking the 
Ibn Taymiyya doctrine of the duty to depose a ruler guilty of apostasy, they denounced Arafat‟s 
concessions and illegitimate authority as detrimental to Islam.
47
 Initially threatened by the PLO‟s 
vie for recognition and legitimacy, frustration with Israel‟s delays in implementing agreed-upon 
timetables for withdrawal bolstered skepticism toward the PLO‟s approach. This disenchantment 
with the Oslo Accords translated into Hamas becoming the “champion of resistance to Arafat's 
„sell-out of Palestine‟ through jihad.”48 However, recent developments in the political sphere of 
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the conflict suggest that Hamas too may be softening the uncompromising hard-liner approach 
voiced by its Charter. 
  
Pragmatism and the Prospect for Peace 
 
 In some respects, Hamas‟s reconciliation of its ideology with political realities has led to 
more moderate strategies. While Hamas maintained opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PLO 
as an organization, the first signs of political engagement surface during the early 1990s. Having 
been imprisoned since 1989, Sheikh Yassin managed to have a letter smuggled out in 1993 that 
suggested the possibility of a hudna, or temporary armistice between Muslim armies and their 
enemies allowed by classical Islamic law, if Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. 
Practical considerations of how to liberate Palestine eventually led to the moderation of Hamas‟s 
policy to accept a gradual process. Yassin‟s eventual successor, Dr. Abdel „Aziz Rantisi, 
followed with the following rationalization in 2004: 
“Hamas has come to a conclusion that it is difficult to liberate all of Palestinian land at this 
juncture. Thus, it will accept liberation in stages . . . Hamas proposes a ten-year hudna in return 
for an Israeli withdrawal and establishment of a Palestinian state to include the West Bank, 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.... Whatever new proposal [is made] along these lines does not mean 
that Hamas recognizes Israel or the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”49 
The admission that difficulties in realizing its goals have directly motivated Hamas to suspend its 
warfare explicitly acknowledges that its policies are dictated by political realities. However, such 
an approach is not without historical precedent; various Muslim rulers of the Middle Ages, 
including Saladin himself, agreed to temporary peace agreements as a part of long-run military 
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strategy.
50
 The idea of an uncompromising, violent jihad seems to arise out of the extremist 
rhetoric of the modern ideology of radical militant Islamism. 
Beyond the statements of Hamas leaders, concrete examples of modernist ideology in 
action further indicate that a strategy of political engagement is taking priority over violent 
confrontation. Ayoob asserts that the decision of Hamas participation in the 2006 elections as the 
most telling sign of a change of policy and a new willingness to work toward a solution within 
the existing political framework.
51
 Though still explicitly refusing to recognize the legitimacy of 
the State of Israel, Hamas has demonstrated a loosening of its ideological commitment to waging 
jihad day after day until all of Palestine is subject to Islamic rule.  The theoretical embrace of 
long-term peace agreements indicates that Hamas, “now accepts the two-state solution as part of 
its „phased liberation‟ of Palestine, which is a fundamental change of policy opening the door to 
coexistence.”52  
The evidence that the ideology of Hamas has evolved and in many ways deviated from its 
Charter is clear. The New York Times has even published an interview with the exiled Hamas 
leader Khalid Meshal that he “urged outsiders to ignore the Hamas Charter.”53 The use of the 
rhetoric of Islamism over the theological justifications within shari‟a precedents of armed 
resistance movements in the Islamic world characterizes Hamas‟s ideology at its inception. 
However, the doctrine of necessity has replaced it, rationalizing strategies of pragmatism and 
political realism with classical Islamic doctrines not pertaining to warfare or jihad. As Nüsse 
concludes, “The enormous margin between Hamas‟[s] oral denunciations and its „Realpolitik‟ 
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thus justifies optimism about the future. The ideological flexibility and pragmatism of the 
movement could allow Hamas to find a way of participating in the structures and institutions 
related to the autonomy status. . .”54 The contrast between the early ideology of Hamas and its 
current political and military strategies represents a change from a unwavering commitment to 
instating fundamentalist brand of shari‟a to a realistic willingness to interpret Islamic doctrine on 
warfare in a way that is practical and appropriate in its present historical and political contexts.
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
al-Qaeda‟s Jihad: Global Terrorism and Islamic Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of transnational organizations engaged in violent campaigns of jihad 
like al-Qaeda occurred in conjunction with local armed resistance movements like Hamas. 
Similar to the local movements, the ideology of the loose network of terrorist cells known as al-
Qaeda represents a mixture of global Islamism and defensive jihad against foreign incursion into 
the dar al-Islam. Operationally, however, al-Qaeda‟s manifestation of these two ideological 
influences is entirely different. Still, the doctrine of jihad in defense of Muslim lands as 
individually compulsory for all Muslims served as the basis for the transnational response to the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the jihad campaign that gave birth to al-Qaeda. 
Though the roots of this doctrine reach back into the Middle Ages, the more immediate 
transmission of this ideology came from the Palestinian jihad to Afghanistan through the Sheikh 
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Abdullah Azzam and his fatwa entitled “Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after 
Iman.” 
Azzam was born in Palestine, joined the Muslim Brotherhood, personally participated in 
the 1967 war, and obtained his doctorate from al-Azhar in Islamic jurisprudence. An embattled 
scholar from the Palestinian jihad, Azzam already had credibility among militant Islamists when 
he began to champion the Afghan campaign with the same urgency and theological argument. 
Azzam starts off his fatwa by quoting the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyya: “The first obligation 
after Iman is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly 
affairs.”1 He argues in accordance with modern precedents that this obligation is incumbent upon 
all Muslims individually including not only those residing in the area in contention but also, if 
these local efforts fail, Muslims in neighboring territories and throughout the world. Supporting 
this assertion with citations of the Qur‟an and Sunna as well as a variety of doctrines from all 
four main Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Azzam justifies this doctrine which calls for a 
“General March,” an global, armed, populist uprising against the infidel invaders. Though he 
identifies that this condition applies in countries from Central Africa to Southeast Asia, Azzam 
asserts that Palestine and Afghanistan, as the primary problems facing Muslims, deserve a 
concentration of support. 
Having devoted his own efforts to the jihad in Afghanistan, Azzam traveled throughout 
the world preaching this doctrine to amass international Muslim support for the campaign. The 
distribution of Azzam‟s fatwa and his video-recorded exhortations were also a powerful tool in 
rousing financial assets and recruitment for the mujahideen in Afghanistan.
2
 In coordinating 
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these efforts, Azzam became the mentor of Osama bin Laden, who had been raising funds and 
donating supplies to the mujahideen early on in their resistance against the Soviets. While bin 
Laden “sat at [Azzam‟s] feet as a student and looked up to [Azzam] as a hero,” other influences 
proved to be stronger in shaping his ideology.
3
 While Azzam envisioned a global Muslim army 
to defend Islamic lands from foreign aggression within the dictates of Islamic law by the name of 
al-Qaeda al-Sulbah – the solid base, his assassination in 1989 created a vacuum of more 
traditionalist influence that allowed for bin Laden‟s ideological radicalization.4 Azzam‟s 
influence on bin Laden became increasingly replaced by an important leader of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, an Egyptian radical Islamist who spent three years 
in Egyptian jail for involvement in the assassination of Sadat before moving to Pakistan to 
support the Afghan jihad, justified his opposition to the Egyptian government with the works of 
Ibn Taymiyya that provided an argument for the violent disposition of rulers who had abandoned 
Islam.
5
 When Azzam was assassinated, bin Laden inherited leadership over the “Arab Afghans” 
– the group of transnational mujahideen – and at the conclusion of the war against the Soviets, 
emerged as the commander of the organization now known as al-Qaeda with Zawahiri as his 
right hand man. 
 
The “Far Enemy” and al-Qaeda‟s Global Jihad 
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The ideological gap between a jihad as defense of Muslim territory against Soviet 
aggression in the 1980s and the terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies of by bin 
Laden‟s al-Qaeda in the 21st century was not bridged overnight. Ayoob suggests that the 
ideological exchanges that took place during the later years of the Afghan campaign between 
“leading national jihadi figures, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri . . . and the transnational leaders of 
the Arab Afghans, such as Osama bin Laden,” provided a context in which “the transnational 
jihadi strategy of targeting the „far enemy,‟ the United States and its allies, was born.”6 The 
perception of the West as morally corrupting and politically repressing force that supported anti-
Islamic rulers and the Israeli state – the “near enemy” – had been prevalent among 20th century 
Islamist thought. However, the expansion of the battlefield from local armed resistance 
movements to the targeting of Western interests in the Middle East and transnational attacks is a 
more recent phenomenon. Gerges argues that a full transition from militant Islamists fighting 
localized revolt against the near enemy to exclusive commitment to transnational attacks 
occurred only in the second half of the 1990s.
7
 The change appears to have been incremental 
from the end of the Afghan jihad, gradually brought about through bin Laden‟s own 
advancement of the shift in focus.  
The failure of local uprisings against Muslim governments left some jihadis searching for 
another avenue by which to advance their agenda of militant Islamism. Aboul-Enein reports the 
theory that al-Zawahiri‟s shift from prioritizing jihad against the Egyptian government to support 
of bin Laden‟s preference for attacking the United States “was driven primarily by financial 
desperation and the search for a credible mission to replace the failures of his operations in 
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Egypt.”8 The United States and the West are recognized for their support that guaranteed the 
survival of repressive “puppet” regimes (though not for the significant role the American Central 
Intelligence Agency played in supporting the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s). 
Ayoob summarizes the conclusion al-Qaeda and like-minded Islamist militants reached in 
observance of these engagements: “local regimes, the „near enemy,‟ could not be overthrown 
until their external patrons, the „far enemy,‟ are forced to withdraw their support from these 
regimes and stop meddling in affairs of the Muslim world.”9 Furthermore, the historical success 
of the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan has continued to inspire a belief that God favors 
the cause of the mujahideen to the extent that they may once again defeat a superpower through 
military confrontation. 
Saudi Arabia‟s welcoming of U.S. forces and rejection of bin Laden‟s mujahideen as a 
counter to Saddam Hussein‟s aggression in the Gulf in the early 1990s had earned America 
priority among bin Laden‟s enemies. Gerges observes that “the Gulf War in 1991 and the 
permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia played a decisive role in the globalization of 
jihad, particularly in the ideological incitement and mobilization of anti-Americanism.”10 Bin 
Laden responded to the Saudi decision by challenging the integrity of the political and religious 
elite who allowed themselves to be exploited by the Americans. In a 1994 letter to the head of 
the „ulama in Saudi Arabia entitled “The Betrayal of Palestine,” bin Laden accused him of 
catering to the “political wishes of the regime” in his “latest astonishing juridical decree 
justifying peace with the Jews. . . a disaster for Muslims.”11 Though he subsequently severed 
formal ties with the Saudi government, took exile in the Sudan, and called for “guerilla warfare 
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to expel the occupying American enemy from the country,” bin Laden fell short of encouraging 
revolt against the Saudi regime.
12
 Labeling the United States as the “greatest kufr, or impiety” 
and Muslim rulers as the “lesser kufr,” bin Laden warned against warfare that could divide 
Muslims and argued that jihad against the greater kufr would guarantee victory over both.
13
  
The responses of the United States to attacks against its interests in the Middle East have 
been interpreted as encouraging evidence for al-Qaeda. The withdrawal of American military 
forces from Lebanon after the suicide bombing in Beirut of 1983 “had a profound impression on 
bin Laden, who saw that suicide bombers could be devastatingly effective and that, for all its 
might, America had no appetite for conflict.”14 The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia after 
the tragic failure of a mission in Mogadishu in 1993 further encouraged this perception of an 
America that could be defeated and repelled through armed struggle.
15
 Bin Laden even cites the 
defeat of the United States in Vietnam as historical evidence that Americans have no heart to 
fight an armed populist resistance.
16
 The theory that appeasement and concession only 
encourages further aggression seems to apply to the case of al-Qaeda, at least in relation to how 
its members have interpreted recent American military withdrawals.  
Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri‟s rhetoric also reaches back to the historical victory of 
Muslims against the Crusaders in the same lands to inspire its Muslim audience with the promise 
of victory over the West once again. The idea that the West is still crusading against Islam, 
through United States hegemony and the Zionist enterprise, is a fundamental belief held by bin 
Laden and his fellow militants. Bin Laden‟s 1998 fatwa issued under the newly formed World 
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Islamic Front declared jihad against the “Judeo-Crusader alliance” as a necessary and 
compulsory response to the foreign occupation of the holiest Islamic lands. Bin Laden argues 
that the military aggression of the “brutal Crusader occupation” is “a clear proclamation of war 
against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history 
have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries.”17 This 
element of the fatwa finds a wealth of historical and theological precedents, especially in recent 
centuries. Jihad in defense of Afghanistan from the Soviets, the continued resistance against 
Zionism and Israel in Palestine, and numerous examples elsewhere in the Islamic world have 
applied the works of Islamic jurisprudence from the era of European colonialism in modern 
realms. 
From a strategic perspective, the attacks of al-Qaeda on U.S. assets in what bin Laden 
and others assert as Muslim lands, such as the 1992 bombing of hotels that stationed U.S. troops 
in Aden, Yemen, resemble the same kind of geographically restricted uprising of an armed 
resistance to the occupying forces of a foreign power. However, al-Qaeda fuses this historically 
precedented movement with the ideology of Islamic radicalism to expand from a jihad in defense 
of Muslim lands to a global jihad in defense of Islam. The 1998 fatwa lists a number of Qur‟anic 
sword verses to build up legitimacy for its ultimate conclusion: “With God‟s permission we call 
on everyone who believes in God and wants reward to comply with His will to kill the 
Americans and seize their money wherever and whenever they find them.”18 Whereas classical, 
medieval, colonial-era, and even Afghan jihad doctrines emphasized the duty of Muslims to 
travel physically to the land under siege to defend it from foreign conquest, the battlefield had 
now become global. This radical exhortation emphasizes the global nature of al-Qaeda‟s jihad; 
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every Muslim in the world now had the individual duty to fight in the jihad against America and, 
given the global battlefield, American assets and people around the world became the targets.  
Global jihadism promoted and practiced by al-Qaeda and like-minded groups seems to arise as 
an unprecedented product of modernity.  
Conducting offensive attacks overseas is hardly the most controversial element of al-
Qaeda‟s jihad.  Al-Qaeda clearly departs from the more recent developments in the tradition of 
Islamic jurisprudence as well as classical doctrines in the conduct of its warfare. Terrorism has 
become the primary manifestation of Al-Qaeda‟s jihad as bin Laden and others direct attacks 
against civilians in addition to military targets. The 1998 World Islamic Front fatwa asserts: 
 “To kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty incumbent 
upon every Muslim in all countries, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque 
from their grip, so that their armies leave all the territory of Islam, defeated, broken, and unable to 
threaten any Muslim.”19  
This exhortation borrows the lexicon of the traditional juridical decree that participation in jihad 
was an individual duty in defensive campaigns to advocate violence against non-combatants 
around the world. The fatwa advances a jihad of liberation envisioned by Qutb, yet it adopts the 
traditional ruling that applied in defensive warfare. The specified goal of liberating the holy sites 
in Palestine and Saudi Arabia symbolize a commitment to ridding the entire Muslim world of 
Western influence. The intentional targeting of non-combatants as a method of causing fear to 
achieve a political agenda constitutes terrorism. Dramatic acts of terrorism against civilians, 
conducted by bin Laden and militant groups inspired by his ideology, aim to coerce Western 
governments to withdraw politically and militarily from the Middle East. Yet the questions 
remain: To what extent can the goals of Islamist ideology redeem the unorthodox methodology? 
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To what extent does the argument of al-Qaeda adhere to the principles of Just War established in 
the early sources and the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence? 
 
The “Theological” Arguments 
 
The onset of modernity led to development of radical doctrine through the practice of 
ijtihad by ideologues with no formal training or education in Islamic jurisprudence, like al-
Banna, Mawdudi, and Qutb. Similarly neither bin Laden, a construction contractor, or al-
Zawahiri, a physician by profession, have credentials in Islamic jurisprudence. Kelsay offers a 
summary of the correlation between the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence and its role in the 
justifying arguments of today‟s extreme militant Islamists: 
“The fundamental problem with militant versions of Shari‟a reasoning is that they confuse their 
own views with those of the Qur‟an and the sunna. In doing so they are encouraged by a selective 
or piecemeal approach to the judgments articulated by historical „ulama. Militants claim 
consistency with Islamic tradition. One is never clear just what tradition they mean, however. In 
the end, many end up posing as authoritarians, rather than submitting themselves to the hard and 
patient labor required for an understanding of authoritative texts.”20 
As Kelsay observes, extremists like bin Laden seek to justify their claims with precedents in the 
very same Islamic tradition that they denounce while simultaneously amending it with new 
doctrine. The extremist‟s denunciation of moderate doctrines and scholars with a fundamentalist 
ideology constitutes an attempt to seize authority from the „ulama and bolster support for radical 
doctrine. Furthermore, bin Laden‟s title of “Sheikh,” assumed by bin Laden himself and echoed 
by his followers, signifies rhetorical tribute to the title of religious scholars in the Islamic 
tradition in an attempt to construct an image of religious authority.  
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The rhetorical tricks and sophistry required to defend the religious authority of an 
individual like bin Laden weakens the validity of the justifications. However, in terms of 
justifying his authority for declaring jihad, bin Laden bypasses the classical restriction that it is 
the prerogative of the imam alone with the argument of individual duty.  Comparing bin Laden‟s 
leadership of al-Qaeda‟s jihad to that of Saladin, al-Qaeda militants undertake a similar program 
of propaganda, depicting their leader as an embattled religious scholar and supreme mujahid to 
inspire support among Muslims. Ironically, while the fundamentalist rhetoric denounces the 
tradition of Islamic jurisprudence after the first four caliphs, the argument of militant groups like 
al-Qaeda rely on medieval and modern doctrines in arguing for the legitimacy of their authority 
to wage jihad without the declaration of the imam. Reaching back to precedents born in the 
Counter-Crusades, Al-Qaeda militants confront the question of legitimate authority by invoking 
the doctrine of sufficiency and individual duty to wage jihad. 
Al-Qaeda also employs the analogy to the Crusades in relation to its goals of liberating 
the holy land. Utilizing this mobilizing rhetoric, al-Qaeda announces its just cause with 
straightforward, fundamentalist argument of global Islamism. Al-Qaeda groups champion the 
brand of jihad advocated by Qutb that rejected the notion of jihad as defensive warfare. Jihad, 
these radical Islamists argue, is an enterprise of establishing shari‟a rule all over the world, not a 
geographically confined campaign. The goal to liberate the oppressed people of the world that 
they may know the freedom to accept Islam may prioritize the holy sites in Saudi Arabia and 
Palestine but by no means do these historically and religiously significant territories limit the 
mission. Kelsay cites a 2005 statement given by al-Zawahiri in which he outlines the three major 
ambitions of al-Qaeda: establishing the rule of shari‟a; driving out the “Crusaders and Jews” – 
Western invaders – from Islamic lands; and liberating the world of these oppressors to attain the 
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freedom of the Muslim world to manage its own affairs.
21
 It is with these goals that al-Qaeda 
justifies the necessity to fight aggressively under the banner of jihad.  
Though some elements of al-Qaeda ideology are at odds with classical Islamic doctrine, 
this kind of continuous and expansive jihad may, by its practical injunctions, more accurately 
reflect the classical concept of jihad than do the defensive campaigns waged since the 12
th
 
century. As Johnson has pointed out, the defensive campaigns of jihad that first took hold in 
response to the crusaders are, “not the religiously motivated and authorized offensive warfare 
that the classical jurists had in mind.”22 However, one needs not be a qualified jurist of Islamic 
law to see that the application of this classical doctrine, which was developed in the context of an 
expanding Islamic caliphate with a legitimate leader of a politically unified umma, hardly seems 
appropriate for today‟s world. The modernist or apologist interpretation of jihad which requires 
that such fighting be defensive in nature insists that the underlying messages of Islamic sources 
invoke tolerance and peace, and the militant precedents of the Sunna and verses of the Qur‟an 
are to be understood in their particular contexts. By Zaidi‟s analysis, the Sword Verses quoted by 
bin Laden are usually from the later Medinate period of revelation when the Prophet received 
divine guidance for the practical purpose of dealing with immediate military threats to the 
Islamic nation.
23
 Yet, as Kelsay observes, “The militant vision is one in which premodern 
precedents are not so much interpreted as applied.”24 More by design than accident, bin Laden, 
like many militant extremists of the al-Qaeda camp, fails to contextualize the Qur‟anic verses of 
militancy in his own understanding of their meanings and in his citation of them in his statements 
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that defend the jihad of al-Qaeda. Bin Laden exhibits the characteristically fundamentalist 
tendency to intentionally separate elements of Islamic teaching from their contexts.  
The trademark example of al-Qaeda‟s sophist rationalizations appears in making the 
difficult argument for the most controversial element of the extremists‟ warfare doctrine: the 
dissolution of the mandate of non-combatant immunity, prominent in classical Islamic 
jurisprudence and the modern Just War concept in Western and Islamic traditions alike. The 
easiest way to examine the argument is through the various statements of bin Laden, “the 
archetype of [the fundamentalist communicative strategy],” who defends his unorthodox 
interpretation of Islam that permits indiscriminate acts of violence.
25
 Bin Laden employs several 
strategies to justify his intentional killing of non-combatants. One argument, termed by Kelsay as 
“the law of reciprocity,” makes an amoral argument of retaliation, not Islamic warfare ethics.26 
The argument boils down to the killing of American civilians as retaliation for the killing of 
Muslim civilians by American agents, including Israel. In an interview with an al-Jazeera 
journalist in October of 2001, bin Laden responds to the question of whether or not the 
September 11
th
 attacks were a transgression with the following argument: “So, as they kill us, 
without a doubt we have to kill them, until we obtain a balance in terror.”27 However, the 
difference between the civilian casualties inflicted by the United States in its military strikes in 
the Middle East and those inflicted by al-Qaeda jihad operations is the intent: 
“No military campaign is free from tragedy or from mistakes. In the World Islamic Front 
Declaration and other statements, however, Muslim militants set for an intention to wage 
indiscriminate war as a matter of policy.”28 
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The classical Muslim jurists established that the Islamic sources confirmed that killing innocent 
non-combatants and fellow Muslims was to be avoided, not pursued out of vengeance. This 
ruling, which represents the prevailing consensus among Muslim religious scholars and even 
other militant Islamist movements, is rejected by al-Qaeda. 
Still, bin Laden asserts that there is more to the argument than mere vengeance. When 
pressed by the reporter, bin Laden confirms that this is indeed “an eye for an eye” defense, but 
maintains that it is both logically and religiously sound.
29
 Bin Laden acknowledges that the 
example of the Prophet forbidding violence against women and children, central to the 
arguments against his indiscriminate warfare, is “true. . . valid and has been laid down by the 
Prophet in an authentic Tradition,” but is “not set in stone.”30 Here, bin Laden exhibits the 
second major element of al-Qaeda‟s justification for indiscriminate violence: abrogation. This 
practice of judging which of two conflicting one of the most challenging tasks reserved for only 
the most learned jurists in the tradition of shari‟a reasoning. The 8th-9th century Sunni jurist al-
Shafi‟i wrote at length about interpreting divine declarations that may appear to be contradicted 
by later revelations, concluding that only the Qur‟an could abrogate the Qur‟an, as it literally 
delivers the word of God. Furthermore, al-Shafi‟i argued that a life devoted to extreme effort in 
studying Islamic law, with divine guidance, was the only possible way to comprehend the 
meaning.
31
 In view of this tradition, bin Laden‟s presumption of juridical authority is even more 
questionable. Though acknowledging that the Prophet forbade indiscriminate violence, bin 
Laden argues that this ruling is abrogated by a verse of the Qur‟an (16:126): “God saying: „And 
if you punish (your enemy, O you believers in the Oneness of God), then punish them with the 
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like of that with which you were afflicted…‟”32 However, as Lawrence observes, bin Laden 
intentionally stops short of finishing the verse, which ends with the conclusion, “but it is best to 
stand fast.”33 This exhibits another tendency of the extremist argument – selective utilization of 
fractured Qur‟anic verses to put a more militant spin on the implications of divine revelations. 
This kind of disjointed quotation of the holy scriptures of Islam is typical of bin Laden‟s 
epistemological arguments. Furthermore, bin Laden even changes the context of the verses 
themselves through omission of qualifying phrases. In addition to cutting verses short, as he did 
with the above mentioned verse to give divine sanction to retaliatory violence, bin Laden 
modifies the Qur‟anic message by omitting parts in the middle of the verse. In a 1996 statement, 
bin Laden declares, “. . . and His words: „When you meet the disbelievers, strike them in the 
neck.‟”34 While bin Laden is indeed citing the Qur‟anic verse 47:4, the complete text reads, 
“When you meet the disbelievers in battle, strike them in the neck, and once they are defeated, 
bind captives firmly – later you can release them by grace or by ransom – until the toils of war 
have ended.”35 Thus, bin Laden perverts Qur‟anic verse to make it appear to sanction the killing 
of all non-Muslims when in reality the verse served as a practical guide for the Prophet‟s military 
engagements.  
Bin Laden‟s arguments also show to be inconsistent in terms of his classification of the 
attacks conducted by al-Qaeda members under his leadership or inspiration. The October 2001 
interview shows how one element of his argument seeks to provide religious justification for the 
killing of non-combatants, which he first defines as women and children in acknowledging 
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whom the Prophet forbade killing. Then, he defines non-combatants as children and innocents in 
citing the same doctrine, continuing to argue that the September 11
th
 attacks targeted the 
Pentagon, a legitimate military target. The interviewer interrupts him to ask, “what about the 
World Trade Center,” to which bin Laden replies defensively: 
“. . . It wasn‟t a children‟s school! Neither was it a residence. . . most of the people who were in 
the towers were men that backed the biggest financial force in the world, which spreads mischief 
throughout the world. And those individuals should stand before God, and rethink and redo their 
calculations. We treat others like they treat us. Those who kill our women and our innocent, we 
kill their women and innocent, until they stop doing so.”36 
This response portrays a number of different inconsistencies in bin Laden‟s argument. He first 
attempts to defend the legitimacy of the attack on grounds that it did not target children, as non-
combatants. Then he revises the definition of non-combatants once again to “women and 
innocents,” a fourth definition in the same interview. Ultimately, bin Laden reverts to the 
Hammurabian argument of violent reciprocity. 
 In between bin Laden‟s terminological variations, his defense carries another argument. 
Bin Laden implies that those who work in the World Trade Center were not innocent but guilty 
for America‟s economic imperialism which he, and militants of the same persuasion, view as a 
destructive anti-Islamic form of crusading. Bin Laden has also voiced the argument of al-Qaeda 
militants that the citizenry of the United States is implicit in the crimes of the American 
government and military by the nature of representative government. Bin Laden argues that the 
“shared guilt of the citizens in a democratic state,” results from their responsibility for electing 
the government which acts on their behalf.
37
 In this perspective, any actions of a democratically 
elected government necessarily reflect the desires and attitudes of its citizens. However, this 
classification would still exclude the substantial part of the American population under the 
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voting age of eighteen. The argument militants use to justify the death of Israeli children, based 
on anticipation of their future mandatory military service, fails to bear any relevance to the 
United States. Moreover, that bin Laden classifies his own attacks as terrorism indicates that his 
ethical arguments about the guilt and innocence of non-combatants lacks sincerity. Bin Laden 
compares the terrorism of al-Qaeda against Americans to that of a police officer terrorizing a 
criminal, asserting, “America and Israel practice ill-advised terrorism, and we practice good 
terrorism, because it deters those from killing our children in Palestine and other places.”38 Here, 
bin Laden defends his brand of terrorism as an enterprise of justice, partly with the argument that 
the Americans, including the non-combatants, are guilty of America‟s and Israel‟s crimes. The 
second aspect of this rationalization for terrorism is its perceived psychological affect on 
American foreign policy decisions – yet another argument of political logic, not religious 
imperative. 
 Another theological point of contention in the global attacks of al-Qaeda militants is the 
killing fellow Muslims, or as the militants would have it, those deemed to be apostates. Bin 
Laden argues that “he who allies himself with the disbelievers has become an apostate,” 
supplying Qur‟anic verse 5:54 as evidence, though it only supports bin Laden‟s point by saying 
that God loves those who are “humble towards the believers, and hard on the disbelievers.”39 
After the 1992 al-Qaeda hotel bombings in Yemen that resulted in multiple Muslim casualties, 
Mamdouh Mahmoud Salim, or Abu Hajer, one of bin Laden‟s lieutenants, issued a fatwa that 
defended such indiscriminate violence on the following basis: “If he is a good Muslim, he will 
go to Paradise; if he is bad, he will go to hell, and good riddance. Thus [they] would find their 
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proper reward.”40 Bin Laden has further radicalized such doctrine since, arguing that those who 
fail to drive the enemy out of their land are as guilty as the apostates that collaborate with them 
because they have shirked their individual duty as Muslims to participate in the jihad. Zaidi calls 
this reasoning a “blanket justification” that relieves al-Qaeda of responsibility for killing 
Muslims indiscriminately in attacks, many of which have been carried out in mosques.
41
 Such 
justifications show how the influence of Ibn Taymiyya‟s ideas on waging jihad against apostate 
Muslims contributed to the development of extremist doctrine that supports indiscriminate 
violence against the “Jews and Crusaders” and fellow Muslims alike. 
 
al-Qaeda in its Modern Context 
 
The extreme militant brand of Islam advanced by al-Qaeda and bin Laden only represents 
a small fraction of today‟s Muslims. In fact, al-Qaeda‟s ideology  is viewed as extreme even 
among contemporary militant global Islamist movements. Hizb ut-Tahrir provides an example of 
an organized global network of radical Islamists whose central leadership, unlike al-Qaeda, 
insists on the revival of the caliphate as a necessary prerequisite for waging violent jihad while at 
the same time it encourages Muslims to support jihadi movements across the world. Ayoob notes 
that “for HT, ordinary Muslims cannot declare jihad; it is the exclusive prerogative of the 
Caliph,” as a collective duty of the umma.42 More peaceful manifestations of political Islam are 
seen in more moderate Islamic reform movements in many parts of the Middle East. Among the 
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world‟s Muslims who perceive a political mission of Islam, the militants of al-Qaeda compose a 
small minority. 
Al-Qaeda‟s ideology is even at odds with contemporary movements of violent jihad. 
Localized religious nationalist movements like that of Hamas confine their warfare 
geographically, relying on the doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence that confirmed jihad as an 
individual duty in defense as legitimizing precedents.  Al-Qaeda arises as an unprecedented 
phenomenon in the historical tradition of Islamic warfare. Ayoob concludes that al-Qaeda has 
developed its extremist doctrine of violent jihad characterized by global terrorist attacks “against 
the dictates of the leading jurists of classical Islam.”43 Further compromising the theological 
legitimacy bin Laden could hope to claim, the leading jurists of modern Islamic scholarship have 
also denounced al-Qaeda‟s warfare as unethical and unlawful. Kelsay observes how the 
respected leading Sunni scholar, the Sheikh al-Azhar, declared after al-Qaeda‟s 1998 embassy 
bombings, “Any explosion that leads to the death of innocent women and children is a criminal 
act, carried out only by people who are base cowards and traitors.”44  Even the more radical 
scholar Qaradawi, a strong supporter of Hamas‟s jihad in Palestine, condemned the September 
11
th
 attacks as, in Kelsay‟s words, “grave sins,” and “a violation of shari‟a norms.”45 The 
examples of such scholars distancing themselves and the movements they support from the 
terrorism employed by al-Qaeda stems from more than ideological dissonance. Kelsay suggests 
that the backlash against al-Qaeda by such scholars of a common enemy can be explained by 
“the obvious point that Qaradawi and others regard the Palestinian case as special, and do not 
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want to see the justice of that cause contaminated by association with other, less clear cases.”46 
While bin Laden champions his cause and methodology as divinely sanctioned violence to 
liberate Islamic lands, with emphasis on Palestine, the Muslims who consider themselves or 
Palestinians to be engaged in legitimate warfare, such as members of Hamas, view al-Qaeda‟s 
acts of terrorism as a liability to their just cause. Interestingly, the stated causes of Hamas and al-
Qaeda are relatively similar; the polarizing differences arise from their methodologies. 
As the voice of al-Qaeda and its militants, Osama bin Laden conveys a powerful, 
politically charged message of uncompromising defiance of United States hegemony and its 
corrupting influence on Islamic societies. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda militants share with other 
militant Islamist movements a common perception that the “Judeo-Crusader alliance” of the 
West is engaged in a continual ideological campaign to conquer the Islamic world through 
political, military, cultural, and economic domination. While many Muslims are sympathetic to 
the grievances bin Laden lodges against Arab regimes, the United States, Israel, and the West in 
general, al-Qaeda‟s horrifying terrorist attacks are seen to clearly transgress the ethical 
restrictions of warfare in both classical and modern interpretations of shari‟a. It is for this reason 
that bin Laden‟s arguments fail to convince the majority of both his Western and Muslim 
audiences of the theological legitimacy of al-Qaeda‟s global jihad.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Justice and Morality in Modern Warfare: The Role of Religion 
 
 
 
 
 
On December 10
th
, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered his Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech before an international audience. Citing his own moral responsibility as the 
commander-in-chief of the military of a nation at war, Obama focused the topic of his lecture on 
the applications of Just War theory in today‟s conflicts. Several elements of Obama‟s lecture 
reflect modern ideas and preconceptions about the role religion played in shaping present day 
and historical conflicts around the world. The modern concept of Just War arises from the 
complex and dynamic development of war doctrines that varied by religion and culture. Obama 
summarized the process: “the concept of a „just war‟ emerged, suggesting that war is justified 
only when certain conditions were met: If it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the 
forced used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.”1 
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However, this emergence took place over thousands of years, and until the 12
th
 Century, only 
non-combatant immunity, of the various criteria he listed, was an actual doctrine of Christian 
ethics.  
Obama‟s address characterized the most prevalent elements of mainstream warfare ethics 
in the Western tradition today. Obama voiced the prominent view of a just war as inherently evil; 
“no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy.”2 This attitude towards warfare stems 
more from extensive historical experience than theological or philosophical considerations alone. 
Augustinian doctrine did not consider violence and loss of life, even that of civilians, to be 
inherently immoral; bloodlust and enthusiasm for such externalities of war were the real crimes. 
Similarly, classical juridical and epistemological doctrines of the Islamic tradition exhort 
Muslims to wage war, but “always with the caveat of restraint.”3 However, the human 
experience with war in the 20
th
 century, such as WWII in which more civilians died than did 
soldiers, and the ever-impending possibility of nuclear holocaust during the Cold War, has led to 
the universal condemnation of war and the mourning of its necessity. 
The criterion of violence as a last resort to defend against aggression is a central 
component of modern Just War theory. Though Augustine refuted self-defensive violence as 
subjective and motivated by a selfish impulse for self-preservation, the idea of war as political 
means by which different nations must sometimes revert to out of defensive necessity is 
generally accepted in modern theory as a necessary evil. Obama voiced this doctrine: “I – like 
any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.”4 
Thomas Aquinas‟s contribution to the Western Just War tradition, defense of the common good, 
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became accepted as a duty of political leaders. The expectation that a sovereign ruler provide for 
the security of those under his rule, a fundamental element of social contract theory developed 
during the European Enlightenment, has pervaded Western political philosophy for centuries. In 
recent decades, however, defense of the common good has come to mean more than protecting a 
nation-state or people against direct military aggression. 
Obama asserted that the cause of every war must be a “just and lasting peace.”5 This 
challenge, Obama argued, obligates the leaders of world superpowers “beyond self-defense or 
the defense of one nation against an aggressor.”6 He continued, “I believe force can be justified 
on humanitarian grounds,” promoting military action taken “to prevent the slaughter of civilians 
by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire 
region.”7 Obama reflected the opinion of contemporary Just War theorist Michael Walzer who 
argues that the goal of preventing or putting an end to “acts that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind,” justifies going to war against the party responsible.8 The recent consideration of 
scenarios in which interventionist military engagement qualifies as just war suggests that 
campaigns of liberation manifested by both the Crusade and radical Islamist creeds have a place 
in modern jus ad bellum ethics.  
Military campaigns of liberation are surrounded with controversy because the nature of 
the initiating party‟s warfare is not defensive in the sense of an immediate response to an 
aggressor. Urban II declared the Crusades to be a war for the liberation of the Christians and holy 
sites of Christendom in the East from Muslim oppression, the Augustinian theological 
justifications behind the declaration of war supported an offensive campaign with the idea that 
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vindication was an act of love to restore justice and peace. Al-Qaeda‟s radical Islamist ideology 
that promotes offensive warfare draws on the perceived mission given by Islamic sources to 
wage jihad as a war of liberation; the ideological onslaught of anti-Islamic political systems has 
oppressed the freedom of all humanity to know true justice through the implementation of 
shari‟a. As the historical examples of theological justification for military campaigns of 
liberation indicate, the legitimacy of non-defensive warfare depends on the just cause of 
establishing divine justice on earth.  
The ideological motives and goals behind these two campaigns and the liberation 
ideology advanced in some Just War thinking today have more in common than history would 
suggest. While defensive warfare claims legitimacy based on the assumed right to fight against 
the war-initiating aggressor for self-preservation, liberation warfare claims legitimacy through 
the moral imperative to implement its lofty goal of transcendent justice. The Crusades sought to 
vindicate an injustice done to Christianity and the Christians of the East under the theologically 
derived mission to right a wrong. Militant Islamism advocates violent uprisings to “depose 
jahiliyya from the leadership of man,” an enterprise of social justice, the “foremost duty of Islam 
in this world.”9 Likewise, social justice qualifies as the just cause for liberation warfare in 
modern Western thought. International acceptance of the legitimacy of force employed in 
humanitarian interventions stems from a sense of moral responsibility to address injustice 
inflicted upon a distant group.  
This sense of responsibility, Obama suggested, arises out of a faith – not religion – but a 
faith in the progress of mankind. As Christian and Muslim ethicists insist of their relative 
religions, Obama argued that “if we divorce [this faith] from the decisions that we make on 
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issues of war and peace – then we lose what‟s best about humanity . . . we lose our moral 
compass.”10 While the Western concept of Just War theory began with the fusion of Roman legal 
doctrine with Christian ethical discourse on violence in the 4
th
 century, the secularization of the 
moral basis for modern Just War theory indicates that Christian values transcend religious creed. 
The word “faith” still implies a transcendent or sublime source of morality without associating 
modern Just War theory to the controversial taboo of religious justifications for war. 
The concept of a holy war is widely considered to be contradictory to religion. While a 
Holy War is a just war by definition, the observed manifestations of violence motivated by 
religious doctrine, most recently the global terrorist attacks of al-Qaeda, have led to human 
suffering on a horrific scale. Reflecting on the Western tradition, Obama suggested that “[al-
Qaeda] extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are 
amply recorded.”11 Though he makes no claim to be a medieval historian, Obama‟s invocation of 
the legacy of the Crusades as unjustified, hate-driven warfare reflects just how prominent this 
misunderstanding of the historical conflict, including the motives driving the historical 
campaigns continues to be even among the World‟s academic and political elite. However, the 
documented atrocities of the medieval crusaders and global terrorism are both characterized by 
indiscriminate warfare with perceived religious injunction. On these grounds, Obama rejected 
the concept of Holy War, arguing, “no Holy War can ever be a just war. For if you truly believe 
that you are carrying out divine will, then there is no need for restraint.”12 While observant of the 
historical tendency to justify prohibited actions by just cause, this condemnation ignores the 
essential theological doctrines in both Christian and Islamic traditions of warfare ethics.  
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Barring the recent additions of radical militant doctrine, both Christian and Islamic 
traditions condemn the killing of innocents in any context, and in war, forbid intentional violence 
against non-combatants. While Augustine did not discriminate between soldiers and non-
combatants in terms of their objective guilt, he still viewed civilians as illegitimate targets. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, bin Laden‟s justifications for indiscriminate warfare rely on the 
claim that all Americans, both soldiers and civilians are subjectively guilty due to the 
representative nature of democratic government. Yet, the overwhelming majority of Islamic 
jurisprudence, classical, medieval, and modern, argues against the legitimacy of this claim. In 
general, both Christian and Islamic doctrines suggest that cases where civilian casualties are 
unintended may be forgiven with repentance.  
The controversial aspect to modern just in bello doctrines lies in determining cases of 
military necessity. Operations where civilian casualties can be anticipated, for example, are 
difficult to justify even when the target is legitimate. Military commanders must consider a 
variety of ethical questions, not least among them, the extent to which the civilian death toll or 
strategic priority of the intended target affect whether or not “collateral damage” can be 
considered an acceptable transgression of ethical standards for warfare. The concept of military 
necessity as an excuse for violating jus in bello restrictions is extremely relevant in discussion of 
both historical and modern examples. Some pillaging of the Crusaders in Eastern Europe on the 
path of the Crusades occurred as a result of practical necessity to resupply on the warpath. 
Saladin likewise deviated from classical Islamic principles for political and military necessity 
during the Counter-Crusades. Today, the theological argument of al-Qaradawi seeks to 
legitimize Hamas‟s resort to suicide attacks in the conduct of jihad against Israel with a formal 
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decree that argues, “Necessity makes the forbidden things permitted.”13 While bin Laden‟s 
justification for intentionally killing non-combatants makes no argument for their practicality, he 
defends al-Qaeda‟s attacks against distant targets in the United States and other Western, anti-
Islamic powers as a necessary prerequisite to implementing Islamic reform in the Middle East 
due to the political and economic hegemony the United States exercises over local Islamic 
governments. Jurists, and more recently, politically active individuals, have developed 
unorthodox doctrines to legitimize violence generally considered illicit out of a need for a 
military strategy that could be both practical for the challenges at hand and theologically 
justifiable. 
Unprecedented circumstances prompted reinterpretation of religious sources to produce 
unprecedented theological doctrines. Modern phenomena such as the non-state actor have left 
Muslims with unanswered questions about complex scenarios unimagined by contemporaries of 
the Prophet or per-modern religious scholars of classical or medieval Islamic jurisprudence. 
While the Pope still serves as a source of religious authority for the world‟s Catholics, the 
Protestant Reformation undermined the previously established and respected structure of Church 
authority as each literate individual with a bible became a theologian. The Islamic Proto-
Reformation of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries affected the authority of the „ulama with similar 
consequences; literate Muslims, an expanding proportion of Muslim populations, assumed the 
right to practice of ijtihad previously reserved for the class of professional religious scholars. 
Such trends have led to the interpretation of shari‟a by Muslims in professions like journalism 
and construction, and the issuance of fatwas by such individuals that promote less theologically 
conservative doctrines of questionable legitimacy. Political discontent and nationalist grievances 
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gave birth to populist movements that adopted Islamist ideology as a means for attaining 
mobilizing power and religious legitimacy for armed uprisings.  
The circumstances created by the onset of modernity in the Islamic world created 
opportunities for redefinition and reapplication of shari‟a by individuals untrained in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Riley-Smith observes of al-Qaeda, “Globalization and migration has blurred the 
geographical boundaries between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb and has provided the 
jihadists with the opportunity, denied to their predecessors, to deliver long-range blows.”14 The 
strategic shift of al-Qaeda, promoted by bin Laden, to go on the offensive and conduct overseas 
attacks on the United States and its allies, Riley-Smith observes, partly stems from the realization 
that such operations were possible and even, in the minds of the militants, justifiable. The debate 
over defining the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb, distinctions critical to the application of jihad 
doctrine, has continued to divide Muslim scholars since European imperialism challenged the 
sovereignty of Islamic polities with colonial ventures. However, the theological legitimacy of 
declaring jihad or waging it by questionable methods depends not on  how politically effective 
acts of terrorism prove to be for al-Qaeda, rather, on its compatibility with the fundamental 
principles of Islamic doctrine. As seen in the case of Hamas, practicality itself became adopted 
as a doctrine of jihad jurisprudence to justify policy changes in both extremist and moderate 
directions. The erosion of authoritative structures of Islamic jurisprudence and a historical 
tendency to Islamicize secular or Western ideas allowed for Hamas to adopt flexible policies in 
light of difficult and challenging realities.
15
 
The complicating reality of interpreting shari‟a today is that the world lacks a variety of 
elements present during the time of the Prophet. For one, the Muslim umma was united under a 
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single political and religious authority engaged in military campaigns of political expansion. 
Debate continues today between fundamentalist and modernist interpretations of Islamic creed as 
to whether the context of the precedents for Islamic warfare should be considered in interpreting 
shari‟a or these doctrines are timeless imperatives appropriate for every circumstance. One of 
the biggest challenges to the legitimacy of historical military campaigns concerns the legitimacy 
of the authority declaring and waging war of jihad. The early sources and classical works of 
jurisprudence are clear; jihad may only be declared and waged by the imam, which in classical 
Islam was a role fulfilled by the caliph. The end of the fourth caliphate marked the end of 
Muslim unity, as contending parties argued as to who was the rightful heir to the caliphate. Al-
Ghazali‟s doctrine of sufficiency provided a legitimizing doctrine for jihad warfare in the 
absence of an imam. Supported by other medieval jurists like al-Sulami in the context of the 
Crusades and Ibn Taymiyya in response to Mongol invaders, this doctrine proposed that in the 
event that the army of volunteers waging jihad on behalf of the Muslim umma fails in its 
purpose, then fighting becomes an individual duty of every able-bodied Muslim. Muslims rulers 
put this theological doctrine into practice, as Saladin did to justify fighting defensive warfare 
against the Crusaders and anti-colonial resistance movements centuries later, setting the 
historical precedents militants now drawn upon in modern conflicts. 
Many modern movements of militant Islamism recognize the lack of a legitimate 
authority to declare jihad requires that such warfare be postponed until after the reinstatement of 
the caliphate. More radical approaches to religiously justify violence such as the Mahdism have 
failed to gain legitimacy. Mahdism‟s most infamous incarnation was the ideology behind the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 that led to the slaughter of fellow Muslims at the 
holiest site in Islam. Somewhere in between the strategies of postponing jihad until a caliph can 
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legitimate declare and lead it and the apocalyptic claims of extremist militants to be Mahdi, 
Hamas and al-Qaeda claim legitimate authority with invocation of the historical doctrine of jihad 
as an individual obligation in defense. While al-Qaeda‟s ideology interprets the doctrine to 
include wars of liberation as the defense of Islam or mankind, Hamas‟s restriction to defensive 
warfare against the immediate threat of Zionist territorial ambitions is much more reminiscent of 
the historical precedents. 
The doctrine of jihad as an individual duty in defense relies extensively on an argument 
that transcends religion. Al-Sulami argued that the invading franji and resulting suffering 
inflicted upon Muslims constituted an emergency situation in which the divine commandment to 
wage jihad became the obligation of every individual Muslim in lieu of an imam-authorized 
corps of volunteer warriors. This doctrine is an early example of theological justification for the 
idea that extreme or unprecedented circumstances can sometimes suspend the legal or ethical 
restrictions on warfare, applicable to jus ad bellum and jus in bello alike. The implications of this 
kind of attempt to legitimize unprecedented warfare tactics and strategies in modern campaigns 
of jihad are seen in different forms with Hamas and al-Qaeda. However, the idea of an 
emergency circumstance permitting a suspension of ethical standards in warfare also threatens to 
destroy the legitimacy of Western Just War theory. In his speech, Obama warned against this 
notion on grounds of maintaining standards of morality and legitimacy: 
“We have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even 
as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America 
must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those 
whom we fight . . . We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend 
. . . We honor those ideals by upholding them not when it‟s easy, but when it‟s hard.”16 
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While bin Laden justifies indiscriminate attacks of terrorism weakly with the law of reciprocity 
and sophistry, rich with historical allusion and rhetoric, Obama advocated a strategy of Just War 
for the strategic benefit of legitimacy gained by maintaining the moral high ground and the 
ideological benefit adhering to ethical doctrines and principles of justice in times of adversity. 
 The prominent characterization of holy wars as violent campaigns of indiscriminate hate 
unbridled by a sense of moral restraint more closely represents the sad truth of the human 
experience in wars waged in the name of God than the conceptual validity of fighting for a just 
cause with the conviction that such warfare is divinely willed. Yet the very criteria of modern 
Just War theory have religious roots in theologically ordained principles of Christian ethics, 
amended and revised over centuries. In reality, the growing acceptance of humanitarian 
inventions as a category of Just War reflects a sense of responsibility to attain justice not merely 
for oneself or nation through self-defense, but for mankind as a whole as a global enterprise of 
social justice. The religious imperatives that inspired the Crusades and militant Islamism share in 
this liberation ideology, though the legacy of the former and the radical manifestations of the 
latter have stained the concept of violence for a divine cause with the blood of countless innocent 
men, women, and children. While religion has played a role in rationales behind some of the 
world‟s most scarring tragedies, it has also proven to be a compelling force behind good-willed 
campaigns for justice and peace. The trajectory of Just War theory seems to be reconnecting with 
its Augustinian roots in the incorporation of liberation ideology and advocacy of military 
intervention for the transcendent purpose of justice.
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